The Continuing Expansive Pressure to Hold Employers Strictly Liable for Supervisory Sexual Extortion: An Alternative Approach Based on Reasonableness by Murr, Heather S.
Golden Gate University School of Law
GGU Law Digital Commons
Publications Faculty Scholarship
2-2006
The Continuing Expansive Pressure to Hold
Employers Strictly Liable for Supervisory Sexual
Extortion: An Alternative Approach Based on
Reasonableness
Heather S. Murr
Golden Gate University School of Law, hmurr@ggu.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/pubs
Part of the Civil Law Commons, and the Law and Gender Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at GGU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Publications by an authorized administrator of GGU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact jfischer@ggu.edu.
Recommended Citation
39 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 529 (2006)
The Continuing Expansive Pressure 
to Hold Employers Strictly Liable 
for Supervisory Sexual Extortion: 
An Alternative Approach Based 
on Reasonableness 
Heather S. Murr* 
Supervisory sexual extortion claims, where a supervisor extorts sex from a 
subordinate by threatening discharge or some other job detriment, do not fit 
neatly into the current employer liability framework for supervisory sexual 
harassment under Title VII. Prior to 1998, employers were strictly liable for 
such claims as they constituted quid pro quo sexual harassment. Since 1998, 
employer liability for supervisory sexual harassment has hinged upon the 
employer's official decision-making processes. An employer is strictly liable for 
supervisory sexual harassment only when the supervisor takes a tangible action, 
such as termination, that implicates the employer's official decision-making 
processes. In all other instances of supervisory sexual harassment, the employer 
may be vicariously liable but may defeat liability, or reduce damages, by 
asserting and proving a two-prong affirmative defense that considers the 
reasonableness of both the employer's and the subordinate's actions. In the 
supervisory sexual extortion context, certain courts have taken a realist effects-
based approach and have imposed strict liability for these classic quid pro quo 
claims based on the supervisor's abuse of official power in extorting sex. Other 
courts have taken a formalist approach and have concluded that, because the 
supervisor did not take the threatened official action, the employer's official 
decision-making processes were not implicated. Consequently, such courts have 
imposed vicarious but not strict liability. These same courts then apply the two-
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prong affirmative defense and often deny liability on the grounds that the 
employer acted reasonably because it took some, often minimal, steps to prevent 
the supervisor's abusive conduct and the subordinate acted unreasonably 
because she failed to avoid harm by not reporting but instead submitting to the 
supervisor's abusive conduct. 
This Article offers a normative framework for how the current employer 
liability standards should be applied to sexual extortion claims. It analyzes the 
realist-formalist dichotomy in the supervisory sexual extortion context and 
concludes that the formalist approach is more consistent with the current 
employer liability standards and related policy considerations. The Article then 
explains how certain courts have incorrectly applied the second prong of the 
affirmative defense and inappropriately denied liability by failing to consider the 
avoidable consequences doctrine and related harm-avoidance principles upon 
which the second prong is based. The Article concludes by offering a framework 
for how these harm-avoidance principles apply in the supervisory sexual 
extortion context specifically, and the supervisory sexual harassment context 
more generally, such that employers are held liable for supervisory sexual 
extortion and sexual harassment under circumstances where it is reasonable to 
impose liability. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Imagine a deaf-mute employee whose supervisor sexually harasses 
her and uses his authority to coerce her into performing numerous acts 
of oral sex on him. Her supervisor is the most senior manager at the 
facility during her shift. He is also the only person in the facility with 
whom she can communicate in sign language. The supervisor coerces 
the employee's submission to his sexual demands by tying her continued 
employment to her submission. Shortly before the harassment began, 
the employee and her husband purchased a family home, relying on her 
income to make the mortgage payments. Faced with the choice of either 
enduring her supervisor's abusive conduct or the prospect of losing her 
job and home if she reports his conduct or refuses his sexual demands, 
she submits. After enduring her supervisor's abuse for approximately 
six months, during which her home-life and marriage deteriorate, she 
musters the courage to report her supervisor's conduct to her employer.! 
Prior to 1998, a victim's employer was strictly liable for a supervisor's 
sexual extortion under Title VII because the supervisor's conduct 
constituted quid pro quo sexual harassment - "one of the most 
pernicious and oppressive forms of sexual harassment that can occur in 
the workplace.,,2 Unlike a hostile work environment sexual harassment 
claim, which involves "bothersome attentions or sexual remarks that are 
sufficiently severe or pervasive to create a hostile work environment,,,3 a 
supervisory sexual extortion claim represents a classic quid pro quo, 
where the supervisor "explicitly or implicitly condition[s] a job, a job 
benefit, or the absence of a job detriment, upon an employee's acceptance 
of sexual conduct.,,4 In supervisory sexual extortion cases, power is the 
fundamental prerequisite for a supervisor's ability to extort sex through 
compelled submission to unwelcome sexual advances.5 This same 
1 These facts are essential1y those found in Nichols v. Frank, 42 F.3d 503 (9th Cir. 1994). 
See infra text accompanying note 55. 
2 Jin v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 310 F.3d 84, 94 (2d Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 52 
(2004) ("The most oppressive and invidious type of workplace sexual harassment is quid 
pro quo sex. . .. Most workers subjected to sexual pressure in the workplace have little 
means of defense - other than the law. For economic reasons, most workers cannot 
simply abandon their employment - new jobs are hard to find"); Nichols, 42 F.3d at 510. 
3 Burlington Indus., Inc. v. El1erth, 524 U.S. 742, 751 (1998). 
4 Heyne v. Caruso, 69 F.3d 1475, 1478 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Nichols, 42 F.3d at 511). 
5 See Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 76-77 (1986) (Marshall, J., 
concurring) ("[Ilt is the authority vested in the supervisor by the employer that enables him 
to commit the wrong: it is precisely because the supervisor is understood to be clothed 
with the employer's authority that he is able to impose unwelcome sexual conduct on 
subordinates."); Jansen v. Packaging Corp. of Am., 123 F.3d 490, 504 (7th Cir. 1997) (en 
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power enables the supervisor to carry out his threats if the subordinate 
does not engage in the demanded sexual acts. The source of the 
perpetrating supervisor's power is a general grant of authority from the 
employer to make employment decisions, such as termination and 
promotion, regarding employees under his control. Because this grant of 
authority makes the supervisor's sexual extortion possible in the first 
instance, federal courts traditionally held employers strictly liable for a 
supervisor's quid pro quo harassment of a subordinate.6 That is no 
longer the case. 
The strict liability tide changed in 1998 when the Supreme Court 
issued its opinions in two companion cases, Burlington Industries, Inc. v. 
Ellerth7 and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton.8 While both cases addressed an 
employer's vicarious liability for supervisory sexual harassment, only 
Ellerth involved a quid pro quo claim, whereas Faragher involved a 
hostile work environment claim. 
In Ellerth, the Court acknowledged that the quid pro quo label had 
become synonymous with strict liability, which in turn placed expansive 
pressure on the label as plaintiffs sought to plead their claims as quid 
pro quo.9 This expansive pressure highlighted the need for a "uniform 
and predictable standard" for employer vicarious liability for quid pro 
quo claims. lO Similarly, the hostile work environment claim in Faragher 
highlighted the need for a clear standard regarding the scope of an 
employer's vicarious liability for such claims. 
To resolve the employer vicarious liability issues presented in Ellerth 
and Faragher, the Court relied on traditional agency principles and 
adopted a formalist approach. Instead of imposing strict liability based 
on the label affixed to the harassment claim involved or based on the 
supervisor's unique ability to sexually harass subordinates, the Court's 
formalist approach focused on the employer's official decision-making 
banc) (per curiam) (Cudahy, J., concurring) ("Quid pro quo is always a creature of power. It 
is the classic paradigm of powerful males forcing their will on vulnerable females."), affd 
sub nom. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742; see also Kathryn Abrams, The New Jurisprudence of Sexual 
Harassment, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1169, 1172 (1998) (placing "women's subordination at the 
center of the sexual harassment analysis," and arguing that sexual harassment is 
"phenomenon that serves to preserve male control and entrench masculine norms in the 
workplace"). 
6 As discussed in Part I.B.2 infra, the relevant question was whether the alleged 
conduct was within the quid pro quo definition, and definitions varied among the circuits. 
7 524 U.s. 742 (1998). 
8 524 U.S. 775 (1998). 
9 Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 753. 
10 [d. at 754. 
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processes. l1 Under this approach, the Court held that an employer is 
strictly liable for a supervisor's sexual harassment of a subordinate, 
regardless of whether the claim is labeled as quid pro quo or hostile 
work environment, when the "supervisor's harassment culminates in a 
tangible employment action, such as discharge, demotion, or undesirable 
reassignment. ,,12 
In contrast, where severe or pervasive harassment exists, but where 
the supervisor does not take a tangible employment action against the 
subordinate, the Court in Ellerth and Faragher held that the employer is 
vicariously liable but may assert and prove a two-prong affirmative 
defense to liability or damages.13 The first prong of the affirmative 
defense is based on negligence principles and requires the employer to 
prove that it "exercised reasonable care to prevent and promptly correct 
any sexually harassing behavior.,,14 The second prong of the affirmative 
defense incorporates avoidable consequences principles associated with 
mitigation of damages. IS This prong requires the employer to prove that 
the "plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any 
preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to 
avoid harm otherwise.,,16 
Since the Ellerth and Faragher opinions in 1998, federal courts have 
grappled with the question of what constitutes a tangible employment 
action.17 The Court provided some guidance when it explained that "[a] 
tangible employment action constitutes a significant change in 
employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, 
reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision 
11 See Martha Chamallas, Title VII's Midlife Crisis: The Case of Constructive Discharge, 77 
S. CAL. 1. REv. 307, 347-48 (2004). Professor Chamallas discussed the formalist and realist 
approaches to employer liability for supervisory sexual harassment in the constructive 
discharge context. ld. She explained that a formalist approach focuses on the employer's 
"formal decisions and policies" and considers whether there has been any disparate 
treatment on unlawful grounds regarding the employer's official "decisionmaking 
process." ld. A realist approach "capture[s] more subtle or hidden forms of 
discrimination" as it focuses on the "actual effects of employer behavior (whether formal or 
informal) on employees and tak[es] into account the perspectives of the targets of behavior, 
as well as those who represent the enterprise." ld. at 348. 
12 Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807-08; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765. 
13 See cases cited supra note 12. 
14 See cases cited supra note 12. 
15 See cases cited supra note 12. 
\6 See cases cited supra note 12. 
17 As discussed in Part V infra, the courts have had similar difficulties in correctly 
applying the affirmative defense and, in particular, the second prong. 
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causing a significant change in benefits."ls This list, however, was 
merely illustrative and provided little guidance for more complex cases. 
Given the Court's lack of guidance and the promise of strict liability 
associated with tangible employment actions, the tangible employment 
action label has experienced the same expansive pressure as the quid pro 
quo label prior to Ellerth and Faragher. 19 
Ellerth and Faragher left unresolved the question of whether the 
tangible employment action standard encompasses either of the related 
claims of constructive discharge and supervisory sexual extortion. In the 
constructive discharge scenario, the subordinate resigns in response to 
objectively intolerable working conditions created by the supervisor's 
sexual harassment. In the supervisory sexual extortion scenario, the 
subordinate submits to the supervisor's unwelcome sexual demands in 
response to the supervisor's threats of tangible job detriment if the 
subordinate refuses. Although the claims differ in certain respects, they 
are largely analogous in the context of the tangible employment action 
analysis because, in both cases, the subordinate responds to the 
supervisor's sexual harassment by taking the action - quitting or 
submitting - that brings about the resulting harm.20 As might be 
expected, federal courts have reached varying conclusions regarding 
whether and under what circumstances a claim of either constructive 
discharge or supervisory sexual extortion constitutes a tangible 
employment action for which an employer is strictly liable.21 
In Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders,22 the Court determined that an 
employer's strict liability for a constructive discharge resulting from 
18 Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.s. 742, 761 (1998). 
19 See infra Part III. 
20 See Chamallas, supra note 11, at 344 (analogizing constructive discharge cases to 
forced submission cases because in both cases "the employer makes an illegal demand and 
renders it impossible for the plaintiff to stay on the job on her own terms" and "in each 
situation the employee capitulates by behaving the way the supervisor wants her to 
behave"); see also infra note 218 and accompanying text (discussing how Third Circuit in 
Suders analogized constructive discharge claims to sexual extortion claims). 
21 For a discussion of the varied approaches taken by federal courts regarding 
constructive discharge and whether it constitutes a tangible employment action, see 
Chamallas, supra note 11, at 328-36. In her article, Professor Chamallas noted that some 
courts took a "formalist approach," which focused on "characterization of the constructive 
discharge claim that purports to fit all cases, regardless of the facts," while others took a 
"realist approach" focused on the "actual effects" of the constructive discharge suffered by 
the plaintiff. Id. at 328-34. Still, others took a "middle-ground" approach by "classifying 
some, but not all constructive discharges as tangible employment actions." Id. The 
formalist-realist dichotomy applies equally in the analogous supervisory sexual extortion 
context. See infra Part III. 
22 542 U.s. 129 (2004). 
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supervisory sexual harassment turns on whether an "official act of the 
enterprise" precipitated the plaintiff's resignation.23 In reaching this 
conclusion, the Court rejected a realist approach, which would impose 
strict liability on employers for all constructive discharges resulting from 
a supervisor's creation of objectively intolerable working conditions.24 
Rather, as in Ellerth and Faragher, the Court took a formalist approach 
and held that, even when the constructive discharge is the result of 
objectively intolerable working conditions brought about solely, and 
perhaps intentionally, by supervisory sexual harassment, the 
constructive discharge constitutes a tangible employment action only 
when the plaintiff resigns in "reasonable response to an employer-
sanctioned adverse action officially changing her employment status or 
si tua tion.,,25 
The Court, however, has not yet spoken directly regarding whether a 
subordinate's submission to a supervisor's sexual demands constitutes a 
tangible employment action for which an employer is strictly liable.26 In 
the absence of guidance on this issue, federal courts have reached 
conflicting conclusions. The Second27 and Ninth Circuits,28 the only two 
23 Id. at 2355 (citing Ellerth, 524 U.s. at 762). 
24 Id. at 2355-56. 
25 Id. at 2347. 
26 See, e.g., Joanna L. Grossman, The First Bite is Free: Employer Liability for Sexual 
Harassment, 61 U. PIn. L. REV. 671, 681-83 (2000). Professor Grossman stated that it is 
unclear following Ellerth whether submission cases constitute tangible employment action 
cases for which employers are strictly liable. Id. She noted that the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (the "EEOC") guidelines regarding tangible employment actions 
do not address situations where an employee submits to a supervisor's sexual demands to 
avoid the threatened harm. Id. Professor Grossman contended that "[i]t is, of course, 
anomalous to refuse to recognize that submission to a supervisor's sexual extortion is itself 
an alteration in the terms and conditions of employment. It also strains the holding in 
Ellerth, contradicts the principles behind it, and undermines Title VII's goals of deterrence 
and compensation." Id. at 732. But see Chamallas, supra note 11, at 344-46 (noting that after 
Ellerth and Faragher, it is unclear how submission cases will be classified). Professor 
Chamallas stated: 
[The] difficulty in developing a compelling rationale to retain vicarious liability 
in submission cases after Ellerth/Faragher is not surprising [as] [ilt flows from 
the problem of carving out some types of sexual harassment and treating them 
like disparate treatment cases, while relegating the rest of the sexual harassment 
cases to the category of hostile environment, even though both types of cases 
involve behavior on the part of a supervisor that is not qualitatively different in 
terms of its severity or its structure. 
Chamallas, supra note 11, at 344-46; see also infra text accompanying notes 328-32. 
27 Jin v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 310 F.3d 84, 87 (2d Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 52 
(2004); see infra Part III. A. 1 (discussing Second Circuit's opinion in lin). 
Z8 Holly D. v. Cal. Inst. of Tech., 339 F.3d 1158, 1162 (9th Cir. 2003); see infra Part III.A.1 
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courts of appeals to publish opinions on the issue,29 answered the 
question in the affirmative. Two district courts in the Eleventh Circuit 
concluded otherwise.30 
As in the constructive discharge context, the conflicting conclusions 
tum on whether the reviewing court employed a formalist or realist 
approach to supervisory sexual extortion. The Second and Ninth Circuit 
adopted a realist approach focused on the supervisor's use of official 
power and the actual effects of supervisory sexual extortion.3! In doing 
so, both courts concluded that a subordinate suffers a tangible 
employment action when her supervisor coerces her into performing 
unwanted sex acts through threats of discharge.32 In contrast, the district 
courts in the Eleventh Circuit adopted a formalist approach to resolve 
the supervisory sexual extortion question. These courts focused on the 
employer's official decision-making processes. Under this formalist 
approach, these courts concluded that supervisory sexual extortion 
claims do not constitute tangible employment actions because, in the 
absence of the requisite official action by the employer, such claims are 
simply aggravated hostile work environment claims to which the 
Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense applies.33 
Based on the often egregious facts presented in supervisory sexual 
extortion cases, the realist approach taken by the Second and Ninth 
Circuits seems just. This is particularly true considering that, in the 
absence of a tangible employment action, the only alternative available 
to a sexual extortion victim following Ellerth and Faragher is to 
demonstrate an actionable hostile work environment and hope that the 
employer is unable to satisfy both prongs of the affirmative defense. 
(discussing Ninth Circuit's opinion in Holly D.). 
29 In its unpublished opinion in Hetreed v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 00-1787, 2001 WL 
427785, at *1 (7th Cir. Apr. 12,2001); the Seventh Circuit reached the opposite conclusion 
from the Second and Ninth Circuits. See infra text accompanying note 208. For additional 
cases discussing, but not resolving the question of whether supervisory sexual extortion 
constitutes a tangible employment action, see infra text accompanying notes 187, 208. 
JO Speaks v. City of Lakeland, 315 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1227 (M.D. Fla. 2004); Sarnedi v. 
Miami-Dade County, 206 F. Supp. 2d 1213, 1223 (S.D. Fla. 2002); see infra Part I1I.A.2 
(discussing district court's opinion in Speaks). 
31 Chamallas, supra note 11, at 345 (noting Second Circuit's realist approach to 
submission cases) .. 
32 Holly D., 339 F.3d at 1162; Tin, 310 F.3d at 99. 
33 Speaks, 315 F. Supp. 2d at 1226; Samedi, 206 F. Supp. 2d at 1219 (holding without 
analYSis that plaintiff did not allege tangible employment action based on her allegations 
that she submitted to unwelcome sexual intercourse and other sex acts with her superiors 
because they threatened her with termination if she did not do so, and concluding that 
such facts constitute severe hostile environment claim to which Ellerth/Faragher affirmative 
defense applies). 
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Given the documented pro-employer trend in granting summary 
judgment on the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense, and the courts' 
rather cursory and often incorrect analysis of the two prongs, it is highly 
unlikely that an employer will fail in its efforts to successfully assert the 
affirmative defense.34 In light of this trend, it is understandable why 
harassment victims are pleading, and certain courts are construing, 
supervisory sexual extortion cases as tangible employment actions in an 
effort to hold employers strictly liable for such conduct. 
Notwithstanding the appeal of holding employers strictly liable for 
supervisory sexual extortion, imposing strict liability in such cases does 
not comport with the Court's formalist tangible employment action 
approach in Ellerth and Faragher. This formalist approach and the related 
policy considerations in the analogous constructive discharge context 
further bolster this conclusion. 
The purpose of this Article is two-fold. First, the Article explains why 
imposing strict liability in supervisory sexual extortion cases is 
inconsistent with both the Court's jurisprudence regarding tangible 
employment actions in Ellerth, Faragher, and Suders, as well as 
congressional intent regarding Title VII's goals of preventing and 
deterring harassment. Second, the Article proposes a normative 
framework to govern the application of the second prong of the 
Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense in the context of sexual extortion 
cases. Under the proposed framework, employers will be liable for 
supervisory sexual extortion specifically, and supervisory sexual 
harassment more generally, under circumstances where it was not 
unreasonable for the employee to submit to the supervisor's abusive 
conduct. 
Part I of this Article details the historical progression of the law 
regarding supervisory sexual harassment and the development of 
standards for vicarious employer liability in quid pro quo cases. It also 
explains the pressure placed on courts to expand the definition of "quid 
pro quo" in an effort to hold employers strictly liable for supervisory 
sexual harassment. Part II then discusses the paradigm shift from strict 
liability in quid pro quo sexual harassment cases to the new formalist 
approach under Ellerth and Faragher, which distinguishes between 
tangible employment action cases, for which an employer is strictly 
liable, and all other cases, to which negligence and avoidable 
consequences principles apply. Part III addresses the lower courts' 
34 See infra Part V (discussing courts' application of second prong of affirmative 
defense). 
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application of Ellerth and Faragher to supervisory sexual extortion claims. 
It also discusses the Court's June 2004 opinion in Suders, in which the 
Court applied Ellerth and Faragher to constructive discharge claims 
resulting from supervisory sexual harassment. Part III then explains 
how Suders provides guidance in the analogous supervisory sexual 
extortion context. Part IV applies the tangible employment action 
analysis to supervisory sexual extortion cases and explains how the 
realist approach misinterprets and misapplies the tangible employment 
action standard. 
Part V proposes a normative framework to govern the application of 
the second prong of the EllerthlFaragher affirmative defense, which 
focuses on avoidable consequences principles in determining whether 
the subordinate acted unreasonably. Part V then explains how the 
second prong of the defense should apply in supervisory sexual 
extortion cases specifically, and supervisory sexual harassment cases 
more generally. Finally, Part V delineates factors that courts and fact-
finders should consider in assessing whether supervisory sexual 
extortion and sexual harassment victims unreasonably failed to report or 
avoid harm. 
I. EVOLUTION OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT JURISPRUDENCE 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (the" Act") provides that it 
"shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer ... to 
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, 
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such 
individual's ... sex.,,35 Yet, the Supreme Court did not address the 
question of whether sexual harassment constitutes an unlawful form of 
sex discrimination under the Act until 1986. 36 In Meritor Savings Bank, 
FSB v. Vinson, the Court concluded that it does. 
A. Sexual Harassment as a Form of Sex Discrimination 
In Meritor, the Court held that sexual harassment constitutes a form of 
sex discrimination when the harassment is "because of the subordinate's 
sex.,,37 In defining "sexual harassment," the Court deferred to the 
Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex (the "Guidelines") issued 
35 42 u.s.c. § 2000e-2 (2005). 
36 Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.s. 57, 59 (1986). 
37 [d. at 64 (quoting L.A. Oep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.s. 702, 707 n.13 
(1978». 
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by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the "EEOC,,).38 
The Guidelines define "sexual harassment" as conduct including 
"[u]nwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other 
verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature.,,39 Moreover, the Court 
embraced the distinction made by the EEOC and lower courts between 
quid pro quo and hostile work environment sexual harassment claims.40 
With respect to the standard of employer liability for supervisory 
sexual harassment, the Court in Meritor was less clear. The Court 
rejected the negligence approach taken by the district court, as well as 
the strict liability approach taken by the D.C. Circuit.41 Instead, the 
Court agreed with the EEOC's position that agency principles should 
govern employer liability in the supervisory sexual harassment context.42 
Nevertheless, based on the "abstract" state of the factual record 
regarding employer liability, the Court declined to issue a definitive 
employer liability standard.43 Instead, the Court stated that "Congress 
wanted courts to look to agency principles for guidance in this area." 44 
The Court explained that the language of Title VII evinced "Congress'[s] 
. . . intent to place some limits on the acts of emplolees for which 
employers under Title VII are to be held responsible.,,4 Based on the 
applicable agency principles, the Court concluded that "employers are 
[not] always automatically liable for sexual harassment by their 
supervisors" and an "absence of notice to an employer does not 
38 [d. at 65. The EEOC is the administrative agency charged with enforcing the Act and 
promulgating the procedural regulations and guidelines thereunder. See Griggs v. Duke 
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971) (noting that EEOC is agency responsible for 
enforcement of Title VII, and further noting that EEOC's interpretation of Title VII is 
entitled to deference). 
39 Meritor, 477 U.s. at 65. The Court acknowledged that although the EEOC's 
interpretation of the Act was not controlling upon the federal courts, the Guidelines 
"constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may 
properly resort for guidance." [d. (citations omitted). 
40 [d. The EEOC Guidelines define "quid pro quo sexual harassment" as: 
Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or 
physical conduct of a sexual nature ... when (1) submission to such conduct is 
made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an individuars 
employment, [or] (2) submission to or rejection of such conduct by an individual 
is used as the basis for employment decisions affecting such individual .... 
29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(1)-(2) (2004). 
41 Meritor, 477 U.s. at 72. 
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necessarily insulate that employer from liability.,,46 Not surprisingly, the 
failure to establish a definitive rule, and the lack of guidance as to 
whether liability depended on the category of harassment, led to 
confusion among lower courts regarding the applicable employer 
liability standard for supervisor harassment. 
B. Employer Liability for Supervisory Sexual Harassment 
Following Meritor, lower courts turned to the agency principles set 
forth in the Restatement (Second) of Agency (the "Restatement of 
Agency") to fashion employer liability standards for supervisory sexual 
harassment claims. The resulting liability standards varied depending 
on whether the claim was labeled as either hostile work environment or 
quid pro quo. 
1. Hostile Work Environment 
In the hostile work environment context, federal courts attempted to 
grapple with the agency principles set forth in section 219 of the 
Restatement of Agency. As a result, they adopted varied and often 
conflicting approaches to employer liability for supervisor harassment.47 
For example, many courts required that the plaintiff demonstrate both 
vicarious and direct liability for the supervisor's harassment, even 
though agency principles dictated that either of the two was sufficient to 
impose liability on an employer for injuries suffered by its employees.48 
Consequently, courts often required plaintiffs to demonstrate the 
employer's vicarious liability by proving that the supervisor either acted 
46 ld. In Justice Marshall's concurring opinion, in which Justices Brennan, Blackrnun, 
and Stevens joined, Justice Marshall concluded that the employer liability issue was 
properly before the Court and stated that he would adopt the rule historically followed by 
courts and the EEOC. ld. The rule states that an employer is strictly liable for a supervisor 
or agent who violates Title VII regardless of whether the employer knew or should have 
known of the unlawful conduct or "any other mitigating factor.'" ld. at 75 (citing 45 Fed. 
Reg. 74,676 (Nov. 10, 1980». The focus of Justice Marshall's argument was that the 
supervisor's power in the workplace enables him to commit the violation, regardless of 
whether the violation results in tangible job detriment or an abusive or hostile working 
environment. ld. at 76-77; see infra Part 1V.A.1 (explaining that Second Circuit has 
essentially followed this reasoning and concluded that employee who submits to 
supervisor's sexual extortion demands has suffered tangible employment action because 
supervisor abuses his power in coercing employee's submission). 
" See, e.g., David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Exacerbating the Exasperating: Title VII 
Liability of Employers for Sexual Harassment Committed by Their Supervisors, 81 CORNELL L. 
REv. 66, 131-40 (1995) (discussing and critiquing various pre-Ellerth/Faragher approaches to 
employer liability for supervisory sexual harassment based on agency principles). 
" ld. at 131-36. 
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within the scope of his employment or misused his authority when he 
engaged in the sexual harassment. 49 These courts also required plaintiffs 
to further demonstrate the employer's direct liability by proving that the 
employer was either negligent or reckless in failing to prevent or 
respond to the sexual harassment.50 As a result of these varied 
approaches, the state of the law regarding employer liability for a hostile 
work environment created by a supervisor's conduct was uncertain. 
2. Quid Pro Quo 
The quid pro quo label suffered from a different lack of certainty. 
Because the quid pro quo label was synonymous with strict liability,S! 
plaintiffs creatively pleaded sexual harassment claims as quid pro quo 
claims, which resulted in pressure to expand the definition of "quid pro 
quO.',S2 In tum, this expansive pressure led to varied definitions of "quid 
49 Id.; see also id. at 136-40 (discussing courts' other varied approaches to employer 
liability based on agency principles). 
50 Id. 
51 See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.s. 742, 753 (1998) ("If the plaintiff 
established a quid pro quo claim, the Courts of Appeal held, the employer was subject to 
vicarious liability."); see also Meritor, 477 U.s. at 76 (Marshall, J., concurring) ("[Elvery Court 
of Appeals that has considered the issue has held that sexual harassment by supervisory 
personnel is automatically imputed to the employer when the harassment results in 
tangible job detriment to the subordinate employee."). 
" In Ellerth, the Court acknowledged the incentive for plaintiffs to state their claims as 
quid pro quo claims due to the equivalence of the quid pro quo label with vicarious 
liability. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 753. For a detailed discussion regarding the tortured evolution 
of quid pro quo sexual harassment and the elements of the claim prior to the Court's 
opinions in Ellerth and Faragher, see Eugene Scalia, The Strange Career of Quid Pro Quo Sexual 
Harassment, 21 HARV. J.1. & PUB. POL'y 307 (1998). In his article, Scalia traced the history of 
qUid pro quo sexual harassment and concluded that that the quid pro quo label is 
"functionally meaningless," "analytically useless and cumbersome," and "should be 
eliminated as a functional category of discrimination." Id. at 308. Scalia argued, consistent 
with the position advanced in this Article, that discrimination on the basis of sex should fall 
into one of two categories: first, disparate treatment, where an employee suffers an 
"adverse job action" on a discriminatory basis, including cases where the employee suffers 
an adverse job action for refusing her supervisor's advances; and second, harassment, 
including hostile work environment cases, submission cases where an employee submits to 
a supervisor's unwelcome sexual demands and thus avoids any adverse job action, and 
unfulfilled threat cases where the supervisor makes unwelcome sexual demands and 
threatens the employee with adverse job action, but the employee refuses and the 
supervisor does not follow through on the threat. Id. at 308-19. In the context of these two 
categories, Scalia concluded that a submission case is not actionable as an adverse job 
action case but should instead be evaluated as a hostile environment claim. Id. at 312, 316. 
As discussed in Part II infra, the Court implicitly adopted Scalia's approach in Ellerth 
and Faragher when it distinguished between tangible employment action claims, for which 
employers are strictly liable, and all other hostile environment sexual harassment claims, 
for which an employer is vicariously liable but may assert and prove the two-prong 
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pro quo" among the circuits. 53 
In its most restrictive form, the quid pro quo definition included only 
those circumstances in which the employee suffered some form of 
tangible job detriment, such as termination, in retaliation for refusing to 
submit to a supervisor's unwelcome sexual advances.54 This Article 
refers to these circumstances as "fulfilled threat" cases. In its more 
expansive form, the quid pro quo definition also included circumstances 
in which the employee submitted to the supervisor's unwelcome sexual 
advances and thereby avoided the threatened reprisals.55 This Article 
refers to such scenarios as "submission" cases. 56 The policy behind 
including submission cases in the quid pro quo definition and holding 
employers strictly liable for such conduct is to avoid punishing plaintiffs 
affirmative defense. Moreover, as discussed in Part IV.A.1 infra, the tangible employment 
action standard incorporates the "adverse" component of adverse job action. Ironically, 
although the Court intended the tangible employment action standard to resolve the 
expansive pressure experienced by the quid pro quo label for purposes of imposing strict 
liability, the tangible employment action standard is experiencing the same expansive 
pressure (for the same reasons). The question now is whether successful supervisory 
sexual extortion constitutes a tangible employment action for which an employer is strictly 
liable. See infra Part IV (discussing whether submission case constitutes tangible 
employment action for which employer is strictly liable). 
53 See Jansen v. Packaging Corp. of Am., 123 F.3d 490, 499 (7th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (per 
curiam) ("Defining an actionable quid pro quo, of course, is central to the liability 
standard."), affd sub nom. Ellerth, 524 U.s. 742 .. 
54 See, e.g., Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 910 (11th Cir. 1982) (holding that 
plaintiff had viable quid pro quo claim because she suffered tangible job detriment, in form 
of unfair suspension, based on her refusal to acquiesce to her supervisor's repeated 
demands that she engage in sex with him); cf Gary v. Long, 59 F.3d 1391, 1396 (D.C. Cir. 
1995) (holding that plaintiff who endured her supervisor's sexual advances, groping, and 
rape as result of her supervisor's threats of adverse job consequences if she did not submit 
to such conduct was unable to allege viable quid pro quo claim because she did not suffer 
requisite tangible job detriment as supervisor never carried out any of his threats). 
55 See, e.g., Nichols v. Frank, 42 F.3d 503, 514 (9th Cir. 1994) (stating that employer is 
always strictly liable for supervisor's quid pro quo sexual harassment because supervisor's 
use of his "actual or apparent authority" gives rise to respondeat superior liability, and 
concluding that plaintiff had established prima facie case of quid pro quo sexual 
harassment based on allegations that her supervisor coerced her into submitting to his 
unwelcome sexual advances and performing numerous acts of oral sex on him by tying her 
continued employment and receipt of job-related benefits, such as appropriate performance 
reviews and leave time, to her submission to his sexual demands); Karibian v. Columbia 
Univ., 14 F.3d 773, 776, 778 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that pertinent inquiry in quid pro quo 
case is "whether the supervisor has linked tangible job benefits to the [plaintiff's] 
acceptance or rejection of sexual advances," and not whether employee can show economic 
or other tangible job detriment, and thus concluding that plaintiff alleged viable quid pro 
quo claim where her supervisor coerced her into having "violent sexual relationship" with 
him by tying conditions of her employment to her acquiescence to his sexual demands). 
,. See, e.g., Nichols, 42 F.3d at 514 (describing facts of case which exemplify submission 
case); Karibian, 14 F.3d at 776-78. 
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who lacked the capacity to resist their supervisor's threats of job 
detriment and risk incurring economic harm.57 
Finally, the most expansive, and ultimately the most controversial 
definition of "quid pro quo" sexual harassment, included not only 
fulfilled threat and submission cases, but also those cases in which the 
supervisor threatened job detriment if the subordinate did not submit to 
the supervisor's sexual demands and yet the threat remained unfulfilled 
even though the subordinate refused to submit.58 This Article refers to 
these cases as "unfulfilled threat" cases. 
The policy behind including unfulfilled threats in the quid pro quo 
definition and holding employers strictly liable for such conduct was 
articulated in Jansen v. Packaging Corporation of America.59 In Jansen, the 
Seventh Circuit recognized that "[e]mployees who have the wherewithal 
to call the supervisor's 'bluff' and suffer emotionally as a consequence 
should not have to go uncompensated, nor should a 'bluff' so likely to 
cause harm go unrecognized by the law.,,60 The extension of the quid 
pro quo definition to the unfulfilled threat circumstances in Jansen would 
later serve as a catalyst for the creation of the new framework in 
Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth61 and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton62 for 
addressing supervisory sexual harassment claims. 
C. Expansion of Quid Pro Quo as a Catalyst for Change 
In Jansen, the Seventh Circuit en banc held in a sharply divided 
opinion that an employer is strictly liable for quid pro quo harassment 
"even if the supervisor's threat does not result in a company act," such 
as termination.63 Jansen involved two plaintiffs, Alice Jansen and 
Kimberly Ellerth, who alleged quid pro quo claims against their 
respective employers.64 Because both cases involved an employer's 
liability for quid pro quo harassment and both were reargued en bane on 
57 Karibian, 14 F.3d at 778. 
.. Jansen, 123 F.3d at 500; see also Robinson v. City of PittSburgh, 120 F.3d 1286, 1297 (3d 
Cir. 1997) (holding that quid pro quo violation occurs when supervisor either (1) explicitly 
or implicitly conditions term, condition, or privilege of employment on employee's 
response to supervisor's unwelcome sexual advances, regardless of whether employee 
submits or whether threats are carried out, or (2) makes decisions regarding employee'S 
compensation, etc., based on employee'S response to unwelcome sexual advances). 
59 123 F.3d 490 (7th Cir. 1997). 
60 [d. at 500. 
61 524 U.s. 742 (1998). 
62 524 U.s. 775 (1998). 
6' Jansen, 123 F.3d at 495. 
64 [d. at 492. 
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the same day, the Seventh Circuit consolidated the cases for decision.65 
Alice Jansen claimed that her supervisor engaged in quid pro quo 
harassment when he conditioned certain terms, conditions, and 
privileges of her employment on her submission to his unwelcome 
sexual advances.66 Jansen alleged that her supervisor intimated that he 
would withhold her raise if she refused to submit to his sexual 
advances.67 Additionally, Jansen alleged that her supervisor said, "I 
haven't forgotten your [performance] review, it's on my desk," while at 
the same time patting his crotch.68 Based on these allegations, the 
Seventh Circuit concluded that the supervisor implicitly conditioned a 
favorable performance review, and thus a raise, on the plaintiff's 
submission to his sexual advances.69 Accordingly, the court held that 
Jansen demonstrated a triable issue of fact regarding whether the threat 
alone constituted quid pro quo harassment.7o 
Similarly, Kimberly Ellerth claimed that her supervisor's supervisor 
subjected her to unwelcome sexual advances over a year-long period. 
She claimed this supervisor implicitly threatened that her employment 
with the company would not progress unless she submitted to his 
advances.71 Ellerth alleged that this supervisor once ogled her and 
threatened, "[Y]ou know, Kim, I could make your life [with the 
company] very hard or very easy."n On a subsequent occasion, when 
Ellerth requested permission to undertake a special project, the same 
supervisor said, "I don't have time for you right now, ... unless you tell 
me what you're wearing.,,73 On yet another occasion, the supervisor 
denied her request to undertake a special project and then asked her if 
she would start wearing shorter skirts because "that would make her job 
'a whole heck of a lot easier.",74 Finally, during an interview for Ellerth's 
promotion, the same supervisor rubbed her knee and said he had 
reservations about promoting her because she was not "loose enough for 
him. ,,75 Notwithstanding these implicit threats and Ellerth's refusal to 
.5 ld . 
.. ld. at 493 . 
• 7 ld. Although Jansen's supervisor initially withheld her raise because she rebuffed 
his advances, Jansen ultimately received her raise, and it was made retroactive. ld . 
.. ld. at 503. 
69 ld. 
70 ld. at 495. 
7I ld. at 493. 
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engage in the demanded sexual activity, Ellerth subsequently received a 
• 76 
promotion. 
Although Ellerth's supervisor's threats remained unfulfilled, the 
Seventh Circuit found that a reasonable jury could conclude that these 
unfulfilled threats "condition[ed] or threaten[ed] to base the 'terms and 
conditions' of Ellerth's employment on [her] catering to [the alleged 
harasser's] sexual desires.,,77 The court concluded that Ellerth 
demonstrated a triable issue of fact regarding whether she was subjected 
to quid pro ~uo sexual harassment for which her employer would be 
strictly liable. S Although the Supreme Court granted certiorari and 
affirmed the Seventh Circuit's judgment, it affirmed on very different 
grounds. 
II. EMPLOYER LIABILITY FOR SUPERVISORY SEXUAL HARASSMENT UNDER 
ELLERTH AND FARAGHER 
When the Supreme Court issued its companion decisions in Burlington 
Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth79 and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton,SO the quid pro 
76 ld. at n.13. Ellerth ultimately quit her employment as a result of her supervisor's 
harassment. Ellerth v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 912 F. Supp. 1101, 1109 (N.D. Ill. 1996), rev'd, 
102 F.3d 848 (7th Cir. 1996), affd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Jansen, 123 F.3d 490, affd sub 
nom. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.s. 742 (1998). She subsequently filed an action 
against her employer alleging that she had been sexually harassed and subjected to a 
hostile work environment in violation of Title VII and that the harassment resulted in her 
constructive discharge. Ellerth, 912 F. Supp. at 1105; see infra Part I1I.S (discussing Court's 
opinion in Suders, in which Court addressed whether constructive discharge constitutes 
tangible employment action). 
n Jansen, 123 F.3d at 503. 
" ld. A minority of the en banc panel in Jansen, including Chief Judge Posner and 
Judges Manion and Kanne, concluded that an "adverse job consequence" or "company act" 
was necessary to impose strict liability on an employer for quid pro quo sexual harassment. 
ld. at 499,505,513-15,559-60. Thus, under this approach, strict liability should be imposed 
only in what this Article refers to as "fulfilled threat" cases - circumstances where the 
employee rebuffs the supervisor's advances and the supervisor then retaliates and "fires 
her, or denies her a promotion, or blocks a scheduled raise, or demotes her, or transfers her 
to a less desirable job location, or refuses to give her the training that the company's rules 
entitle her to receive." ld. at 512. In doing so, the supervisor is using the authority 
delegated to him by the employer to take a "company act." ld. Under this approach, strict 
liability should not be imposed under circumstances lacking a "company act," such as 
where the employee submits to the sexual extortion threats, the supervisor was merely 
"bluff[ing]," or the employee reports the harassment before the supervisor can effectuate 
the quid pro quo threat. ld. at 499. See infra Part I1.C (discussing Court's opinions in Ellerth 
and Faragher where Court adopts this "company act" standard for purposes of imposing 
strict liability on employers for supervisory sexual harassment). 
'" 524 U.s. 742 (1998). 
80 524 U.s. 775 (1998). 
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quo strict liability landscape appeared to change dramatically, although 
the extent of that change has been the subject of much debate.S! Ellerth 
and Faragher represented a paradigm shift from employer strict liability 
for sexual harassment claims labeled as quid pro quo to employer strict 
liability for sexual harassment claims labeled as tangible employment 
actions. Although only Ellerth involved a discussion of quid pro quo 
sexual harassment and the "promise of vicarious liability for all quid pro 
quo claims" that then existed under case law}2 both cases addressed in 
detail the principles of, and policy reasons underlying, employer 
vicarious liability for supervisory sexual harassment. 
A. Quid Pro Quo and Hostile Work Environment Labels 
In Ellerth, the Court first addressed the quid pro quo and hostile work 
environment labels and their impact, if any, on an employer's vicarious 
liability for a supervisor's misconduct. The Court acknowledged that the 
quid pro quo label had become synonymous with vicarious liability.83 It 
also explained that this relationship created an incentive for plaintiffs to 
state their claims as quid pro quo harassment.84 The pressure to plead 
sexual harassment claims as quid pro quo claims is illustrated by the 
question presented for certiorari in Ellerth, which does not reference an 
employer's vicarious liability, but instead focuses exclusively on whether 
certain conduct falls within the quid pro quo rubric.85 
Although the question presented focused on whether the plaintiff 
would succeed in labeling her unfulfilled threat claim as quid pro quo, 
the Court reframed the issue. It determined that, notwithstanding the 
label, the "issue of real concern to the parties is whether [the employer] 
has vicarious liability for [its supervisor's] alleged misconduct, rather 
than liability for its own negligence.,,86 The Court explained that, 
although the terms "quid pro quo" and "hostile environment" are 
"helpful, perhaps, in making a rough demarcation between cases in 
which threats are carried out and those where they are not or are absent 
altogether," they are of "limited utility" beyond this demarcation as they 
81 See infra text accompanying notes 134, 349-50. 
82 Ellerth, 524 U.s. at 765. 
63 [d. at 753. 
84 [d. 
" [d. ("Whether a claim of quid pro quo sexual harassment may be stated under Title VII 
. . . where the plaintiff employee has neither submitted to the sexual advances of the 
alleged harasser nor suffered any tangible effects on the compensation, terms, conditions or 
privileges of employment as a consequence of a refusal to submit to those advances?"). 
56 [d. 
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have no bearing on an employer's liability for supervisory sexual 
harassment. 87 
Because Ellerth's claim involved only unfulfilled threats, the Court 
characterized her claim as a hostile work environment claim.ss It 
accepted the district court's finding that the alleged conduct was severe 
and pervasive and thus actionable under Title VII.89 The question that 
remained unanswered, however, was whether Ellerth's employer was 
vicariously liable for the hostile work environment. The Court would 
ultimately resolve this question together with the hostile work 
environment claim alleged in Faragher. 
Faragher involved allegations of a supervisor-created, sexually hostile 
work environment that did not involve any threat of tangible 
employment detriment.9o Beth Ann Faragher alleged that while working 
as a city lifeguard, her immediate supervisor and next successively 
higher supervisor subjected her and other female lifeguards to boorish 
and offensive sexual comments and touching.91 Although Faragher 
alleged that she endured this conduct for approximately five years, she 
87 [d. at 751-52. The Court explained that the terms served a "specific and limited 
purpose" in Meritor where they were used to distinguish between discrimination based on 
explicit alterations in the terms or conditions of employment - the quid pro quo situation 
where a supervisor either subjects a subordinate to a tangible job detriment for refusing his 
sexual advances or demands sexual favors in return for a job benefit - and discrimination 
based on constructive alterations in the terms or conditions of employment - the hostile 
environment situation where an employee is subjected to sexually demeaning behavior. [d. 
at 752. Regarding the distinction between fulfilled and unfulfilled threat cases, the Court 
stated: 
When a plaintiff proves that a tangible employment action resulted from a 
refusal to submit to a supervisor's sexual demands, he or she establishes that the 
employment decision itself constitutes a change in the terms and conditions of 
employment that is actionable under Title VII. For any sexual harassment 
preceding the employment decision to be actionable, however, the conduct must 
be severe or pervasive. 
[d. at 753-54. In his dissent, Justice Thomas disagreed with the majority'S characterization 
of the distinction between quid pro quo and hostile environment as relevant to whether 
discrimination occurred in the first instance. [d. at 770 n.3 (Thomas, L dissenting). Justice 
Thomas clarified that fulfilled threat claims, where the supervisor "carries out his threat 
and causes the plaintiff a job detriment," are essentially disparate treatment claims for 
which employers are always strictly liable under Title VII, while unfulfilled threat claims 
should be analyzed as hostile work environment cases only. [d. (Thomas, J., dissenting) 
(citing Scalia, supra note 52, at 309-14). 
8S [d. at 754. 
89 [d. 
90 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 780, 785 (1998). 
9! [d. at 782. 
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did not report the conduct and eventually resigned.92 In a seven-to-five 
opinion, the Eleventh Circuit en banc concluded that the City was not 
vicariously liable for the supervisors' conduct for three reasons.93 First, 
the conduct fell outside the scope of the supervisor's employment. 
Second, the agency relation did not aid the supervisors in their 
harassment because they did not threaten to fire or demote Faragher. 
Finally, the City lacked constructive knowledge of the harassment.94 
Subsequently, the Court granted review to determine the scope of and 
standard for an employer's vicarious liability for hostile environment 
harassment perpetrated by supervisory employees.95 In an effort to 
answer the vicarious liability questions posed in Ellerth and Faragher, and 
to establish the "uniform and predictable standard" deemed necessary 
for employer vicarious liability, the Court returned to traditional agency 
principles as it directed lower courts to use twelve years earlier in 
Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson.% 
B. Agency Principles 
In Ellerth and Faragher, the Court focused its agency analysis on section 
219(2) of the Restatement of Agency.97 The pertinent provision of section 
219(2) provides that "[a] master is not subject to liability for the torts of 
his servants acting outside the scope of their employment, unless ... the 
servant ... was aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence of the 
agency relation.,,98 The Court concluded that because most supervisory 
sexual harassment claims are premised on the supervisor's misuse of 
delegated authority, the appropriate analytical starting point is the 
Restatement's "aided in the agency relation" analysis.99 
92 ld. at 780, 782. 
" ld. at 784. 
94 ld. 
95 ld. at 780. 
.. 477 U.s. 57 (1986); see Faragher, 524 U.s. at 785-86; Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 
524 U.s. 742,754 (1998). 
" Faragher, 524 U.S. at 793-806; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 756-64. In Faragher, the Court noted 
that federal courts had been unanimous in holding employers vicariously liable for a 
supervisor's "discriminatory employment actions with tangible results, like hiring, firing, 
promotion, compensation, and work assignment." Faragher, 524 U.S. at 790. Although it 
ultimately rejected certain approaches to vicarious liability previously used by federal 
courts, such as scope of employment, the Court in Faragher nevertheless approved of 
imposing vicarious liability under such circumstances based on applicable agency 
principles. ld. at 791 (noting that "the soundness of the results" of earlier cases remained 
viable "in light of basic agency principles"). 
.. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 758. 
99 Faragher, 524 U.s. at 802; Ellerth, 524 U.s. at 759-60. 
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Although the aided in the agency relation standard provided the 
Court with the analytical starting point, its "malleable terminology" 
presented a threshold issue of how broadly the standard should be 
construed. lOO At first blush, there was a certain appeal to an expansive 
interpretation of the stanq.ard whereby an employer would be held 
vicariously liable under any circumstance in which a supervisor abused 
his or her authority.lOl This appeal stemmed primarily from the fact that, 
in one sense, the agency relation always aids a supervisor because the 
power and authority granted by the employer cloaks the supervisor's 
harassing conduct with "a particular threatening character."lo2 In 
addition to the supervisor's power to influence subordinates in subtle yet 
discriminatory ways, an equally compelling reason for imposing 
vicarious liability for all acts of supervisor harassment is the employer'S 
opportunity and incentive to prevent supervisor harassment in the first 
instance through arpropriate screening, hiring, training, and monitoring 
of its supervisors.lo 
Notwithstanding the laudable reasons for equating the standard with 
vicarious liability for all acts of supervisor harassment, the Court was 
constrained by Meritor's holding that an "employer is not 'automatically' 
liable for harassment by a supervisor who creates the requisite degree of 
discrimination."l04 Thus, to avoid automatic liability, something more 
than the mere "aid" provided by the supervisory relationship itself is 
necessary. lOS The Faragher Court identified two alternatives to automatic 
liability: (1) impose vicarious liability on the employer only upon a 
showing of an affirmative use of supervisory authority, or (2) impose 
100 Ellerth, 524 u.s. at 763. 
101 Id. 
102 Faragher, 524 U.S. at 802; Ellerth, 524 U.s. at 763 ("[lIt is precisely because the 
supervisor is understood to be clothed with the employer's authority that he is able to 
impose unwelcome sexual conduct on subordinates." (quoting Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. 
Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 77 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring))). 
103 Faragher, 524 U.s. at 803; see also infra Part V.B (discussing employers' efforts to 
implement antiharassment policies and monitor workplace compliance and how such 
efforts are potentially relevant in decreasing incidence of workplace harassment and 
increasing likelihood that sexual harassment victims will report). 
104 Faragher, 524 U.S. at 804; see Ellerth, 524 U.s. at 763. The Court also acknowledged 
that because "most workplace tortfeasors are aided in accomplishing their tortious 
objective by the existence of the agency relation," vicarious liability based solely on the 
aided in the agency relation standard would be virtually limitless. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 760. 
Further, if the proximity and regular contact afforded by the employment relationship 
were sufficient to impose liability, employers would be vicariously liable for not only all 
supervisor harassment but all coworker harassment as well, a result inconsistent with the 
position of the EEOC and the federal appellate courts. Id. 
105 Faragher, 524 U.S. at 804. 
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vicarious liability on the employer for actionable sexual harassment, but 
permit the employer to raise an affirmative defense under certain 
. t 106 Clrcums ances. 
With respect to the first alternative, the Court acknowledged that there 
was authority for requiring an affirmative, as opposed to implicit, 
misuse of supervisory authority as a condition precedent to imposing 
liability.l07 This authority stemmed from cases holding employers liable 
for a supervisor's discrimination that led to tangible employment-related 
results, such as terminations, promotions, and the like.los 
Notwithstanding such authority, the Court rejected the affirmative use 
alternative.109 In doing so, the Court expressed concern that a rule that 
imposed liability only upon a showing of affirmative, as opposed to 
implicit, uses of power would enable employers to avoid liability 
entirely for the more subtle harms inherent in harassing conduct by 
supervisors. 110 Furthermore, such a rule would be unworkable in 
• III Th C d practice. e ourt reasone : 
Neat examples illustrating the line between the affirmative and 
merely implicit uses of power are not easy to come by in 
considering management behavior. . .. How far from the course of 
ostensible supervisory behavior would a company officer have to 
step before his orders would not reasonably be seen as actively 
using authority? Judgment calls would often be close, the results 
would often seem disparate even if not demonstrably contradictory, 
and the temptation to litigate would be hard to resist. 1l2 
Thus, the Court was left with the second alternative, which held an 
employer vicariously liable for all actionable supervisor harassment, but 
recognized an employer's ability to raise an affirmative defense to 
liability or damages under certain circumstances. If the Court adopted 
this alternative, however, what circumstances would preclude the 
employer from raising the affirmative defense? Furthermore, if the 
employer could raise such a defense, what would it consist of? 
106 ld. 
107 Id. 
lOS [d. at 804-05. 
109 Id. at 805. 
110 [d. 
111 [d. 
112 [d.; see also infra notes 328-32 and accompanying text. 
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C. New Employer Liability Standards 
With respect to the circumstances under which an employer would be 
strictly liable, and thus precluded from raising the affirmative defense, 
the Court endeavored to draw a bright line. In doing so, it took a 
formalist approach. The Court concluded that the "something more" 
necessary to avoid automatic liability in all sexual harassment cases was 
satisfied where a supervisor "takes a tangible employment action against 
the subordinate.,,!13 The reason for this bright-line rule was simple: 
when a supervisor's harassment "culminates in a tangible employment 
action,,,114 "there is assurance the injury could not have been inflicted 
absent the agency relation.,,115 
In contrast, it is less clear whether the injury resulted from the agency 
relation in cases where the supervisor does not take a tangible 
employment action against the subordinate.116 In such cases, the Court 
reasoned that permitting an employer to raise an affirmative defense 
would give effect to Title VII's purposes if it considered the employer's 
efforts to prevent and correct harassment and the employee's 
corresponding duty to prevent and avoid harm as part of the liability 
calculus.1I7 For example, because one of the goals of Title VII is to 
"promote conciliation rather than litigation,,,ns the Court reasoned that it 
would effectuate Congress's intent to encourage employers to create and 
administer effective antiharassment policies and grievance mechanisms 
and to base employer liability at least in part on an evaluation of an 
employer's efforts in these respects.119 Additionally, the Court reasoned 
that a rule encouraging employees to report harassing conduct before it 
becomes actionable would serve Title VII's preventive purposes.120 
113 Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 760 (1998). Similarly, in Faragher the 
Court stated: "There is nothing remarkable in the fact that claims against employers for 
discriminatory employment actions with tangible results, like hiring, firing, promotion, 
compensation, and work assignment, have resulted in employer liability once the 
discrimination was shown." 524 U.s. at 790. 
114 Ellerth, 524 U.s. at 765. 
115 Id. at 761-62. 
116 [d. at 763. 
117 Faragher, 524 U.s. at 805. 
118 Ellerth, 524 U.s. at 764. But see Grossman, supra note 26, at 720 (noting Court's 
emphasis on deterrence and prevention and contrasting that emphasis with Court's historic 
emphasis on Title VII's "two separate, yet equally important goals: compensation and 
deterrence"). 
119 Ellerth, 524 U.s. at 764. 
120 Id. (citing McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ'g Co., 513 U.s. 352, 358 (1995)). 
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In its efforts to "accommodate the agency principles of vicarious 
liability for harm caused by misuse of supervisory authority, as well as 
Title VII's equally basic policies of encouraging forethought by 
employers and saving actions by objecting employees," the Court 
adopted the following joint holding in Ellerth and Faragher: 
An employer is subject to vicarious liability to a victimized 
employee for an actionable hostile environment created by a 
supervisor with immediate (or successively higher) authority over 
the employee. When no tangible employment action is taken, a 
defending employer may raise an affirmative defense to liability or 
damages, subject to proof by a preponderance of the evidence .... 
The defense comprises two necessary elements: (a) that the 
employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly 
any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff employee 
unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or 
corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm 
th 
. 12 o erwlse. . 
Based on this holding, two questions remained: "what constitutes a 
tangible employment action?" and "how does an employer successfully 
assert the affirmative defense?" 
1. Tangible Employment Action 
The Court's guidance regarding what constitutes a tangible 
employment action addressed the type of power wielded by supervisors. 
It also provided examples of the types of action taken against and 
injuries suffered by subordinates in the tangible employment action 
context. The Court explained that tangible employment actions are the 
J2I Faragher, 524 U.s. at 807; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765. Elsewhere in the Faragher opinion, 
the Court indicated that there are still other means by which an employer may be directly 
liable for supervisory sexual harassment. Examples include situations where the employer 
had actual knowledge of the harassment and did nothing to stop it or where the supervisor 
is sufficiently high up in the organization's hierarchical structure such that the supervisor 
is considered a "proxy" for the employer. 524 U.S. at 789; see, e.g., Ackel v. Nat'! 
Commc'ns, Inc., 339 F.3d 376, 384 (5th Cir. 2003) (concluding that triable issue of fact 
existed as to whether president and general manager of corporation who was also 
stockholder and member of board of directors was corporation's proxy, making 
Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense unavailable to employer); see also B. Glenn George, If 
You're Not Part of the Solution, You're Part of the Problem: Employer Liability for Sexual 
Harassment, 13 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 133 (2001) (discussing employer's direct liability for 
known superviSOry sexual harassment based on negligence principles after Ellerth and 
Faragher, and arguing that Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense applies only when employer 
was unaware of supervisor's conduct). 
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"means by which the supervisor brings the official power of the 
enterprise to bear on subordinates," and thus a "tangible emplo~ment 
decision requires an official act of the enterprise, a company act."l The 
Court stated that a tangible employment action "constitutes a significant 
change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, 
reassignment with significantly different responsibilities,,,l23 "demotion, 
or undesirable reassignment,,,l24or a "decision causing a significant 
change in benefits."l25 
Additionally, as to the type of injury suffered by the subordinate, the 
Court explained that "in most cases, a tangible employment action will 
inflict 'direct economic harm,'" which the Court noted is the type of 
injury that "only a supervisor, or other person acting with the authority 
of the company" can cause.l26 Moreover, because tangible employment 
decisions require an "official act of the enterprise" or "company act," the 
Court posited that such decisions will, in most cases, be documented or 
otherwise reflected in official company records and will often be subject 
to review by the harasser's superiors.127 Finally, consistent with the 
company act requirement, the Court noted that the nature of a tangible 
employment action is such that the "supervisor often must obtain the 
imprimatur of the enterprise and use its internal processes."l28 
2. Affirmative Defense 
For those situations in which a harassing supervisor does not take a 
tangible employment action against the subordinate employee, but 
where the harassing conduct is nevertheless severe or pervasive, the 
Court attempted to provide guidance regarding the manner in which an 
employer might satisfy its burden of proof under each of the "two 
necessary elements" of the affirmative defense. l29 With respect to the 
employer's obligations under prong one, the Court indicated that 
although an antiharassment policy and accompanying complaint 
122 Ellerth, 524 u.s. at 762. 
123 Id. at 761. In the context of Ellerth, the Court noted that a tangible employment 
action "would have taken the form of a denial of [either] a raise or a promotion." Id. 
124 [d. at 765. 
125 Id. at 76l. 
126 [d. at 762. 
127 [d. 
128 [d. 
129 See infra text accompanying note 354 (discussing courts that have concluded that 
only one of two elements must be met for employers to avoid liability under certain 
circumstances). 
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procedure are not necessary as a matter of law, courts nevertheless 
should consider the need for such a policy and related procedures in 
assessing whether the employer has satisfied its burden.130 Regarding 
the employee's corresponding burden under prong two, the Court 
explained that the second prong incorporates the principles underlying 
the avoidable consequences doctrine from tort law,l3J and thus imposes 
an affirmative duty on the plaintiff to avoid or otherwise mitigate 
harm.
132 
The Court stated that an employer's proof that the plaintiff 
unreasonably failed to avail herself of the employer's complaint 
procedure will "normally suffice" to satisfy the employer's burden under 
prong twO.133 The Court then applied the newly minted vicarious 
liability standards and the accompanying affirmative defense to the facts 
of Ellerth and Faragher. l34 
In Ellerth, the Court noted that Ellerth had focused her efforts on 
proving that her claim fell within the quid pro quo category given the 
"promise of vicarious liability for all quid pro quo claims" under existing 
case law.135 Because the quid pro quo and hostile work environment 
labels no longer control an employer's liability for a supervisor's 
harassing acts, the Court concluded that Ellerth should have an 
opportunity on remand to prove that her employer was liable.136 In this 
130 Ellerth, 524 u.s. at 765. 
131 [d. at 764. 
132 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.s. 775,806-07 (1998) (citing Ford Motor Co. v. 
EEOC, 458 U.s. 219, 232 n.15 (1982»; see infra Part V.B (discussing applicable avoidable 
consequences principles in context of second prong of affirmative defense). 
133 Faragher, 524 U.s. at 807-08; Ellerth, 524 U.s. at 765. 
134 In his dissent in Ellerth, Justice Thomas lamented that the Court had provided 
"shockingly little guidance about how employers can actually avoid vicarious liability 
[under the affirmative defense]" and instead "issue[d] only Delphic pronouncements and 
le[ft] the dirty work to the lower courts" because the meaning of those pronouncements 
"remains a mystery." 524 U.s. at 773 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas predicted 
that under the affirmative defense, vicarious liability will be the rule, rather than the 
exception, because even an employer who acted reasonably will be held liable "so long as 
the plaintiff in question fulfilled her duty of reasonable care to avoid harm." Id.; see infra 
text accompanying notes 349-50, 353-54 (demonstrating that Justice Thomas's predictions 
have not come to fruition given pro-employer trend regarding application of affirmative 
defense and, in particular, second prong). 
135 Ellerth, 524 U.s. at 765. 
136 Id. at 765-66. In this respect, Ellerth would need to show that the acts to which she 
was subjected were sufficiently severe or pervasive to create a hostile work environment. 
Id. at 752. Notwithstanding the fact that Ellerth's complaint alleged that she had been 
constructively discharged, the Court stated that she had "not alleged she suffered a 
tangible employment action at the hands of [the harassing supervisor]." Id. at 766; see infra 
text accompanying note 231 (regarding how this foreshadowed Court's holding regarding 
constructive discharge cases in Suders v. Easton, 325 F.3d 432 (3d Cir. 2003), vacated sub nom. 
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respect, the Court indicated that Ellerth's employer was vicariously 
liable for the actions of its supervisor, but Ellerth's employer would have 
an opportunity on remand to assert and prove the affirmative defense.137 
The result in Faragher differed dramatically. Because the harassing 
acts of Faragher's supervisor did not include a tangible employment 
action taken against Faragher, the Court stated that the City would have 
had an opportunity to raise the two-prong affirmative defense "if there 
were any serious prospect of its presenting one .... ,,138 The Court 
concluded, however, that the facts of the case foreclosed any possibility 
of the City presenting the affirmative defense.139 Although the City had a 
sexual harassment policy, it had completely failed to distribute its policy 
to the plaintiff and her colleagues at the city beach.l40 Moreover, the City 
officials made no effort to oversee or otherwise keep track of its 
supervisors' conduct.141 Additionally, the City's sexual harassment 
policy did not include any mechanism or assurance that a subordinate 
could bypass a haraSSing supervisor when registering a complaint.142 
Based on these facts, the Court held, as a matter of law, that the City 
could not satisfy the first prong of the affirmative defense because no 
reasonable jury could conclude that the City exercised reasonable care to 
t . h t 143 preven supervlsory arassmen. 
III. THE PROGENY OF ELLERTH AND FARAGHER 
Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerthl44 and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton145 
clarified the vicarious liability standards for unfulfilled and fulfilled 
threat cases. In an unfulfilled threat case such as Ellerth, the employer 
was vicariously liable but would have an opportunity to establish the 
two-prong Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense. l46 By comparison, an 
employer in a fulfilled threat case was strictly liable, and thus would not 
have an opportunity to raise the two-prong affirmative defense. What 
Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.s. 129 (2004». 
137 Ellerth, 524 U.s. at 766. 






144 Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998). 
145 Faragher, 524 U.S. at 775. 
146 The same would be true if the action threatened and taken by the supervisor did not 
amount to a tangible employment action. 
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remained unclear, however, was how submission and constructive 
discharge claims fit into the newly minted Ellerth/Furagher tangible 
employment action, fulfilled/ unfulfilled threat paradigm. 
A. Submission Claims 
Following Ellerth and Faragher, it was unclear whether a submission 
case constituted a tangible employment action for which an employer 
would be strictly liable or an unfulfilled threat case in which an 
employer could assert and prove the two-prong affirmative defense. 
Some courts construed submission claims as tangible employment 
actions, while others construed such claims as aggravated hostile 
environment claims to which the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense 
Ii d 147 app e . 
147 Following Ellerth and Faragher, the EEOC issued Enforcement Guidance: Vicarious 
Employer Liability for Unlawful Harassment by Supervisors ("Enforcement Guidance") and took 
the position that an employee who submits to a supervisor's sexual demands and obtains a 
tangible job benefit has experienced a tangible employment action for which her employer 
is strictly liable. EEOC, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE: VICARIOUS EMPLOYER LIABILITY FOR 
UNLAWFUL HARASSMENT BY SUPERVISORS Gune 18, 1999), available at 
http://www.eeoc.gov I policy I docs/harassment.html. In Enforcement Guidance, the EEOC 
included as examples of tangible employment actions both "hiring and firing" and 
"promotion and failure to promote." Id. The EEOC explained as follows: 
If a supervisor undertakes or recommends a tangible job action based on a 
subordinate's response to unwelcome sexual demands, the employer is liable 
and cannot raise the affirmative defense. The result is the same whether the 
employee rejects the demands and is subjected to an adverse tangible 
employment action or submits to the demands and consequently obtains a 
tangible job benefit. Such harassment previously would have been characterized 
as "quid pro quo." It would be a perverse result if the employer is foreclosed 
from raising the affirmative defense if its supervisor denies a tangible job benefit 
based on an employee's rejection of unwelcome sexual demands, but can raise 
the defense if its supervisor grants a tangible job benefit based on submission to 
such demands. The Commission rejects such an analysis. In both those 
situations the supervisor undertakes a tangible employment action on a 
discriminatory basis. The Supreme Court stated that there must be a significant 
change in employment status; it did not require that the change be adverse in 
order to qualify as tangible. 
Id. The EEOC did not clarify whether obtaining a "tangible job benefit" included only 
those circumstances where the employee obtained a job benefit to which the employee was 
not otherwise entitled or also included those circumstances where the employee was 
performing satisfactorily and retained her job solely because she submitted to her 
supervisor's sexual demands. Grossman, supra note 26, at 682-83 (noting that EEOC did 
not address circumstances where employee "submits to avoid harm rather than obtain a 
benefit"). Although the EEOC would likely contend that the job-retention scenario is also 
included in "tangible job benefit," an employee under such circumstances has not 
experienced the requisite "significant change in employment status" under Ellerth. See 
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1. Tangible Employment Action 
In 2002, four years after Ellerth and Faragher, the Second Circuit 
addressed whether an employee experiences a tangible employment 
action when, instead of refusing her supervisor's sexual extortion 
demands, she submits to the demanded conduct. In fin v. Metropolitan 
Life Insurance CO.,I48 the Second Circuit took a realist approach to 
employer liability for sexual extortion. It concluded that a submission 
plaintiff experiences a tangible employment action where her supervisor 
requires her to repeatedly submit to sexual abuse under explicit threats 
of termination if she does not accede to his demands.149 
The circumstances in fin were particularly egregious. After working 
successfully for Metropolitan Life Insurance Company ("MetLife") for 
approximately four years, Jin encountered a new colleague who began a 
thirteen-month campaign of egregious conduct toward her.150 Six 
months into his campaign, the colleague became Jin's supervisor. 151 The 
conduct included: 
(a) making numerous crude sexual remarks to her, both in the office 
and by calling her at home; (b) offensively touching Jin's buttocks, 
breasts, and legs on numerous occasions at the office, including 
when she was making sales calls at her desk and walking clients to 
the elevator; (c) requiring Jin ... to attend weekly Thursday night 
private meetings in Uin's supervisor's] locked office during which 
he would threaten her with a baseball bat, kiss, lick, bite and fondle 
her, attempt to undress her, physically force her to unzip his pants 
and fondle him, push against her with his penis exposed, and 
ejaculate on her; and (d) repeatedly threatening to fire Jin if she did 
not accede to his sexual demands, as well as threatening her with 
h . I h 152 P YSlca arm. 
Jin alleged that she endured the weekly sexual abuse out of fear of losing 
h . b 153 erJo . 
discussion infra Part IV.A. Moreover, as discussed in Part IV.A.1 infra, the EEOC's position 
that the change in employment status need not be adverse is inconsistent with Ellerth and 
Faragher. 
148 310 F.3d 84 (2d Cir. 2002). 
14' See id. at 94. 
150 Id. at 88. 
151 [d. 
152 [d. at 88-89. 
153 Id. at 89. 
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Ultimately, Jin filed a sexual harassment action against MetLife.154 
Although the jury concluded that Jin had been subjected to an actionable 
hostile environment, Jin did not prevail on her claim because she had not 
suffered the requisite tangible adverse action.155 
On appeal, Jin argued that her submission to her supervisor's sexual 
abuse became an added job requirement necessary to keep her job, and 
thus, constituted a tangible employment action.156 The Second Circuit 
concluded that Jin had suffered a tangible employment action,157 
reasoning that the agency relation aided Jin's supervisor in his sexual 
extortion efforts because MetLife empowered him to make economic 
decisions impacting his subordinates.15 Furthermore, the power MetLife 
bestowed upon Jin's supervisor to make such decisions enabled him to 
compel Jin to report to him and remain in his office while he harassed 
159 her. 
Additionally, the Second Circuit agreed with the EEOC's position that 
a tangible employment action occurs when an employee submits to a 
supervisor's unwelcome sexual demands and "obtains a job benefit.,,160 
It concluded that the pre-Ellerth strict liability approach to submission 
claims is "sound even under the Supreme Court's new liability 
analysis.,,161 The Second Circuit reasoned that the proper focus for 
imposing liability on an employer is on the supervisor's decision to 
either retain or terminate the subordinate based on the subordinate's 
reaction to his sexual demands.162 Based on this reasoning, the court 
concluded that Jin had presented evidence of a tangible employment 
action because her supervisor required her to submit to his sexual 
demands and used her "submission as a basis for granting her a job 
benefit (her continued employment)."I63 
154 ld. at 87-88. 
155 ld. at 90. The court instructed the jury that to hold Jin's employer strictly liable on a 
tangible employment action theory, Jin had to show that her supervisor subjected her to a 
"tangible adverse action." ld. (emphasis added). 
156 [d. at 94. 
157 ld. 
158 ld. The court explained that a coworker could not have "compelled Jin's 
acquiescence because a mere co-worker lacked the authority to either terminate or retain 
Jin based on her response to sexual demands." ld. But see infra text accompanying note 
244. 
159 ld. 
160 ld. at 94-95 (citing EEOC, supra note 147). 
161 ld. at 96. 
162 ld. 
163 ld. at 97. The lin court also concluded that the Supreme Court in Ellerth expressly 
recognized the inherent difference between a submission case and an unfulfilled threat case 
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Finally, the Second Circuit rejected the argument that submission 
claims lack the "official act of the enterprise" or "company act" required 
for a tangible employment action.l64 The court concluded that Jin's 
supervisor's actions constituted an act of Jin's employer because the 
supervisor "brought 'the official power of the enterprise to bear' on [her] 
by explicitly threatening to fire her if she did not submit, and then 
allowing her to retain her job based on her submission."l65 The court 
reasoned: 
It would be anomalous to find an employer liable when an 
employee was able to stand up to a supervisor's sexual demands, 
and therefore provoke an action such as termination, but to find no 
liability when the employee was unable to refuse and was actually 
subjected to sexual abuse. Such a rule would punish employees 
who submit because, for example, they desperately need the income 
to make house payments... or because a sick spouse or child 
depends on their health benefits.166 
Accordingly, the Second Circuit concluded that Title VII should not 
shield employers from liability when a subordinate cannot refuse a 
supervisor's sexual demands.167 
Subsequently, in Holly D. v. California Institute of Technoiogy,l68 the 
Ninth Circuit joined the Second Circuit in taking a realist approach to 
because the question for review made it clear that Ellerth consisted of circumstances 
involving an unfulfilled threat as opposed to a plaintiff's "submission" or a plaintiff's 
suffering "tangible effects" for refusing to submit. ld. 
164 ld. at 98. 
165 ld. (quoting Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 762 (1998»; see also 
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.s. 775, 790 (1998) ("When a supervisor requires 
sexual favors as a quid pro quo for job benefits, the supervisor, by definition, acts as the 
company." (quoting Steele v. Offshore Shipbuilding, Inc., 867 F.2d 1311, 1316 (11th Cir. 
1989))). 
166 lin, 310 F.3d at 99 (citing Nichols v. Frank, 42 F.3d 503, 507 (9th Cir. 1994»; see also 
Showalter v. Allison Reed Group, Inc., 767 F. Supp. 1205, 1209 (O.R.1. 1991) (describing 
supervisor's threat to take away benefits if Showalter refused to engage in requested sexual 
acts). The court also relied upon the EEOC's guidelines and noted the "perverse result" if 
cases where the employee avoids tangible job detriment by submitting do not constitute 
tangible employment actions, but cases where the employee receives a job benefit by 
submitting do constitute tangible employment actions. lin, 310 F.3d at 99 n.ll (quoting 
EEOC, supra note 147, at *5). 
167 Cf. Kelly Collins Woodford & Harry A. Rissetto, Tangible Employment Action: What 
Did the Supreme Court Really Mean in Faragher and Ellerth?, 19 LAB. LAW. 63, 76-78 (2003) 
(discussing Second Circuit's opinion in lin, and concluding that court's analysis was 
inconsistent with Ellerth and Faragher because Second Circuit incorrectly construed facts as 
alleging viable tangible employment action claim). 
168 339 F.3d 1158 (9th Cir. 2003). 
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submission claims. The Ninth Circuit concluded that a subordinate 
states a tangible employment action claim when she alleges that her 
supervisor coerced her into performing unwelcome sex acts by either 
explicitly or implicitly threatening her with termination if she refused.169 
Holly D. alleged that her new supervisor leered at her breasts and 
buttocks, commented on his preferred sexual activities, and showed her 
pornographic websites.17o Although her supervisor ceased this behavior 
when she informed him that she was not interested, he subsequently 
criticized her work and threatened to extend her six-month probationary 
period indefinitely.J71 Notwithstanding the threat, he did not extend her 
probationary period.172 
Two months after her probationary period ended, however, she 
received a negative performance rating that she believed resulted from 
her prior refusal to engage in sexual conversations with her supervisor.173 
She ultimately concluded that if her supervisor made sexual demands of 
her, she had to acquiesce to the demands to keep her job.174 One month 
after receiving the negative performance rating, Holly D.'s supervisor 
visited her office, engaged her in a sexual conversation, and then 
sexually propositioned her.175 Based on her subjective belief that she had 
to engage in the conduct to keep her job, she submitted.176 For the next 
year, Holly D. and her supervisor engaged in numerous sex acts during 
work hours, including intercourse and oral sex.177 At the end of the one-
year period, she received her second performance review, which she 
characterized as excellent. After an unsuccessful attempt to transfer to 
another office, she filed a sexual harassment action in which she alleged 
that her submission constituted a tangible employment action.178 
The Ninth Circuit agreed with Holly D. Like the Second Circuit in lin, 
the Ninth Circuit relied heavily on the malleable nature of the aided in 
the agency relation standard discussed in Ellerth and Faragher to 
conclude that a submission case constitutes a tangible employment 
169 ld. at 1162. 
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action.l79 The Ninth Circuit first noted that if Holly D.'s supervisor 
terminated her employment as a result of her resistance to his alleged 
threats, her termination would have constituted the requisite tangible 
employment action for which her employer would be strictly liable.lso 
The court reasoned that a successful extortion or submission case 
implicates the "same abuse of supervisorial authority - the power, for 
example, to hire and fire" that renders a termination a tangible 
employment action. lSI In both cases, the supervisor "successfully brings 
to bear the weight of the employer's enterprise in order to achieve the 
1 IS2 unlawfu purpose.// 
To fit the submission case within the tangible employment action 
rubric, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that the supervisor makes the "initial 
conditional decision" to discharge the employee unless his sexual 
demands are met. l83 Once the plaintiff acquiesces to his demands, he 
makes the "subsequent final decision to retain the employee in her 
position."I84 In this sense, the subordinate's "participation in unwanted 
sexual acts becomes a condition of the employee's employment - a 
critical condition that effects a substantial change in the terms of that 
employment."IBS Moreover, in addressing the El/erth/Faragher 
requirement that tangible employment actions require "some form of 
sufficiently concrete employment action," the Ninth Circuit reasoned 
that the threat in a submission case is "not unfulfilled or inchoate, but is 
implemented when the supervisor actually coerces sex by abusing the 
employer's authority, and thus makes concrete the condition of 
employment he has imposed. In short, the threat culminates in a 
tangible employment action.//I86 Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit 
concluded that the El/erth/Faragher affirmative defense is unavailable to 
an employer when a "supervisor who abuses his supervisorial authority 
119 ld. at 1167. 
180 ld. 
181 ld. at 1168. 
182 ld. 
183 ld. at 1169. 
184 ld. 
185 ld. 
186 ld. at 1170. Additionally, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the examples of tangible 
employment actions provided by the Court in Ellerth and Faragher - hiring, firing, failing 
to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing 
a significant change in benefits - constituted further support for the conclusion that 
successful superviSOry sexual extortion constitutes a tangible employment action. ld. 
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succeeds in coercing an employee to engage in sexual acts by threats of 
discharge." 187 
2. Aggravated Hostile Environment 
In April 2004, a federal district court in Florida issued its opinion in 
Speaks v. City of Lakeland.l88 In contrast to the realist approach adopted in 
lin and Holly D., the district court adopted a formalist approach and held 
that a submission claim is simply an aggravated hostile environment 
187 ld. at 1173. Notwithstanding the Ninth Circuit's holding regarding submission 
cases, the court concluded that the plaintiff's employer would be permitted an opportunity 
to assert the EUerth/Faragher affirmative defense because the plaintiff was unable to 
provide any evidence "connecting any discussion of her job duties [or other job-related 
matters] with [her supervisor's] requests that she engage in sex acts with him," much less 
prove either an explicit or implicit threat. ld. at 1175-76. Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit 
concluded that the plaintiff's employer established both prongs of the affirmative defense 
by demonstrating that: (1) the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and 
promptly correct any sexually harassing behavior, and (2) the plaintiff unreasonably failed 
to take advantage of the employer's complaint mechanisms by failing to seek relief through 
any of the numerous avenues proVided by her employer until after she endured a full year 
of unwelcome sexual activity and two years from the date of the first sexual incident. ld. at 
1177-79. Notwithstanding the plaintiff's documented financial and psychological 
disabilities, the plaintiff did not contend that either her depression or her financial 
circumstances contributed to her decision to forego reporting. ld. at 1179 n.24. For a 
discussion of how a victim's financial circumstances should be considered in assessing 
whether the plaintiff unreasonably failed to avoid harm under the second prong of the 
affirmative defense, see infra Part V.B. 
There are additional cases implicitly approving of the lin and Holly D. courts' 
tangible employment action approach to submission cases. See Suders v. Easton, 325 F.3d 
432, 458-59 (3d Cir. 2003) (stating in dicta that circumstance where plaintiff who submits to 
supervisor's demands for sexual favors in return for "job benefits, such as continued 
employment," constitutes tangible employment action even though such circumstances are 
void of any "official company act"), vacated sub nom. Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129 
(2004); Walton v. Johnson & Johnson Servs., Inc., 203 F. Supp. 2d 1312, 1321 (M.D. Fla. 2002) 
(suggesting in dicta that tangible employment action might exist where plaintiff's 
supervisor uses '''supervisory authority' to ... demand sex in return for job promotion"), 
affd, 347 F.3d 1272 (11th Cir. 2003); Bennett v. ProgreSSive Corp., 225 F. Supp. 2d 190, 204 
(N.D.N.Y. 2002) (stating in dicta that supervisor takes tangible employment action when he 
grants tangible job benefit based on subordinate's submission to sexual demands); Lewis v. 
Forest Pharms., Inc., 217 F. Supp. 2d 638, 655 n.8 (D. Md. 2002) (stating in dicta that "[a]n 
employer is liable for sexual harassment both when an employee garners tangible job 
benefit because the employee submitted to supervisor's sexual advances and when an 
employee suffers tangible job detriment because the employee rebuffed sexual advances"); 
Perrigo v. Harveys Iowa Mgmt. Co., No. CIV. 1-99-CV-I0003, 2000 WL 33363252, at '6 (S.D. 
Iowa Mar. 14, 2000) (implicitly holding that plaintiff's submission to her supervisor's 
sexual advances constitutes tangible employment action where submission was based on 
supervisor's express or implied promise to change plaintiff's work hours and plaintiff's 
belief that she would suffer reprisals if she refused his advances); infra text accompanying 
note 340. 
188 315 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1227 (M.D. Fla. 2004). 
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claim to which the EllerthlFaragher affirmative defense applies. 
Speaks worked in one of the four police squads in the City of 
Lakeland's police department.189 Approximately two and one-half years 
into her tenure with the City, a police sergeant began making 
unwelcome sexual advances toward her.190 Speaks alleged that she 
submitted to and did not report the sergeant's sexual demands because 
she feared that he would harm, transfer, or fire her if she refused.191 
Approximately one year after Speaks's sexual relationship with the 
sergeant began, the sergeant threatened to transfer her to a different 
squad.192 Speaks then told her husband about the sergeant's behavior.193 
Shortly thereafter, Speaks's husband reported the sergeant's alleged 
misconduct.194 Speaks subsequently filed an action for sexual 
harassment in violation of Title VII.195 
The City moved for summary judgment on the grounds that Speaks 
did not suffer a tangible employment action and that the City satisfied 
both prongs of the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense.l96 Speaks argued, 
however, that the EllerthlFaragher affirmative defense was unavailable to 
the City on her quid pro quo claim because she suffered a tangible 
employment action when the harassing sergeant "used his supervisory 
authority (including threats of termination or transfer) to obtain 
[Speaks's] consent to engage in sexual activities.,,197 Speaks analogized 
her submission situation to the circumstances in Suders v. Easton, in 
which the Third Circuit held that an employee suffers a tangible 
employment action when she is constructively discharged as a result of a 
supervisor's repeated episodes of sexually harassing behavior.198 
The district court found Speaks's tangible employment action 
argument problematic for two reasons: (1) it was inconsistent with Ellerth 
and Faragher and appeared to be a "return to the pre-FaragherlEllerth 
189 Id. at 1220 n.3. 




194 Id. at 1221. 
195 Id. at 1222. 
196 Id. at 1223. 
197 Id. at 1224. 
198 Id. Speaks analogized her situation to Suders even though more than three months 
prior to the City filing for summary judgment, the Court had granted certiorari on the 
constructive discharge issue presented in Suders. Suders v. Easton, 325 F.3d 432 (3d Cir. 
2003), vacated sub nom. Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.s. 129 (2004). See infra Part Ill.B for 
a discussion of the Court's opinion in Suders, in which the Court reversed the Third Circuit. 
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state of sexual harassment law where the category of harassment 
determined vicarious liability; and (2) it undermine[d] the concept of an 
employee having a coordinate duty to avoid harm."l99 In rejecting 
Speaks's argument, the district court first noted that, following Ellerth 
and Faragher, the label quid pro quo was no longer controlling regarding 
employer liability.20o Thus, to permit Speaks to use the quid pro quo 
label as a subterfuge to avoid the tangible employment action 
requirement would be inconsistent with Ellerth. 201 Moreover, the district 
court explicitly disagreed with Jin. It reasoned that "maintenance of the 
status quo" where an employee "continu[es] to work with the same job, 
pay, benefits, and responsibilities is not a change in status and is not 
analogous to any of the [tangible employment action] examples 
provided by the Court in Ellerth or Faragher.,,202 
The district court then explained how Speaks's tangible employment 
action argument was inconsistent with the employee's duty under Ellerth 
and Faragher to avoid harm.203 It reasoned that, by holding that an 
employee's submission in Jin or constructive discharge in Suders 
constitutes a tangible employment action, the Second and Third Circuits 
undermined the avoidable consequences principles underpinning the 
second prong.204 According to the district court, such an approach leads 
to the anomalous result whereby an employee who submits to a 
supervisor's demands in the Second Circuit or an employee who quits as 
a result of a supervisor's sexual harassment in the Third Circuit "fares 
better by submitting ... [or] quitting[, respectively,] than by immediately 
reporting the misconduct.,,205 
Finally, the district court reasoned that this approach "encourages 
Plaintiffs' counsel to bring and fit facts into certain types or categories of 
harassment claims" in an effort to impose strict liability.206 This is 
precisely the type of semantics that the Supreme Court sought to avoid 
in Ellerth and Faragher. 
199 Speaks, 315 F. Supp. 2d at 1225. 
200 [d. at 1223, 1225. 
201 [d. at 1225. Additionally, given the Court's explicit statement in Ellerth that the quid 
pro quo label is not controlling for purposes of an employer's vicarious liability for sexual 
harassment, the district court rejected the argument that a different vicarious liability 
standard applies in a quid pro quo submission case as compared to the unfulfilled threat 
quid pro quo case presented in Ellerth. [d. at 1225 n.20. 
202 Speaks, 315 F.Supp.2d at 1225. 
203 [d. 
204 Id. at 1226. 
205 [d. 
206 [d. at 1226 n.22. 
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For these reasons, the district court concluded that the Second Circuit's 
approach to submission in lin and the Third Circuit's approach to 
constructive discharge in Suders were inconsistent with the vicarious 
liability and harm avoidance balance struck by the Court in Ellerth and 
Fa ragher. 207 Accordingly, the district court held that Speaks had not 
suffered a tangible employment action and that the City could assert the 
EllerthlFaragher affirmative defense.2oB 
207 [d. 
208 [d. The court then concluded that the employer satisfied both prongs of the 
E/lerth/Faragher affirmative defense. [d. at 1229. With respect to the second prong, the 
court concluded that Speaks's outright failure to report the harassment, and the fact that 
her husband did not report the harassment until it had been ongoing for over one year, was 
unreasonable as it was based solely on Speaks's subjective fear of reprisals. [d. 
Furthermore, Speaks could have avoided "[mlost, if not all, of the harm" if she had simply 
reported the sergeant's behavior at the beginning of the harassment. [d.; see infra Part V.B 
(discussing factors courts should consider under prong two of affirmative defense in 
determining whether subordinate's submission to her supervisor's demands was 
unreasonable under circumstances). 
Additional cases have concluded that a subordinate's submission to her supervisor's 
sexual demands does not constitute a tangible employment action. See Coker v. Ball Janitor 
Serv., Inc., No. 99-5099, 2000 WL 305487, at *4 (10th Cir. Mar. 24, 2000) (holding that 
plaintiff who submitted to sexual acts with her supervisor based on subjective fear that she 
would be terminated if she resisted did not suffer tangible employment action based on 
submission); Fisher v. Elec. Data Sys., 278 F. Supp. 2d 980, 988 (S.D. Iowa 2003) (concluding 
that plaintiff's "submission" to her supervisor's sexual comments, touching, and sexual 
advances did not constitute tangible employment action but rather amounted only to 
"unfulfilled threats" in absence of "detrimental" employment action taken against her 
(citing Newton v. Cadwell Labs., 156 F.3d 880 (8th Cir. 1998))); Samedi v. Miami-Dade 
County, 206 F. Supp. 2d 1213, 1219 (S.D. Fla. 2002) (holding that plaintiff did not allege 
tangible employment action based on her allegations that she submitted to unwelcome 
sexual intercourse and other sex acts with her superiors because they threatened her with 
termination if she did not do so, and concluding that such facts constitute severe hostile 
environment claim to which E/lerth/Faragher affirmative defense applies); Hetreed v. 
Allstate Ins. Co., No. 96 C 2021, 1999 WL 311728, at *4-5 (N.D. Ill. May 12, 1999) (holding 
that plaintiff did not suffer tangible employment action when she submitted to "repeated, 
coerced sexual encounters" with her supervisor "in return for 'reasonably appropriate 
future evaluations, compensation (including bonuses and pay raises), responsibilities, and 
other job-related treatment''' because "harassment itself does not constitute tangible 
employment action" and she "did not suffer any sort of negative repercussions ... as a 
result of the harassment"), affd, No. 00-1787,2001 WL 427785, at *1 (7th Cir. Mar. 16,2001) 
(stating that plaintiff's contention that "sexual relations are 'tangible employment actions' 
is at variance with the definition given in Faragher and E/lerth," and further stating that "a 
supervisor's sexual activity is not attributed to the firm unless it fails to take preventive or 
responsive steps within its power"); Johnson v. Brown, No. 94 C 6530, 1998 WL 483521, at 
*4 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 10, 1998) (granting judgment in favor of employer following bench trial, 
and concluding that plaintiff had not alleged tangible employment action where plaintiff's 
supervisor subjected her to crude and "offensive" behavior and engaged in threatening and 
intimidating behavior, which ultimately coerced plaintiff to engage in unwanted sexual 
intercourse with him out of fear that she would be terminated if she rejected his advances), 
rev'd on other grounds, Johnson v. West, 218 F.3d 725 (7th Cir. 2000); Grozdanich v. Leisure 
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B. Constructive Discharge Claims 
Two months after Speaks, the Supreme Court issued its long-awaited 
opinion in the constructive discharge case of Pennsylvania State Police v. 
Suders. 2rB Contrary to the Third Circuit's conclusion, the Court held that 
a constructive discharge caused by a supervisor's sexual harassment of a 
subordinate does not constitute a tangible employment action, except in 
limited circumstances. Because submission and constructive discharge 
claims are analogous for the purposes of the tangible employment action 
analysis - in each instance it is the employee who takes action in 
response to the supervisor's conduct - the Court's opinion in Suders 
provides useful guidance regarding whether submission cases constitute 
tangible employment actions. 
Suders involved a situation where an employee's supervisors subjected 
her to what the Court referred to as a '"wors [t] case' harassment 
scenario, harassment ratcheted up to the breaking point."210 
Commencing with Suders's employment with the Pennsylvania State 
Police (the "PSP"), her three supervisors subjected her to a campaign of 
sexual harassment that stopped only when she quit her employment less 
than six months later.2l1 The conduct included repeated obscene 
gestures, vulgar comments, and frequent discussions regarding 
bestiality.212 In addition, Suders's supervisors subjected her to other 
harassment, which included twice unfairly accusing Suders of work-
related misconduct.213 
Suders subsequently filed a Title VII action based upon her 
supervisors' sexual harassment, which caused her to resign.214 Because 
Suders did not label her claim as one of constructive discharge, the 
district court did not consider whether her allegations constituted a 
constructive discharge. Instead, it granted summary judgment in favor 
of the PSP because Suders unreasonably failed to report her supervisors' 
harassment.215 The Third Circuit reversed and remanded on the grounds 
Hills Health Ctr., Inc., 25 F. Supp. 2d 953, 968-69 (D. Minn. 1998) (concluding that plaintiff 
stated "unfulfilled threat" claim to which EUerth/Faragher affirmative defense applies 
where she alleged that she retained her employment only because she "passively 
submit[tedl" to her supervisor's unwelcome sexual advances in form of inappropriate 
touching and groping). 
209 542 U.S. 129 (2004). 
210 [d. at 147-48. 
2JI [d. at 134-35. 
212 [d. at 134-37. 
213 [d. at 136-37. 
214 [d. 
215 [d. at 137. 
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that, inter alia, the district court erred in failing to construe Suders's 
allegations as a constructive discharge claim. The Third Circuit held 
that, if proven, a constructive discharge claim constitutes a tangible 
employment action claim that deprives the employer of the 
EllerthlFaragher affirmative defense.216 
In reaching this conclusion, the Third Circuit in Suders took a realist 
approach. It focused on the harm suffered by employees who are forced 
to resign as a result of supervisory sexual harassment, and concluded 
that an official act was not necessary for the resignation to constitute a 
tangible employment action.
217 
In doing so, the Third Circuit analogized 
constructive discharge cases to submission cases and relied on the 
reasoning in fin: 
[S]ome of the most permcIOus forms of workplace harassment, 
clearly amounting to tangible employment actions, are often not 
accompanied by official company acts. This is especially true in quid 
pro quo cases where a victimized employee submits to a supervisor's 
demands for sexual favors in return for job benefits, such as 
continued employment. In these cases, it is rare that a supervisor's 
demands for sexual liberties, and the corresponding threat of 
adverse consequences for failure to submit, will be documented 
anywhere in company records. Therefore, a rule requiring a 
victimized employee who submits to a supervisor's indecent 
demand for sexual favors to prove an official company act in order 
to establish a tangible employment action strains common sense. As 
the Second Circuit has held, the more sensible approach in the quid 
pro quo context is to recognize that, by his or her actions, a 
supervisor invokes the official authority of the enterprise. . .. This 
rationale is equally applicable in the context of constructive 
d · h 218 ISC arge. 
Based on this reasoning, the Third Circuit concluded that a plaintiff who 
alleges that she was constructively discharged as a result of her 
supervisor's sexual harassment is not required to show an official 
company act to prove a tangible employment action.
219 
Subsequently, the Supreme Court granted review to resolve the 
question of whether "a constructive discharge brought about by 
216 Id. at 138-39. 
217 Suders v. Easton, 325 F.3d 432, 459 (3d Cir. 2003), vacated sub nom. Pa. State Police v. 
Suders, 542 U.s. 129 (2004); see Chamallas, supra note 11, at 331 (noting that Third Circuit 
took realist approach to constructive discharge based on "actual effects"). 
218 Suders, 325 F.3d at 458-59. 
219 Id. at 459. 
570 University of California, Davis [Vol. 39:529 
supervisor harassment ranks as a tangible employment action.,,220 In an 
eight-to-one opinion, it reversed the Third Circuit and concluded that a 
constructive discharge constitutes a tangible employment action only 
when a "supervisor's official act precipitates the constructive 
discharge.,,221 The Court further noted that in the absence of a tangible 
employment action, the employer could assert the two-prong affirmative 
defense.222 
The Court began its analysis by noting that the companion opinions of 
Ellerth and Faragher distinguished between "supervisor harassment 
unaccompanied by an adverse official act," to which employers may 
assert the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense, and supervisor 
harassment attended by a tangible employment action, for which an 
employer is strictly liable.223 It reaffirmed the aided in the agency 
relation analysis set forth in Ellerth and Faragher and, in doing so, 
explained that a tangible employment action is "in essential character, 
'an official act of the enterprise, a company act.",224 Thus, the Court 
focused its analysis on whether an official act was necessary for a 
constructive discharge to constitute a tangible employment action when 
the discharge resulted solely from supervisory sexual harassment.225 
In Suders, the Court disagreed with the Third Circuit's realist approach 
and reaffirmed the Ellerth and Faragher formalist approach to strict 
liability. It reasoned that, unlike an actual termination, which can only 
be achieved through a supervisor's official act, the intolerable conditions 
that result in a constructive discharge "may be effected through co-
worker conduct, unofficial supervisory conduct, or official company 
acts.,,226 "A constructive discharge involves both an employee's decision 
to leave and precipitating conduct: [t]he former involves no official 
action; the latter, like a harassment claim without any constructive 
discharge assertion, mayor may not involve official action.,,227 Thus, in 
the absence of an "'official act of the enterprise' ... as the last straw, the 
employer ordinarily would have no particular reason to suspect that a 
220 Suders, 542 U.S. at 139. 
221 [d. at 140-4l. 
222 ld. 
223 [d. at 137 (emphasis added). 
224 [d. at 145-46 (quoting Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 762 (1998». 
225 The Court focused on the "official act" requirement presumably because a 
constructive discharge results in a "significant change in employment status" by ending the 
employment relationship and it constitutes the legal equivalent of an actual discharge in 
damages enhancing respects. [d. at 140,148. 
226 ld. at 148. 
227 [d. 
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resignation is not the typical kind daily occurring in the work force.,,22s 
In contrast, a circumstance where "an official act [is] reflected in 
company records - a demotion or a reduction in compensation, for 
example - shows 'beyond question' that the supervisor has used his 
managerial or controlling position to the employee's disadvantage.,,229 
The Court also reasoned that it was logically inconsistent to construe 
all constructive discharges as tangible employment actions. By 
dispensing with the official act requirement, the Third Circuit created the 
anomalous result whereby "the graver claim of hostile-environment 
constructive discharge [is] easier to prove than its lesser included 
component, hostile work environment.,,23Q Accordingly, the Court 
concluded that, in the absence of an official act, an employer could assert 
the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense to a constructive discharge claim 
based on supervisory harassment.
231 
Finally, in an effort to provide guidance to lower courts as to how the 
official act requirement applies in the constructive discharge context, the 
Court approved of the First and Seventh Circuit's respective approaches 
to constructive discharge in Reed v. MBNA Marketing Systems, Inc.232 and 
Robinson v. Sappington.233 In Reed, the First Circuit concluded that a 
supervisor's sexual harassment of a subordinate, accompanied by threats 
to discharge her if she reported, were "exceedingly unofficial and 
involved no direct exercise of company authority" and constituted 
"exactly the kind of wholly unauthorized conduct for which the 
affirmative defense was designed.,,234 In Robinson, the Seventh Circuit 
concluded that the requisite official act was present when a plaintiff who 
had been sexually harassed resigned after being transferred to another 
supervisor and being told that her new position "probably would be 
228 [d. 
229 [d. (quoting Ellerth, 524 u.s. at 760). 
230 [d. at 149. Thus, the Court implicitly rejected the Third Circuit's concern that 
"removing constructive discharge from the category of tangible employment actions could 
have the perverse effect of discouraging an employer from actively pursuing remedial 
measures and of possibly encouraging intensified harassment" to cause the employee to 
quit. Suders v. Easton, 325 F.3d 432, 461 (3d Cir. 2003), vacated sub nom. 542 U.s. 129 (2004). 
231 Suders, 542 U.s. at 148-49. The Suders Court noted that the omission of "constructive 
discharge" from the examples of tangible employment actions included in Ellerth and 
Faragher was conspicuous, and equally telling was the Court's conclusion that Ellerth had 
not alleged that she suffered a tangible employment action. [d. at 148. 
232 333 F.3d 27 (1st Cir. 2003). 
233 351 F.3d 317 (7th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 2909 (2004); Suders, 542 U.s. at 149-
50. 
234 Suders, 542 U.s. at 149-50 (citing Reed, 333 F.3d at 33). 
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'hell'" and that she should consider resigning.235 
According to the Suders Court, the First and Seventh Circuits in Reed 
and Robinson "properly recognized that Ellerth and Faragher, which 
divided the universe of supervisor harassment claims according to the 
presence or absence of an official act, mark the path that constructive 
discharge claims based on harassing conduct must follow.,,236 Because 
the Third Circuit failed to consider whether the requisite "official act" 
preceded Suders's alleged constructive discharge, the Court reversed 
and remanded the judgment for further proceedings.237 
The Court's opinion in Suders helped resolve any uncertainty 
regard~ whether submission cases constitute tangible employment 
actions. As explained below, because submission cases do not 
constitute tangible employment actions, an employer should be 
permitted to assert and prove the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense. 
IV. ANALYSIS OF SUBMISSION CLAIMS UNDER ELLERTH AND FARAGHER 
Nearly eight years after Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth239 and 
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton,240 the problem the Supreme Court 
attempted to remedy - namely, the expansive pressure to label and 
construe sexual harassment claims as quid pro quo claims for purposes 
of holding an employer strictly liable - still exists in submission cases. 
The only difference is that the label has changed. Instead of 
characterizing submission claims as quid pro quo claims, plaintiffs now 
plead such claims as tangible employment actions, knowing that the 
tangible employment action label is synonymous with strict liability. 
There is an additional reason why plaintiffs are attempting to expand the 
tangible employment action definition to include submission cases -
district courts have demonstrated a tendency to grant summary 
judgment in favor of defendant employers in hostile environment claims 
not involving a tangible employment action on the grounds that the 
employers have satisfied both prongs of the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative 
235 [d. (citing Robinson, 351 F.3d at 324). 
236 [d. 
237 [d. at 151-52. 
23B But see generally Michael Starr & Adam J. Heft, Employment Law, Sexual Harassment, 
26 NAT'L 1.J. 18 (2004) (noting contrasting approaches to submission claims in Jin and 
Speaks, and further noting that Court's decision in Suders may shed some light on whether 
submission claims constitute tangible employment action, but concluding that result is 
"still unclear" even after Suders). 
239 524 U.s. 742 (1998). 
"" 524 U.s. 775 (1998). 
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defense.241 In addition to plaintiffs' efforts to creatively plead submission 
cases, certain courts have misconstrued and misinterpreted the tangible 
employment action principles provided in Ellerth and Faragher and 
instead equated classic quid pro quo scenarios with an employer's strict 
liability. Perhaps the egregious circumstances presented in cases such as 
lin v. Metropolitan Life Insurance CO. 242 and Holly D. v. California Institute of 
Technology243 fueled this result. 
The opinions in lin and Holly D. are compelling. From a realist 
perspective, it seems unjust to permit an employer to assert the 
EllerthlFaragher affirmative defense under circumstances where a 
supervisor successfully coerces an employee's repeated submission to 
unwelcome sexual acts. Indeed, a supervisor's ability to extort sexual 
acts from a subordinate is perhaps the quintessential example of the 
aided in the agency relation standard. Unlike a typical hostile 
environment scenario where a coworker and supervisor may be equally 
capable of inflicting harm, there are few scenarios where sexual extortion 
could occur absent the agency relation and the supervisor's use of 
power.244 It is precisely because "successful coercion ... depends on the 
same abuse of supervisorial authority - the power to hire and fire -
that ... renders a discharge a 'tangible employment action'" that some 
courts have equated submission claims with tangible employment 
• 245 actions. 
While a supervisor's abuse of power alone may be sufficient reason to 
hold an employer vicariously liable for a supervisor's sexual extortion, the 
Court in Ellerth and Faragher took a formalist approach to employer 
liability. In doing so, it required something more than the supervisor's 
unique ability to sexually harass subordinates before holding an 
employer strictly liable for a supervisor's misconduct. Rather, to impose 
strict liability on an employer, a plaintiff must show that she suffered a 
241 See infra text accompanying note 349 (regarding lower courts' pro-employer trend in 
granting summary judgment on affirmative defense). 
242 310 F.3d 84 (2d Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 52 (2004). 
243 339 F.3d 1158 (9th Cir. 2003). 
244 Ironically, the circumstances in Tin are one example of a scenario where sexual 
extortion was accomplished by a coworker, given that the perpetrator in Tin did not become 
her supervisor until approximately six months into his campaign of harassment 
accompanied by threats of physical harm. See Tin, 310 F.3d at 88 (stating that perpetrator 
began working in Jin's branch in May 1993 and "by at least January 1994" he became her 
manager and supervisor), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 52 (2004); see also Jansen v. Packaging Corp. 
of Am., 123 F.3d 490, 513 (7th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (per curiam) (Posner, c.J., concurrirlg and 
dissenting) (positing that coworker might threaten to steal employee'S work tools if she did 
not submit to him), affd sub nom. Ellerth, 524 U.s. 742. 
245 Holly D., 339 F.3d at 1168. 
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tangible employment action. To do so, the plaintiff must demonstrate 
that she experienced a significant change in employment status that was 
brought about by an "official act of the enterprise, a company act." As 
explained in Part IV.A.I below, the change in employment status must 
be adverse. 
This Part articulates the reasons why submission cases do not satisfy 
the formal requirements of a tangible employment action and why 
construing submission cases as tangible employment actions is 
inconsistent with the policies underlying Ellerth and Faragher. For 
discussion purposes, it is necessary to break submission cases into two 
subsets. 
The first subset involves circumstances where the subordinate submits 
to the supervisor's unwelcome sexual advances because the supervisor 
threatens to impose a tangible job detriment or deny the subordinate 
tangible job benefits to which she is entitled. In such a scenario, the 
subordinate avoids the tangible job detriment or continues to enjoy the 
job benefits to which she was otherwise entitled by submitting to the 
supervisor's demands. Thus, this Article refers to the first subset as an 
"avoided-job-detriment" case. 
The second subset involves circumstances where the subordinate 
submits to the supervisor's unwelcome sexual advances because the 
supervisor promises her a job benefit to which she is not otherwise 
entitled. In such a scenario, the subordinate receives the unwarranted 
job benefit by submitting to the supervisor's sexual demands. This 
Article refers to the second subset as a "received-job-benefit" case. 
As explained in this Part, both subsets of submission cases lack the 
formal requirements of a tangible employment action. The avoided-job-
detriment cases lack the requisite significant change in employment 
status. Moreover, both the avoided-job-detriment and received-job-
benefit cases lack the necessary adverse change required under Ellerth 
and Faragher. Further, the avoided-job-detriment cases lack the requisite 
official act necessary to hold the employer strictly liable for the 
supervisor's sexual extortion. Thus, these claims amount to mere 
unfulfilled threat cases to which the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense 
applies. In addition to lacking the formal requirements of a tangible 
employment action, construing submission cases as tangible 
employment actions is inconsistent with the policies underlying the 
Court's opinions in Ellerth and Faragher. Such a conclusion is 
inconsistent with the bright line the Court endeavored to draw in Ellerth 
and Faragher, and leads to the same expansive pressure that previously 
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existed whereby plaintiffs sought to label claims as quid pro quo to 
impose strict liability. 
A. Significant Change in Employment Status 
In an attempt to bring avoided-job-detriment claims within the 
definition of a "tangible employment action," the fin and Holly D. courts 
reasoned that an avoided-job-detriment plaintiff experiences a significant 
change in employment status in the form of a significant change in her 
job requirements.246 The premise is that an avoided-job-detriment 
plaintiff experiences a significant change in job requirements when 
retention of her job becomes conditioned upon her engaging in 
unwelcome sexual conduct.247 Although there is some appeal to the 
change-in-responsibilities approach, this approach ultimately fails as it 
necessarily encompasses circumstances where a hostile work 
environment plaintiff claims that she too was forced to endure her 
supervisor's sexual comments, innuendo, inappropriate touching, and 
the like. 
The plaintiffs in both the submission and hostile environment cases 
claim that enduring the supervisor's abusive behavior effectively became 
an additional job requirement or, alternatively, resulted in a constructive 
reduction in pay. Indeed, it is precisely because actionable sexual 
harassment, regardless of the label, "alter[s] [the] terms or conditions of 
[the victim's] employment" that the Court concluded that such 
harassment violates Title VIe48 Nevertheless, because all hostile work 
environments created by a supervisor necessarily impose this additional 
job requirement, or the corresponding constructive reduction in pay, 
construing submission cases as imposirig an additional job requirement 
tantamount to a significant change in status would eviscerate the 
distinction the Court drew between hostile work environment cases and 
those involving tangible employment actions.249 For this reason alone, 
construing the subordinate's submission in an avoided-job-detriment 
case as a change in job responsibilities equal to a significant change in 
employment status is inconsistent with Ellerth and Faragher. 250 
246 Id. at 1169. 
247 Id. Because the supervisor imposes this new job requirement and yet the 
subordinate continues to receive the same rate of pay, such a scenario might alternatively 
be viewed as a constructive yet significant reduction in pay. 
248 Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986); see Ellerth, 524 U.s. at 752. 
249 See Lewis v. Forest Pharms., Inc., 217 F. Supp. 2d 638, 655 n.8 (D. Md. 2002) (stating 
that creation of hostile work environment does not constitute tangible employment action). 
250 For this same reason, the constructive yet significant reduction in pay does not 
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Additionally, the Court's examples of what constitutes a significant 
change in employment status suggest that this change in status must be a 
material action or omission beyond the change in job requirements 
experienced by an employee subjected to supervisor harassment.251 Such 
significant changes in employment status include material actions "such 
as hiring, firing, reassignment with significantly different 
responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits," as 
well as "demotion, or undesirable reassignment" and certain material 
omissions, such as a "failure to promote.,,252 The fact that official 
constitute the requisite "decision causing a significant change in benefits" for a tangible 
employment action under Ellerth. 
251 For an example of how the Ellerth/Faragher tangible employment action standard 
differs from the pre-Ellerth/Faragher "tangible job detriment" standard and thus leads to 
different outcomes regarding employer liability, compare the pre-Ellerth result in Reinhold 
v. Virginia, 135 F.3d 920, 931-33 (4th Cir. 1998) (stating that tangible job detriment is 
necessary element for quid pro quo claim, and concluding that plaintiff established prima 
facie case of quid pro quo harassment by demonstrating that, following plaintiff's rejection 
of her supervisor's unwelcome sexual advances, she suffered tangible job detriment in 
form of extra and inappropriate work assignments and being denied opportunity to attend 
valuable professional conference), with the post-Ellerth result in Reinhold v. Virginia, 151 
F.3d 172, 175 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding upon reconsideration following Court's decisions in 
Ellerth and Faragher that aSSignment of extra work does not amount to tangible 
employment action for which employer is strictly liable because increased workload does 
not amount to "change in her employment status akin to a demotion or a reassignment 
entailing significantly different job responsibilities"). See also Watts v. Kroger Co., 170 F.3d 
505, 510 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that employee does not experience requiSite "change in 
employment status" when employer changes her work schedule, expands her duties, and 
requires her to check with her supervisor before taking breaks); Durham Life Ins. Co. v. 
Evans, 166 F.3d 139, 153-54 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that plaintiff suffered tangible 
employment action when employer deprived plaintiff of negotiated conditions of plaintiff's 
employment and further deprived plaintiff of client files, which resulted in 50% decrease in 
her earnings); cf Susan Grover, After Ellerth: The Tangible Employment Action in Sexual 
Harassment Analysis, 35 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 809, 839 (2002) (discussing courts' narrow 
interpretation of tangible employment action, arguing that focus of tangible employment 
action analysis is "not so much the dimension of the action taken against the subordinate, 
but the source of the power the supervisor uses to take that action," and concluding that 
"[i)f that power is derived from the authority the supervisor derives from his relationship 
with the employer, the action taken is a [tangible employment action), regardless of 
whether it alters the subordinate's status in any ultimate sense"). 
252 Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 761, 765. Given the Court's use of the phrase "such as" when 
listing actions that constitute a Significant change in status and the Court's subsequent 
decision in Suders in which the Court held that a significant change in employment status 
not specifically included in the illustrative list - a constructive discharge preceded by an 
official act - may constitute a tangible employment action, the Jin court was correct in its 
conclusion that the list of possible tangible employment actions was not exhaustive. See Jin 
v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 310 F.3d 94, 97 n.8 (2d Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 52 (2004). 
Although the list was not exhaustive, submission cases nevertheless do not constitute 
tangible employment actions because the circumstances lack the prerequisites of an 
adverse significant change in employment status brought about by an official act for the 
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company records will reflect most of these actions further supports the 
material nature of the actions and omissions contemplated by the Court 
in Ellerth.253 
Because an avoided-job-detriment plaintiff maintains the status quo, 
she cannot demonstrate the requisite change in employment status, 
much less the requisite significant change. This was essentially the 
conclusion reached in Speaks v. City of Lakeland,254 in which the district 
court concluded that an employee who simply maintains the status quo 
has not experienced the requisite change in status. Nevertheless, this 
conclusion must be reconciled with the significant change in 
employment status that occurs where a plaintiff, who is entitled to a 
promotion, is not promoted because she resisted her supervisor's 
advances and thus maintains the status quo. 
To reconcile the differing results in the failure to terminate and failure 
to promote scenarios, one need only look at the categories into which the 
significant change in employment status examples provided by the 
Court fall. With the sole exception of hiring, as discussed more fully 
below, the examples of a significant change in employment status fall 
into one of two categories: either an unwarranted detrimental job action, 
such as a termination or a demotion, or an unwarranted failure to carry 
out a beneficial job action under circumstances where the employee was 
entitled to the action, such as a failure to promote.255 Thus, when a 
supervisor fails to promote a subordinate who is otherwise entitled to a 
promotion because the subordinate refused his unwelcome sexual 
advances, the subordinate continues to work with the same job, pay, 
benefits, and responsibilities and thus maintains the status quo. Yet, 
such a failure to promote would constitute the requisite change in 
employment status precisely because the supervisor prevented the 
employee from receiving something to which the employee was entitled. 
reasons discussed more fully in Part IV. 
253 Ellerth, 524 U.s. at 762; see Michael C. Harper, Employer Liability for Harassment Under 
Title VII: A Functional Rationale for Faragher and Ellerth, 36 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 41, 75 (1999) 
(arguing that "critical consideration [in determining what constitutes a tangible 
employment action] should be whether the discriminating supervisor has recorded or 
reported his discriminatory action ... so that it is readily available for review"). 
254 315 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1227 (M.D. Fla. 2004). 
255 The "significant change in employment status" examples provided by the Court 
appear at first blush to contemplate three types of results: (1) actions and omissions with 
negative consequences such as "firing, failure to promote," "demotion, or undesirable 
reaSSignment," (2) actions that may have positive, neutral, or negative consequences such as 
"reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a 
significant change in benefits," and (3) actions with positive consequences such as "hiring." 
Nevertheless, as explained more fully in Part V.A.l, the change must be adverse. 
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Applying the same reasoning to an avoided-job-detriment case, the 
analysis collapses because the supervisor has not deprived the employee 
of anything to which she was entitled, and thus, the employee has not 
experienced a change in employment status, much less a significant 
change. For this reason, the Ninth Circuit's conclusion that the 
significant change in employment status examples necessarily include 
their opposites - firing necessarily implies failing to fire256 - is 
incorrect, at least with respect to circumstances where the employee who 
submits maintains the status quo to which she is otherwise entitled. 
To better understand these differences, it is helpful to employ a spatial 
construct composed of trajectories that represent an employee's standing 
and progress within the employer's organization. In this example, the 
construct consists of three employees with corresponding trajectories: 
Employee A, who is performing well, entitled to a promotion, and on an 
upward trajectory within the organization; Employee B, who is 
performing satisfactorily, entitled to retain her position, and on a flat 
trajectory within the organization; and Employee C, who is performing 
poorly, subject to termination, and on a downward trajectory within the 
organization. Employee A, who is entitled to a promotion but who does 
not receive it because she spurned her supervisor's advances, effectively 
experiences a change in her employment status as her trajectory shifts 
from upward to flat. Employee B, who retains her job either because she 
submitted to her supervisor's advances or because she refused but then 
suffered no job detriment, does not experience a change in her 
employment status as her trajectory remains flat. Finally, Employee C, 
who is performing poorly and is subject to termination but is not 
terminated because she submitted to her supervisor's advances, 
experiences a change in her employment status as her trajectory shifts 
from downward to flat. 
In the scenarios described above, Employees A and C are the only 
employees who experience the requisite change contemplated in 
Ellerth. 257 Whether a court labels Employee B's situation as an avoided-
256 Holly D. v. Cal. Inst. of Tech., 339 F.3d 1158, 1170 (9th Cir. 2003); see text 
accompanying note 147 (noting EEOC includes both promotion and failure to promote as 
examples of tangible employment actions). 
157 The Ninth Circuit concluded: 
When a supervisor [1] hires or promotes an employee because she complies with 
his sexual demands - or when he [2] fires or passes her over for promotion 
because she refuses to comply - he has abused his authority as the employer's 
agent and has taken a 'tangible employment action.' The same is true when a 
supervisor determines that the retention of an employee in the employer'S 
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job-detriment claim or, as the Second and Ninth Circuit concluded, the 
"receipt of a job benefit" in the form of continued employment,2S8 the 
result is the same - Employee B's trajectory remains unchanged. Thus, 
Employee B's employment status has not changed significantly as 
required under Ellerth. Moreover, as discussed in Part IV.A.I below, 
because the Court's decision in Ellerth suggests that the change in 
trajectory must be downward or negative, Employee B has not 
experienced the requisite adverse change under Ellerth. 
Although Employee C's trajectory has changed, she faces a similar 
hurdle. Employee C received a benefit to which she was not otherwise 
entitled, and her trajectory shifted from downward to flat precisely 
because she submitted to her supervisor's advances. Because the Court 
included the positive action of hiring as one of the examples of a 
significant change in employment status, Employee C's retention of 
employment under circumstances where she was not otherwise entitled 
to do so may constitute a change in employment status akin to the 
change experienced by someone who is fired or not promoted because 
she refused a supervisor's sexual demands. Nevertheless, because the 
shift in trajectory must be downward or negative, Employee C, like 
Employee B, has not experienced the adverse change required under 
Ellerth. 
employ will depend on her participation in sexual acts, and then either [3] fires 
her because she does not participate or [4] retains her in her position because she 
does. 
Holly D., 339 F.3d at 1171. While the Ninth Circuit is correct that the "supervisor has 
abused his authority as the employer's agent" in each of the four scenarios and the 
employees in categories 1, 2, and 3 have experienced the requisite change in status, the 
employee in category 4 has not experienced the requisite "change in status" for the reasons 
explained above. Moreover, although the employees in categories 1, 2, and 3 have 
experienced the requisite change in status to constitute a tangible employment action, the 
employee in category 1 lacks the requisite adverse change, and thus has not experienced a 
tangible employment action, as explained more fully below. 
258 Holly D., 339 F.3d at 1169; see also Jin v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 310 F.3d 94, 97 (2d Cir. 
2002) (noting that tangible employment actions do not require economic harm), cert. denied, 
125 S. Ct. 52 (2004). Presumably the reason the Second and Ninth Circuits characterized 
the avoided-job-detriment scenario as the subordinate's receipt of a "benefit" in the form of 
continued employment was because the characterization appears analytically closer to 
Ellerth's required Significant change in employment status or benefits. Additionally, by 
characterizing the avoided-job-detriment case in this fashion, both courts were likely trying 
to bring the circumstances within the EEOC's definition of a "tangible employment action." 
See EEOC, supra note 147. Notwithstanding the characterization, the fact remains that the 
avoided-job-detriment plaintiff has not experienced the requisite change in status as 
discussed above. Moreover, even if the avoided-job-detriment scenario is characterized as 
a "benefit" received, such a characterization raises a separate issue: the plaintiff lacks the 
requisite adverse change. See discussion infra Part IV.A.1. 
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1. Adverse Change Requirement 
Notwithstanding the Court's inclusion of the term "hiring" in its 
illustrative list of significant changes in employment status, these 
examples must be interpreted in light of the Ellerth opinion as a whole, 
which indicates that the change in employment status must be adverse.259 
Indeed, the significant change in employment status concept stems from 
Chief Judge Posner's opinion in Jansen v. Packaging Corporation of 
Americi
60 where he coined the phrase "company act." Chief Judge 
Posner defined a "company act" as a "significant alteration in the terms 
or conditions of [the] victim's employment" under circumstances where 
a supervisor engages in any of the following adverse actions or 
omissions: "fires her, or denies her a promotion, or blocks a scheduled 
raise, or demotes her, or transfers her to a less desirable job location, or 
refuses to give her the training that the company rules entitle her to 
receive.,,261 The adverse nature of these actions is further supported by 
Chief Judge Posner's statement that strict liability should attach when a 
subordinate is terminated or otherwise injured in this manner.262 
259 Indeed, when illustrating the distinction between actions that are sufficient to 
constitute a tangible employment action and those that are not, the Court cited disparate 
treatment cases. In doing so, it suggested that tangible employment actions are those 
comprised of a "material adverse change" as compared with those actions that implicate a 
slight imposition or inconvenience. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761 
(1998) (comparing Crady v. Liberty Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 993 F.2d 132, 136 (7th Cir. 1993) 
("A materially adverse change might be indicated by a termination of employment, a 
demotion evidenced by a decrease in wage or salary, a less distinguished title, a material 
loss of benefits, significantly diminished responsibilities, or other indices that might be 
unique to a particular situation.") (emphasis added), with Kocsis v. Multi-Care Mgmt. Inc., 
97 F.3d 876, 887 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that demotion without change in pay, benefits, 
duties, or prestige is insufficient to constitute tangible employment action), and Harlston v. 
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 37 F.3d 379, 382 (8th Cir. 1994) (finding reassignment to more 
inconvenient job insufficient)). Additionally, the Court later suggested in its joint holding 
in Ellerth and Faragher that any reassignment must be adverse: "No affirmative defense is 
available, however, when the supervisor's harassment culminates in a tangible 
employment action, such as discharge, demotion, or undesirable reaSSignment." Pa. State 
Police v. Suders, 542 US. 129, 137-38 (2004) (quoting same) (emphasis added); Ellerth, 524 
US. at 765 (emphasis added); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 808 (1998) 
(emphasis added). 
260 123 F.3d 490 (7th Cir. 1997). 
261 Jansen v. Packaging Corp. of Am., 123 F.3d 490, 512 (7th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (per 
curiam) (Posner, c.J., concurring and dissenting), affd sub nom. Ellerth, 524 US. 742. 
262 Id.; see id. at 499 (Flaum, J., concurring) (acknowledging Chief Judge Posner's 
position that "adverse job consequence is necessary to succeed on quid pro quo claim," and 
noting that "adverse job consequence" "takes the guise of [aJ 'company act' in Chief Judge 
Posner's opinion"). 
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Moreover, the Court's repeated use of the terms "threat," "injury," 
"harm," and "inflicted" in Ellerth suggests that it contemplated that 
tangible employment actions would encompass only adverse actions and 
omissions.
263 
For example, the Court distinguished between 
circumstances where a supervisor's "threats are carried out and those 
where they are not or are absent altogether .... ,,264 The Court did not 
mention "promises of job benefits made and fulfilled." Furthermore, 
with respect to the "injury inflicted" upon the plaintiff when a 
supervisor takes a tangible employment action, the Court explained: 
When a supervisor makes a tangible employment decision, there is 
assurance the injury could not have been inflicted absent the agency 
relation. A tangible employment action in most cases inflicts direct 
economic harm. As a general proposition, only a supervisor, or 
other person actinJ with the authority of the company, can cause 
this sort of injury.z 
In addition to the term "injury," the Court also used the term "harm" 
when describing the tangible effect of the supervisor's abuse of 
authority. For example, the Court referred to the "direct economic harm" 
caused by most tangible employment actions.266 It also referred to the 
"harm caused by misuse of supervisory authority" and the subordinate's 
coordinate duty to "avoid harm."z67 In each of these instances, the Court 
used the terms "threat," "injury," "harm," and "inflicted" to denote the 
negative job-related consequences suffered by a subordinate as a result 
of the adverSe action or omission. 
While both an avoided-job-detriment and a received-job-benefit 
plaintiff may suffer psychological injury or harm, the Court's efforts to 
distinguish psychological injuries from the job-related injury uniquely 
caused by a supervisor's official adverse action or omission further 
compels the conclusion that tangible employment actions must be 
adverse. In this respect, the Court stated: 
A tangible employment action in most cases inflicts direct economic 
harm. As a general proposition, only a supervisor, or other person 
acting with the authority of the company, can cause this sort of injury. 
A co-worker can break a co-worker's arm as easily as a supervisor, 
263 See Woodford & Rissetto, supra note 167, at 79-80 (noting that terms "threat," 
"against," "injury," and "harm" denote adverse actions). 
264 Ellerth, 524 U.s. at 751. 
265 [d. at 761-62 (emphasis added). 
266 [d. at 762 (emphasis added). 
267 [d. at 764-65 (emphasis added). 
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and anyone who has regular contact with an employee can inflict 
psychological injuries by his or her offensive conduct. But one co-
worker (absent some elaborate scheme) cannot dock another's pay, 
268 nor can one co-worker demote another. 
To illustrate the distinction between the type of injuries resulting from a 
supervisor's adverse action or omission and those resulting from 
nonadverse actions or omissions, recall the injuries suffered by 
Employees A, B, and C in the hypothetical discussed above. Employee A 
suffers job-related, although not necessarily economic, injury when her 
supervisor fails to promote her because she did not submit to his sexual 
demands. In contrast, the injuries suffered by the employees who 
submit to the supervisor's sexual demands - B, the avoided-job-
detriment case, and C, the received-job-benefit case are 
hI .1 269 psyc 0 oglca . 
All three employees suffered injuries that the supervisor had the 
unique ability to inflict, but the types of injury they suffered differ in 
legally significant ways. The job-related injury suffered by Employee A 
is uniquely within the supervisor's ability to inflict. The injuries suffered 
by Employees Band C, however, are exclusively psychological. Thus, 
they are the same type of injury suffered by a plaintiff who endures 
sexual harassment in the form of offensive behavior by either a coworker 
or supervisor. Accordingly, the Court's distinction between 
psychological injuries and the types of job-related injuries uniquely 
inflicted by a supervisor's adverse action or omission is yet another 
reason supporting the conclusion that the Court intended to include only 
adverse actions or omissions in the tangible employment action 
definition. 
Additionally, the Court's use of the phrase "taken against a 
subordinate" when referring to the phrase "tangible employment action" 
further bolsters the conclusion that tangible employment actions include 
only adverse actions or omissions with job-related negative 
consequences: 
At the outset, we can identify a class of cases where, beyond 
question, more than the mere existence of the employment relation 
aids in commission of harassment: when a supervisor takes a tangible 
employment action against the subordinate. . .. Whatever the exact 
contours of the aided in the agency relation standard, its 
268 ld. at 762 (citations omitted) (emphasiS added). 
2b9 Admittedly, such injuries are as "tangible as an injury can be." Holly D. v. Cal. Inst. 
of Tech., 339 F.3d 1158, 1171 (9th Cir. 2003). 
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requirements will always be met when a supervisor takes a tangible 
employment action against a subordinate.,,27o 
583 
If the Court intended tangible employment actions to also include 
positive or neutral actions and omissions, it could have easily used the 
phrase "takes a tangible employment action regarding or with respect to a 
subordinate." 
Finally, the Court's opinion in Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders271 
further supports the conclusion that tangible employment actions 
encompass only adverse actions and omissions. In Suders, the Court 
noted that Ellerth and Faragher "distinguished between supervisor 
harassment unaccompanied by an adverse official act and supervisor 
harassment attended by a 'tangible employment action.,,,272 
270 Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 760-63 (emphasis added). 
271 542 U.s. 129 (2004). 
2n Suders, 542 U.s. at 137-38 (quoting ElIerth, 524 U.S. at 765) (emphasis added). In 
light of the Court's repeated references to changes in employment status that are adverse in 
nature, the Court's reference to the "hiring" context in Ellerth should be construed as a 
reference to a "failure to hire" where the applicant was otherwise qualified but was not 
hired because she did not submit to the supervisor's advances. 
Certain cases have concluded that a tangible employment must be adverse. See 
Walton v. Johnson & Johnson Servs., Inc., 347 F.3d 1272, 1280-81 (11th Cir. 2003) (quoting 
language employed in Frederick v. Sprint/llnited Mgmt. Co., 246 F.3d 1305, 1311 (11th Cir. 
2001», cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 1714 (2004); Frederick, 246 F.3d at 1311 (requiring tangible 
employment action be adverse to impose strict liability); Davis v. Town of Lake Park, 245 
F.3d 1232, 1239 (11th Cir. 2001) (stating that Ellerth Court "suggested that some kind of 
significantly adverse employment action is necessary to prove an employer's Title VII 
liability" for sexual harassment); Molnar v. Booth, 229 F.3d 593, 600 (7th Cir. 2000) (stating 
that tangible employment action must cause '"a substantial detriment to plaintiff's 
employment relationship"') (quoting Savino v. c.P. Hall Co., 199 F.3d 139, 932, n. 8 (7th 
Cir. 1999»; Savino, 199 F.3d at 932 n.8 (stating that tangible employment action must cause 
"a substantial detriment to the plaintiff's employment relationship" and is "akin to an 
adverse employment action"); Watts v. Kroger Co., 170 F.3d 505, 510 (5th Cir. 1999) (stating 
that tangible employment action must be adverse, but not addressing whether tangible 
employment action is synonymous with "adverse employment action" for purposes of 
Title VII retaliation claim); Durham Life Ins. Co. v. Evans, 166 F.3d 139 (3d Cir. 1999) 
(stating employer is strictly liable when subordinate suffers tangible adverse employment 
action); Indest v. Freeman Decorating, Inc., 164 F.3d 258, 264 (5th Cir. 1999) (stating that 
tangible employment action exists when sexual harassment culminates in adverse 
employment decision); Coates v. Sundor Brands, Inc., 164 F.3d 1361, 1367 (11th Cir. 1999) 
(Barkett, J., concurring specially) (stating that Court in Ellerth "differentiated between cases 
in which an employee suffers an adverse 'tangible employment action' as a result of sexual 
harassment and those cases in which an employee suffers the intangible harm of the 
indignity and humiliation caused by hostile work environment sexual harassment"); 
Wilbur v. Corr. Servs. Corp., No. 5:02CV220-0C10GRJ, 2003 WL 23009901, at '4 (M.D. Fla. 
2003) (concluding that "adverse employment action" and tangible employment action are 
synonymous); Fisher v. Elec. Data Sys., 278 F. Supp. 2d 980, 988 (S.D. Iowa 2003) (noting 
that Eighth Circuit has taken position that "absent a tangible job detriment, no 'tangible 
employment action' can be shown"); Gonzalez v. Beth Israel Med. Ctr., 262 F. Supp. 2d 342, 
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For all of these reasons, submission cases do not constitute the 
requisite significant change in employment status. The avoided-job-
detriment plaintiffs cannot demonstrate the requisite change in status, 
even where the circumstances are characterized as a received-job-benefit 
case. Moreover, neither avoided-job-detriment nor received-job-benefit 
cases encompass the necessary adverse action or omission contemplated 
by the Court in Ellerth. Accordingly, submission cases do not constitute 
the tangible employment action necessary to impose strict liability on an 
employer under Ellerth. Furthermore, avoided-job-detriment cases suffer 
from an additional fatal flaw: they lack the requisite official act under 
Ellerth. 
351-52 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (construing tangible employment action to mean "improperly 
motivated conduct by supervisors that brings 'the official power of the enterprise to bear 
on subordinates,' negatively impacting the worker's employment status in a significant, but 
not necessarily materially adverse, way") (quoting Ellerth, 524 U.s. at 762»; Crosson v. 
Caremark, Inc., 212 F. Supp. 2d 875, 882 n.5 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (noting that Seventh Circuit 
construes tangible employment action as adverse action and thus looks to "adverse 
employment action" cases to determine whether plaintiff has suffered tangible 
employment action); see also Chamallas, supra note 11, at 346 (noting that, notwithstanding 
Second Circuit's conclusion in Tin that adverse action is not required, other courts will 
likely require plaintiff to show that she "suffered an adverse change in employment 
status"); Nancy R. Mansfield & Joan T.A. Gabel, An Analysis of the Burlington and Faragher 
Affirmative Defense: When Are Employers Liable?, 19 LAB. LAW. 107, 115-16 (2003) (suggesting 
that tangible employment action must be adverse); David F. McCann, Supervisory Sexual 
Harassment and Employer Liability: The Third Circuit Sheds Light on Vicarious Liability and 
Affirmative Defenses, 45 VILL. L. REV. 767 (2000) (using phrase "adverse tangible 
employment action" throughout when describing Ellerth tangible employment action 
standard); Woodford & Rissetto, supra note 167, at 79-81 (concluding that Ellerth Court's 
language "implies that the Court was thinking solely of adverse actions"). 
For cases concluding that a tangible employment action need not be adverse, see 
supra Part III.A.1 and the discussion of Tin and Holly D. See supra Part I1I.B for a discussion 
of the Third Circuit's approach to constructive discharge in Suders, which was reversed by 
the Court, and see infra text accompanying notes 340, 342. A number of additional cases 
have concluded that a tangible employment action need not be adverse. See Brown v. 
Perry, 184 F.3d 388, 395 (4th Cir. 1999) (implying that receipt of promotion may constitute 
tangible employment action); Lewis v. Forest Pharms., Inc., 217 F. Supp. 2d 638, 655 n.8 (D. 
Md. 2002) ("Tangible employment actions ... need not be adverse."); see supra text 
accompanying note 147 (describing EEOC's position); see also Rebecca Hanner White, De 
Minimis Discrimination, 47 EMORY L.J. 1121, 1160 (1998) (arguing that tangible employment 
action under Ellerth "need not be ultimate nor materially adverse, but it must involve an act 
'within the special province of the supervisor"'); Rebecca Hanner White & Linda Hamilton 
Krieger, Whose Motive Matters?: Discrimination in Multi-Actor Employment Decision Making, 
61 LA. L. REV. 495, 537 n.237 (2001) (stating that "[w]hether a tangible employment action 
must be materially adverse is debatable"). 
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2. Official Act Requirement 
Notwithstanding Ellerth's requirement of "an official act of the 
enterprise, a company act,',273 certain courts faced with avoided-job-
detriment cases274 and certain courts faced with constructive discharge 
cases have dispensed with the official act requirement. They have done 
so by either explicitly stating it does not apply to submission cases or 
implicitly concluding it does not apply in such cases by engaging in the 
somewhat circular reasoning that the plaintiff satisfied the official act 
requirement because the supervisor "invoke[ed] the official authority of 
the enterprise" in causing the resulting harm.275 Although these 
overlapping approaches may be superficially appealing, neither is 
consistent with the Court's tangible employment action jurisprudence, 
particularly in light of the Court's recent constructive discharge decision 
in Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders. 276 
Dispensing with the official act requirement is inconsistent with the 
plain language of Ellerth, which unequivocally requires an official act. 277 
Although certain courts appear inclined to treat submission cases as 
unique and thus dispense with the official act requirement, the Suders 
Court specifically reaffirmed Ellerth's official act requirement in the 
analogous constructive discharge context. In doing so, the Court 
explicitly stated that Ellerth and Faragher "divided the universe of 
supervisor-harassment claims according to the presence or absence of an 
official act. ,,278 
Prior to Suders, the Third Circuit dispensed with the official act 
requirement in the constructive discharge context by analogizing 
constructive discharge claims to submission claims in reliance on the 
reasoning in Jin.279 According to the Third Circuit, the better approach 
for both claims was to simply dispense with the official act requirement 
and recognize that a supervisor who either "creates a hostile work 
environment so severe than an employee has no alternative but to 
273 Ellerth, 524 U.s. at 762. 
2" Part IV.A.2.a addresses only avoided-job-detriment cases because the "official act" 
requirement is met in received-job-benefit cases - the supervisor's official act in bestowing 
the unwarranted benefit suffices. 
27S Suders v. Easton, 325 F.3d 432, 459 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing Jin v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 
310 F.3d 94, 98 (2d Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 52 (2004», vacated sub nom. Pa. State 
Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129 (2004). 
276 542 U.S. 129 (2004). 
2n Ellerth, 524 U.s. at 762. 
278 Suders, 542 U.s. at 149-50. 
2" See supra notes 218-19 and accompanying text. 
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resign" or extorts sexual acts from subordinates "brings the official 
power of the enterprise to bear" on the victimized subordinate.280 The 
Court in Suders drew the line differently and in a way that contradicts 
the reasoning and conclusions in Jin and Holly D. The Court reversed the 
Third Circuit and required that a plaintiff who is constructively 
discharged, and thus experiences the requisite significant change in 
employment status solely as a result of supervisory sexual harassment, 
must still prove that an official act precipitated the constructive 
discharge. In doing so, the Court noted that a constructive discharge 
involves both an employee's decision to leave and the conduct that 
precipitated the resignation. It reasoned that an employee's resignation 
obviously involves no official action, while the precipitating conduct 
may. Accordingly, the Court held that a constructive discharge 
constitutes a tangible employment action only when precipitated by an 
official act of the enterprise.281 The same rationale applies in the 
submission context. 
Like a constructive discharge situation, where an employee decides 
that she has no choice but to resign to avoid the harm, a submission 
situation involves an employee's decision to avoid the threatened harm 
by engaging in the unwelcome conduct. And like the employee's 
unilateral decision to resign in the constructive discharge context, the 
employee's unilateral decision to submit involves no official action.282 
For this reason alone, a submission plaintiff must prove an official act. 
Moreover, as in the constructive discharge context, dispensing with 
the official act requirement in the avoided-job-detriment case would lead 
to an anomalous result. A subordinate who submits to a supervisor's 
unwelcome sexual advances to avoid the threatened termination 
arguably possesses a graver claim than a subordinate who successfully 
resists her supervisor's advances and threats but is not terminated.
283 
Yet, in the absence of an official action requirement, the submission 
plaintiff's claim is an easier claim to prove than the hostile work 
280 Suders, 325 F.3d at 459. 
281 Suders, 542 U.S. at 148; see supra notes 226-31 and accompanying text. 
282 See infra note 285 and accompanying text (discussing reasons why supervisor's 
threat of job detriment does not constitute requisite official action). 
283 As the court in lin reCOgnized, "the employee who is coerced into satisfying a 
supervisor's sexual demands to keep her job may suffer a greater injury than the employee 
who is able to refuse those demands." Jin v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 310 F.3d 84, 99 (2d Cir. 
2002), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 52 (2004). And as Justice Reinhardt appropriately noted in 
Nichols, "[nlothing is more destructive of human dignity than being forced to perform 
sexual acts against one's will." Nichols v. Frank, 42 F.3d 503, 510 (9th Cir. 1994). 
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environment claim available to the resisting employee.284 For these 
reasons, dispensing with the official act requirement in the submission 
context is inconsistent with Ellerth, Faragher, and Suders. Thus, the 
remaining question is whether an avoided-job-detriment plaintiff can 
demonstrate the requisite official act. The answer to that question is 
linD." 
a. Absence of Official Act 
An avoided-job-detriment plaintiff may attempt to demonstrate the 
presence of an official act through one of two approaches. First, the 
plaintiff may show that the supervisor's purported decision to not take 
the threatened action because the plaintiff submitted constitutes an 
official act. Second, the plaintiff may construe the supervisor's threat of 
job detriment coupled with her submission as the requisite official act. 28S 
Nevertheless, both approaches fail because an avoided-job-detriment 
plaintiff cannot show the requisite "change in employment status." 
Under the first approach, the Ninth Circuit characterized the plaintiff's 
submission as the catalyst for a final decision, or official act, taken by the 
employer after the submission occurred. In doing so, it created a 
construct whereby the supervisor's threat to terminate an employee is 
deemed to be a conditional decision to terminate.286 The Ninth Circuit 
then treated the supervisor's decision to retain the employee once she 
submitted as essentially rescinding the earlier conditional decision and 
making a further purported final determination to retain the employee.287 
Based on this reasoning, the Ninth Circuit concluded that "determining 
not to fire an employee who has been threatened with discharge 
constitutes a 'tangible employment action,' at least where the reason for 
28' Moreover, unlike a constructive discharge plaintiff, a submission plaintiff does not 
bear the burden of meeting a high liability threshold that requires proof of objectively 
intolerable working conditions. 
285 Because the Court in Ellerth concluded that Ellerth's resignation did not constitute a 
tangible employment action, it necessarily follows that Ellerth's supervisor's threats to 
deny her tangible job benefits did not constitute the official act necessary to transform 
Ellerth's resignation into a tangible employment action constructive discharge. For the 
same reasons, the Court implicitly rejected the argument that a supervisor's refusal to 
provide guidance or permission to complete a job-related task constitutes the official act 
necessary to transform a forced resignation into a tangible employment action constructive 
discharge. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.s. 742, 748 (1998) (noting that 
Ellerth's supervisor had refused to provide permission to insert customer's logo on fabric 
sample when he stated: "I don't have time for you right now, Kim ... - unless you tell me 
what you're wearing."). 
286 Holly D. v. Cal. Inst. of Tech., 339 F.3d 1158, 1169 (9th Cir. 2003). 
287 Id. 
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the change in the employment decision is that the employee has 
submitted to the coercive sexual demands.,,288 In essence, treating a 
submission case as a series of three actions, as opposed to the two actions 
consisting of the supervisor's threat followed by the employee's 
submission, shifts the focus of the last action from that of the employee 
to the supervisor's "nonaction" or fictional decision to retain the 
employee. By shifting the focus, the Ninth Circuit attempted to show 
that the last action in the series was the supervisor's official act in 
.. h I 289 retammg t e emp oyee. 
Although the Ninth Circuit's approach is analytically innovative, it 
does not satisfy the official act requirement. The only way to shift the 
focus from the employee to the supervisor in the avoided-job-detriment 
scenario is to employ the fiction that once the employee submitted, the 
supervisor decided to retain the employee. A tangible employment 
action, however, requires an adverse change in status brought about by 
an official act, not merely a change in decision. That adverse change in 
status only occurs once the supervisor takes a concrete action or makes a 
concrete and final decision in the form of an official act.290 In the absence 
of such an adverse change in employment status, it is impossible to 
know whether the supervisor initially decided to terminate the employee 
or whether he was merely bluffing. 
Additionally, the Court's subsequent opinion in Suders rejected an 
analogous focus-shifting argument in the constructive discharge context. 
In Suders, various amici curiae argued that a constructive discharge 
satisfies the official act requirement because the "official nature of the 
discharge is reinforced by the employer's receipt, acceptance, processing 
and recording of the employee'S letter or other notice of resignation.,,291 
288 [d. 
289 As discussed more fully in Part IV.B infra, this is essentially a return to the pre-
EUerth/Faragher state of the law regarding quid pro quo in which an employer was held 
strictly liable for a supervisor's "unwelcome sexual conduct" when the supervisor used the 
victim's reaction to that conduct "as the basis for decisions affecting the compensation, 
terms, conditions or privileges of her employment." Karibian v. Columbia Univ., 14 F.3d 
773, 777 (2d Cir. 1994). The focus is now on whether the plaintiff suffered a tangible 
employment action in the form of an adverse Significant change in status brought about by 
a supervisor's official act. 
m See, e.x., Gupta v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 212 F.3d 571, 588 (11th Cir. 2000) (concluding 
in Title VII retaliation context, which requires that plaintiff prove that she suffered 
"adverse employment action," that "a proposed action that is corrected as soon as the 
proper official is made aware of it before it goes into effect, so that the employee does not 
actually suffer any consequence, is not 'adverse"'). 
291 Brief for the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law et al. at 23, Suders v. 
Easton 325 F.3d 432 (3d Cir. 2003) (No. 03-95). 
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Essentially, this argument analyzes a constructive discharge as 
consisting of a series of three acts: the supervisor's harassment of the 
subordinate, the subordinate's resignation, and the employer's receipt 
and processing of the subordinate's resignation. By characterizing a 
constructive discharge in this manner, the amici curiae essentially 
construed the third act in the series - the employer's processing of the 
discharge - as the official act. Nevertheless, the Court in Suders held 
that a constructive discharge is only a tangible employment action when 
an official act precedes the resignation. Because the Court rejected this 
focus-shifting analysis in the analogous constructive discharge context, it 
implicitly rejected the same analysis in the submission context. 
The second approach is to construe the supervisor's threat coupled 
with the employee'S action in submitting as the official act. This 
approach fails, however, because the Court in Suders implicitly rejected 
this approach when it approved of the First Circuit's ap~roach to 
constructive discharge in Reed v. MBNA Marketing System, Inc. 2 2 In Reed, 
the plaintiff's supervisor subjected her to inappropriate sexual touching, 
comments, and assaults, which prompted the plaintiff to resign.293 
Following her resignation, she alleged that her employer was strictly 
liable for her supervisor's actions because she had been constructively 
discharged.294 She argued that she satisfied Ellerth's official action 
requirement because she refrained from reporting the verbal harassment 
and sexual assault due to her supervisor's threats to fire her if she 
reported the harassment.295 The First Circuit concluded that the 
circumstances lacked the requisite official action to render a constructive 
discharge a tangible employment action, even though the plaintiff 
refrained from reporting the harassment and assault because of her 
supervisor's threatening statements.296 Subsequently, the Suders Court 
expressly approved of the First Circuit's conclusion that the supervisor's 
behavior did not involve any official act, that the conduct was 
III exceedingly unofficial and involved no direct exercise of company 
authority,'" and that it was IIlexactly the kind of wholly unauthorized 
conduct for which the affirmative defense was designed.",297 
2" Reed v. MBNA Mktg. Sys. Inc., 333 F.3d 27 (1st Cir. 2003). 
293 ld. at 30-31. 
294 [d. at 33. 
295 Id. at 37. 
296 [d. at 33-34. 
'J97 Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.s. 129,150 (2004) (citing Reed, 333 F.3d at 33). This 
conclusion could not have come as much of a surprise for two reasons. First, the Court had 
foreshadowed this result in Ellerth. See supra text accompanying note 285. Second, because 
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Accordingly, the employer in Reed could assert the EllerthlFaragher 
affirmative defense. 
Under the reasoning in Reed, as approved by Suders, there may be 
circumstances in which a supervisor sexually harasses a subordinate, 
threatens to discharge her if she reports, and perhaps even increases the 
intensity of the sexual harassment to cause her to quit. The Third Circuit 
in Suders even acknowledged that "[s]ome employers might wish for an 
employee to quit voluntarily[, while] others might even tacitly approve 
of increased harassment to achieve that result.//298 Nevertheless, even 
when a constructively discharged plaintiff refrains from reporting 
supervisor harassment precisely because her supervisor explicitly 
threatened her with discharge, as in Reed, the supervisor's threat coupled 
with the employee's submission does not constitute the official act 
necessary to hold the employer strictly liable. 
The reasoning of Reed applies equally to submission cases. Just as a 
supervisor's explicit threats of discharge that cause a plaintiff to refrain 
from acting involve no official action, a supervisor's explicit threats of 
discharge that cause a plaintiff to act and submit to sexual demands 
involve no official action.299 Accordingly, an avoided-job-detriment case 
simply falls on the wrong side of the bright line that the Court sought to 
draw between official act-tangible employment actions for which an 
employer is strictly liable and all other cases to which the 
EllerthlFaragher affirmative defense applies.3QO 
the "official act" concept was coined by Chief Judge Posner in Jansen, Chief Judge Posner's 
conclusion that a mere threat does not constitute an "official act," even when the threat is 
successful, foreshadows a similar result: 
Strict liability is inappropriate ... when the supervisor merely makes threats, 
even if the threats are effective. This is why it is important to distinguish 
between the type of quid pro quo harassment in which the supervisor actually 
alters the terms and conditions of his victim's employment and the type of 
harassment in which he merely threatens to do so, whether or not the victim 
yields to the threats. Suppose the supervisor threatens to fire a subordinate 
unless she'll have sex with him, and she agrees - or refuses and he does not 
carry out his threat. In either case, because he has not used his delegated 
authority to commit a company act, there is no way in which a system for vetting 
such acts would catch him out. 
Jansen v. Packaging Corp. of Am., 123 F.3d 490, 513 (7th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (per curiam) 
(Posner, c.J., concurring and dissenting), affd sub nom. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 
524 U.s. 742 (1998). 
298 Suders v. Easton, 325 F.3d 432, 461 (3d Cir. 2003), vacated sub nom. Pa. State Police v. 
Suders, 542 U.s. 129 (2004). 
299 See supra text accompanying note 297. 
300 Suders, 542 U.s. at 149-50 (stating that Ellerth and Faragher classified such claims 
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b. Absence of Fulfilled Threat 
To compensate for the lack of a significant change in employment 
status and the lack of an official act in the avoided-job-detriment case, 
the Ninth Circuit in Holly D. attempted to construe the circumstances as 
a fulfilled threat case where the threat itself gives rise to a tangible 
employment action.301 Notwithstanding the Ellerth Court's conclusion 
that the quid pro quo label does not control vicarious liability, the Ninth 
Circuit reasoned that in the classic quid pro quo avoided-job-detriment 
scenario, the "threat does not simply remain unfulfilled or inchoate, but 
rather results in a concrete consequence. The supervisor accomplishes 
the objective of the threat - the coercion of the sexual act - by bringing 
to bear the authority to make critical employment determinations on 
behalf of his employer.,,302 
The fundamental problem with the Ninth Circuit's approach is that 
Ellerth requires something more than the supervisor "bringing to bear 
the authority to make critical employment determinations on behalf of 
his employer" to impose strict liability on an employer. If the 
supervisor's abuse of authority was sufficient, the Court would have 
retained the quid pro quo category of harassment as a proxy for strict 
liability instead of creating the tangible employment action standard. 
Indeed, if abuse of authority alone was sufficient, a supervisor's 
reassignment of a subordinate who spurned his advances to a more 
inconvenient job would constitute a tangible employment action. 
Nevertheless, the Court in Ellerth explicitly rejected this conclusion when 
it excluded reassignment to a more inconvenient job from the list of 
tangible employment actions.303 
Moreover, if the supervisor's successful coercion of sexual acts is 
sufficient to constitute a fulfilled threat for which an employer is strictly 
"according to the presence or absence of an official act"). 
301 Holly D. v. Cal. Inst. of Tech., 339 F.3d 1158, 1170 (9th Cir. 2003). 
302 Id. at 1169. For a similar argument in the context of a constructive discharge claim 
based on allegations of quid pro quo harassment, see Christy M. Hanley, Comment, A 
"Constructive" Compromise: Using the Quid Pro Quo and Hostile Work Environment 
Classifications to Adjudicate Constructive Discharge Sexual Harassment Cases, 73 U. ON. 1. REV. 
259, 284-86 (2004) (arguing that constructive discharges resulting from quid pro quo 
harassment constitute tangible employment actions because "the supervisor brings the 
'official power of the enterprise ... to bear' on the employee when he or she directly 
threatens or shows an intent to discharge or demote the subordinate if sexual requests are 
rejected"). 
303 Burlington Indus. Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.s. 742, 761 (1998) (citing Harlston v. 
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 37 F.3d 379, 382 (8th Cir. 1994) (noting "reaSSignment to more 
inconvenient job insufficient")). 
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liable, then the Suders Court would have concluded that a supervisor's 
success in causing an employee to quit by increasing the level of 
harassment constitutes a fulfilled threat case. In fact, various amici 
curiae made this argument when they urged that the official act is the 
creation of workplace conditions so intolerable that the harassed 
employee had no choice but to resign.304 In concluding that an official act 
must precede a constructive discharge, the Suders Court implicitly 
rejected this fulfilled threat argument. 
Additionally, if successful coercion constitutes a fulfilled threat, then it 
is irrelevant in a received-job-benefit case whether the supervisor 
actually confers the benefit that results in the "nonadverse" yet 
significant change in employment status. In both the avoided-job-
detriment and received-job-benefit scenarios, the supervisor coerces sex 
from the subordinate by "bringing to bear the authority to make critical 
employment determinations on behalf of his employer.,,305 Based on this 
successful coercion theory, however, the only difference between an 
avoided-job-detriment case and a received-job-benefit case is the type of 
recoverable damages.306 Given the Court's requirement that a 
subordinate suffer an adverse, significant change in employment status 
brought about by an official act, imposing strict liability on an employer 
solely because a supervisor succeeded in his unlawful goal would 
undermine the balance struck in Ellerth. 
Construing an avoided-job-detriment scenario as a fulfilled threat case 
is also inconsistent with the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of Ellerth and 
Faragher. The Ninth Circuit acknowledged that strict liability "attaches 
only if a quid pro quo threat is implemented by some form of sufficiently 
concrete employment action.,,307 While the supervisor accomplishes the 
304 Brief for the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law et al., supra note 291, at 
23. 
305 Holly D., 339 F.3d at 1169. 
306 If the subordinate engaged in the demanded sexual acts but did not receive the 
promised promotion, she would have a viable tangible employment action claim for which 
her employer would be strictly liable. She would then likely attempt to recover emotional 
distress damages to compensate her for her having given the quid - engaging in the 
sexual acts - without receiving the quo - the promotion. In contrast, even if the 
subordinate received the bargained-for promotion, she would have a viable tangible 
employment action claim for which her employer would be strictly liable. She would then 
likely attempt to recover emotional distress damages to compensate her for her 
supervisor's abuse of authority, although it seems unlikely that a jury would award 
anything more than nominal damages under such circumstances. Under either scenario, 
the subordinate would be entitled to recover her attorney's fees under Title VII. See 42 
U.S.c. § 1988 (2000). 
,.., Holly D., 339 F.3d at 1170 (emphasis added). 
2006] Supervisory Sexual Extortion 593 
objective of the threat when the subordinate submits, the circumstances 
amount to nothing more than an unfulfilled threat case. The threat of 
discharge is not fulfilled precisely because the subordinate submitted. 
This conclusion is consistent with the Ellerth Court's interpretation of 
"unfulfilled threat," where the Court embraced Chief Judge Posner's 
terminology in Jansen: "[i]n the emergent terminology, an unfulfilled 
quid pro quo is a mere threat to do a company act rather than the act 
itself." 30B Chief Judge Posner's words in Jansen, upon which the company 
act concept is based, further demonstrate that an avoided-job-detriment 
case constitutes an unfulfilled threat case: 
[T]he term 'company act' signifies an act that significantly alters the 
terms or conditions of employment of the victim of sexual 
harassment and 'noncompany act' signifies . .. the kind of quid pro quo 
harassment that involves only unfulfilled threats (either because the victim 
submits or because she calls the supervisor's blujf), so that no company act 
is committed.309 
An additional problem with construing submission cases as fulfilled 
threat cases is that in a submission case, the subordinate takes the 
affirmative step that inflicts the harm. In other words, the threat is 
fulfilled because the subordinate submits. Such a result is inconsistent 
with Ellerth and Faragher, which impose strict liability on an employer 
only when the supervisor brought about the threatened harm. Indeed, 
the Court's joint holding specifically provides that an employer is strictly 
liable for a supervisor's harassment only "when a supervisor takes a 
tangible employment action against the subordinate." 310 This is yet 
another reason why tangible employment actions require an official act. 
Finally, Suders, through its approval of Reed, demonstrates that even 
where a supervisor abuses his power by subjecting a subordinate to 
unwanted sexual harassment and intentionally intensifies the 
harassment to coerce her resignation, the supervisor's success in 
accomplishing his goal does not transform a hostile work environment 
claim into a tangible employment action claim. Moreover, even though 
the Reed court characterized the plaintiff's failure to report as submission 
to the supervisor's discharge threat,311 it nevertheless concluded that the 
supervisor's threat, coupled with the employee's submission, was 
308 Ellerth, 524 u.S. at 750-51 (citing Jansen v. Packaging Corp. of Am., 123 F.3d 490, 515 
(7th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (per curiam) (Posner, c.J., concurring and dissenting». 
309 Jansen, 123 F.3d at 515 (Posner, c.J., concurring and dissenting) (emphasis added). 
310 See supra notes 113, 121 and accompanying text. 
311 Reed v. MBNA Mktg. Sys., Inc., 333 F.3d 27, 37 (1st Cir. 2003). 
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insufficient to render the circumstances a fulfilled threat case precisely 
because the discharge threat was not fulfilled. Suders confirms that an 
official act is required in both cases. 
The reasoning in Suders and Reed applies equally to the avoided-job-
detriment scenario. Where the supervisor threatens an employee with 
discharge unless she submits to his sexual advances and the employee 
submits in response to the threat, the threat remains unfulfilled because 
the discharge did not occur. Thus, notwithstanding the supervisor's 
successful abuse of authority, the avoided-job-detriment scenario 
constitutes an unfulfilled threat case to which the Ellerth/Faragher 
ff' . d f l' 312 a lrmative e ense app les. 
B. Policy Considerations 
In addition to the above deficiencies in submission claims, construing 
such claims as tangible employment actions represents a return to the 
pre-Ellerth/Faragher state of the law regarding quid pro quo. This is 
inconsistent with the broader vicarious liability and harm avoidance 
principles set forth in Ellerth and Faragher. By expanding strict liability to 
include submission cases, it necessarily follows that the only classic quid 
pro quo circumstances for which an employer would not be strictly liable 
are those where the supervisor threatens but does not take a detrimental 
job action. That was not the balance struck in Ellerth and Faragher. 
Instead, the Court in Ellerth and Faragher created the tangible 
employment action standard and accompanying affirmative defense 
which, as the Third Circuit in Suders acknowledged, "reflects an intricate 
balance incorporated into a complex rule of law with multiple 
313 components." 
312 In addition, because an avoided-job-detriment case lacks the requisite significant 
change in employment status and official act, the circumstances also lack any 
"document[ation] in official company records," and thus the decision is not subject to 
review by higher level supervisors. Ellerth, 524 U.s. at 762. For the same reasons, the 
supervisor does not obtain the imprimatur of the enterprise, nor does the supervisor use 
the employer's internal processes. Moreover, as discussed in Part IV.A.1, neither an 
avoided-job-detriment plaintiff nor a received-job-benefit plaintiff suffers any economic 
harm. Because the Court in Ellerth used the permissive terms "most," "may," and "often," 
respectively, with respect to these tangible employment action indicia, these deficiencies 
alone are not fatal to the submission-as-tangible-employment-action argument. [d. 
Nevertheless, the collective absence of any of these indicia in the submission context -
particularly in the avoided-job-detriment scenario - is simply further support for the 
conclusion that submission cases do not constitute tangible employment actions. 
313 Suders v. Easton, 325 F.3d 432, 451 (3d Cir. 2003), vacated sub nom. Pa. State Police v. 
Suders, 542 U.S. 129 (2004). If that was the result the Court envisioned, the Court could 
have responded "no" to the question presented for certiorari in Ellerth: "Whether a claim 
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Additionally, imposing strict liability in submission cases improperly 
bases the employer's liability on the employee's reaction to either the 
supervisor's threat in the avoided-job-detriment case or the supervisor's 
promise in the received-job-benefit case. Although the Second Circuit 
rejected this argument in fin, it relied on the reasoning and definition of 
"quid pro quo" from its pre-EllerthlFaragher opinion in Karibian v. 
Columbia University.314 It thus concluded that quid pro quo "liability 
results from the supervisor's use of the employee's reaction to the 
supervisor's unwelcome sexual conduct as the basis for decisions affectin§ 
the compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of her employment.,,31 
Again, the problem is that employing this standard constitutes a return 
to the pre-Ellerth/Faragher state of the law regarding quid pro quO.316 
Moreover, the reasoning in Karibian leads to perverse results when 
applied to submission claims. As discussed in Part IV.A.2.a, the only 
of quid pro quo sexual harassment may be stated under Title Vll ... where the plaintiff 
employee has neither submitted to the sexual advances of the alleged harasser nor suffered 
any tangible effects on the compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment as 
a consequence of a refusal to submit to those advances?" Ellerth, 524 U.s. at 753. 
314 Karibian v. Columbia Univ., 14 F.3d 773 (2d Cir. 1994). 
315 Jin v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 310 F.3d 84, 97 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Karibian, 14 F.3d at 
777), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 52 (2004). To bolster its conclusion that Karibian was still viable 
after Ellerth and Faragher, the fin Court noted that the Faragher Court, as part of its 
illustrative list of cases setting forth the various bases upon which federal courts had held 
employers vicariously liable for supervisory sexual harassment, cited Nichols, where the 
plaintiff alleged a viable quid pro quo claim based on her allegations that she avoided 
tangible job detriment by submitting to her supervisor's demands that she perform oral sex 
on him. fin, 310 F.3d at 96 n.7; see supra text accompanying note 97 (discussing various 
approaches to vicarious liability prior to Ellerth and Faragher). The fin court concluded that 
the Faragher Court's reference to Nichols demonstrated that the Court intended that 
submission cases constituted tangible employment actions for which an employer is strictly 
liable. Such an assertion is incorrect - the important distinction is between vicarious 
liability and strict liability. The Court's reference to Nichols and the quid pro quo and 
agency principles discussed therein simply indicates that the Court found it appropriate to 
hold the employer vicariously liable for such conduct. Under Ellerth and Faragher, even if an 
employer is held vicariously liable for the supervisor's conduct, the employer is permitted 
to assert and prove the affirmative defense to liability or damages unless the subordinate 
suffered a tangible employment action for which the employer is strictly liable. Thus, as 
discussed in this Part, the pertinent question is whether a submission case constitutes a 
tangible employment action. 
316 The EEOC acknowledged as much in its 1999 Enforcement Guidance See supra note 
147 and accompanying text (defining tangible employment action, and noting that "such 
harassment previously would have been characterized as 'quid pro quo.'" (emphasis added». 
Although EEOC regulatiOns and guidance are entitled to deference, they are not persuasive 
when, as in these circumstances, they are contrary to existing law. See Sutton v. United 
Airlines, Inc., 527 U.s. 471, 482-84 (1999) (invalidating EEOC regulations regarding 
Americans with Disabilities Act on grounds that regulations were inconsistent with intent 
and policies underlying Act). 
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way to shift the focus from the employee to the supervisor in the 
avoided-job-detriment case under Karibian is to employ the fiction that 
once the employee submits, the supervisor decides to retain the 
employee.317 In the absence of an official act or change in employment 
status, it is impossible to know whether the supervisor actually makes 
such a decision or whether the decision is a mere fiction because the 
supervisor was only bluffing. Imposing strict liability based on a mere 
fiction is inappropriate. 
The received-job-benefit scenario presents an easier case for why an 
employer should not be strictly liable. Although the supervisor grants 
the unwarranted job benefit, he would not have done so but for the 
employee's decision to submit to his unwelcome sexual advances. Thus, 
it is wholly inappropriate to hold an employer strictly liable for the 
employee's bargained-for job benefit. 
Under both of the above scenarios, the imposition of strict liability 
turns not on the supervisor's conduct but instead on whether the 
employee either successfully resisted the threat of an unwarranted job 
detriment or refused the promise of an unwarranted job benefit. In both 
scenarios, the supervisor's conduct alone warrants the imposition of 
strict liability. Furthermore, the conduct most worthy of deterrence in 
the first instance is the supervisor's initial threat or promise. Thus, a 
more appropriate result would be to hold an employer strictly liable for 
all circumstances where a supervisor abuses his authority by attempting 
to extort sexual favors through either threatening an unwarranted job 
detriment or promising an unwarranted job benefit. Indeed, this is 
precisely the result reached by the Seventh Circuit en banc in Jansen. 
Nevertheless, in Ellerth and Faragher, the Court rejected this result as 
inconsistent with Meritor's holding that employers are not always strictly 
liable for supervisory sexual harassment. The Court required something 
more than the supervisor's threats or fictional decision to retain the 
subordinate to impose strict liability on an employer. That something 
more is a tangible employment action, which is lacking in the sexual 
extortion context. 
Additionally, by dispensing with the formal requirements and 
construing submission cases as tangible employment actions, employers 
will be strictly liable for actions of which they likely had no notice. This 
is counter to the desired deterrent effect of the tangible employment 
317 The Ninth Circuit employed a similar construct when analyzing whether an 
avoided-job-detriment plaintiff could prove the requisite "official act." See supra Part 
IV.A.2.a (discussing why this construct fails in light of Court's opinion in Suders). 
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action standard. As Chief Judge Posner reasoned in Jansen, strict liability 
is appropriate when a plaintiff suffers the tangible job detriment that 
follows from a tangible employment action because strict liability "is 
likely to deter this kind of sexual harassment.,,318 The deterrent effect 
stems from the knowledge that strict liability looms in the background 
for adverse job-related actions. This knowledge provides an incentive 
for employers to review adverse decisions of which they have notice, 
such as where an employee is terminated or receives an undesirable 
reassignment.319 In contrast, in the avoided-job-detriment case, there is 
nothing to review, and thus, there is no notice. To the outside observer, 
the subordinate simply maintains the status quo. 
Moreover, even in the context of a supervisor-subordinate 
relationship, there is no reason to suspect that a subordinate's continued 
employment is out of the ordinary, as the difference between a 
consensual as opposed to a coercive relationship is subtle, if discemable 
at all: 
The words, the gestures, the other behaviors that differentiate the 
fully consensual relationship from the coercive relationship will 
often be invisible to the supervisor's superiors. The yielding to a 
threat will look no different from yielding to a lawful proposal. It is 
only when the threat is carried out that the abusive supervisor does 
something, such as firing the supervised employee, that the 
employer will know about and should monitor.32o 
318 Jansen v. Packaging Corp. of Am., 123 F.3d 490, 512 (7th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (per 
curiam) (Posner, c.J., concurring and dissenting), affd sub nom. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. 
Ellerth, 524 U.s. 742 (1998). 
319 As Chief Judge Posner stated in Jansen: 
In well-managed companies, decisions having such consequences are subject to 
rules, and to review by higher-ups in the company - the industrial equivalent of 
appellate review. The rules will be more carefully formulated and the 
supervisor's compliance with them in firing or otherwise hurting a subordinate 
more carefully reviewed by the supervisor's superiors if the employer is strictly 
liable for the supervisor's use of his delegated powers to harass subordinates. 
Id. at 512-13. He then applied the above reasoning to the avoided-job-detriment scenario: 
But if [the supervisor) doesn't propose to fire her, whether because she has 
submitted to his sexual extortion or called his bluff, there will be no proposed 
action to review. It will be no more feasible for the company to determine what 
is going on than it would be if the harasser were a coworker who had threatened 
to steal the victim's work tools if she didn't submit to him. 
Id. at 513. 
320 Id. 
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Further complicating matters is the fact that some romantic 
relationships between supervisors and subordinates "start well and tum 
ugly and engender charges of sexual harassment that sometimes have 
and sometimes lack merit.,,321 In the absence of the notice provided by 
either the adverse change in employment status inherent in a tangible 
employment action or by a complaint from the subordinate, it is virtually 
impossible for an employer to detect such unlawful conduct.322 For this 
reason, vicarious liability, as opposed to strict liability, is the appropriate 
standard where engaging in sexual acts or submitting to offensive sexual 
conduct is the basis for the subordinate's claim. 
Equally compelling is the fact that construing submission cases as 
tangible employment actions undermines Title VII's policy of 
encouraging plaintiffs to avoid harm by promptly reporting sexually 
harassing conduct. As the Speaks court noted, such an interpretation 
would lead to the anomalous result that an employee who submits to a 
supervisor's demands "fares better [from a liability perspective] by 
submitting" than an employee who does not immediately complain 
about the supervisor's conduct.323 As the Speaks court correctly 
concluded, such a result "seem[s] contrary to the balance sought by the 
Supreme Court. ,,324 
Although the harm avoidance principles apply equally to both 
avoided-job-detriment and received-job-benefit scenarios, the received-
job-benefit scenario is even more troubling from a harm avoidance 
standpoint. In a received-job-benefit scenario, the plaintiff submits and 
receives a job benefit to which she was not otherwise entitled. While it is 
wholly inappropriate for a supervisor to engage in sexual extortion, an 
employer should not be strictly liable for what essentially amounts to a 
fully performed contract between the supervisor and subordinate.325 
321 Id.; see Nichols v. Frank, 42 F.3d 503, 510-11 (9th Cir. 1994) (,,[EJven the question of 
what constitutes the most blatant form of sexual harassment - quid pro quo harassment -
is not always answered easily. For one thing, it is frequently not clear what the facts 
actually are. The parties may tell total1y conflicting stories, in the trial court and elsewhere, 
and there are often no percipient witnesses."). 
322 See Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 STAN. L. REV. 813, 855 (1991) (arguing that quid pro 
quo harassment is more difficult for employer to monitor and detect than hostile work 
environment harassment, as "threats and promises tied to sex are far more likely to take 
place in private, whereas the hostility of the environment is often al1 too obvious and 
patent"). 
32J Speaks v. City of Lakeland, 315 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1226 (M.D. Fla. 2004). 
32. Id. 
325 It is true that the employee would not suffer any economic damages, but 
psychological damages might possibly be awarded and, in any event, the subordinate 
would be entitled to recover her attorney's fees. See 42 U.s.c. § 1988 (2000). Given an 
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Indeed, it is unlikely that the Court in Ellerth and Faragher envisioned 
such a result. 
Finally, if a supervisor's misuse of authority coupled with the 
plaintiff's submission is sufficient to hold an employer strictly liable for 
the supervisor's conduct, then there is no realistic end to the supervisory 
conduct for which an employer will be strictly liable. This potentially 
endless expansion of liability stems from the fine line between a 
supervisor's affirmative, as opposed to implicit, use of power and the 
malleability of the term "submission," which can be interpreted to either 
expand or contract liability. 
With respect to a supervisor's use of power, consider a typical hostile 
environment sexual harassment case. The supervisor does not use or 
even attempt to use his supervisory authority but instead "uses 
unwanted terms of endearment; ... fondles or rubs up against [the] 
victim; ... displays sex toys or tells dirty jokes; ... brags about his sexual 
skills; ... proposes marriage; ... threatens to kill himself; ... or rapes 
[his subordinate].,,326 Even in the absence of any affirmative misuse of 
authority, a subordinate is more likely to submit to, rather than complain 
about, the supervisor's offensive conduct because the supervisor has the 
h · hir d f' 327 aut onty to e an ire. 
Additionally, in many cases, the line between a hostile work 
environment and quid pro quo harassment is virtually indiscernible: 
[SJexual harassment does not sort itself into tidy categories .... 
When [aJ supervisor bombards an unwilling subordinate with 
unwanted sexual images, touching, vulgar words, or denigrating 
comments, only the most committed formalist would feel confident 
in saying when those actions cross the imaginary line from "hostile 
environment" harassment to "quid pro quo" harassment.328 
employee's duty to avoid harm, a received-job-benefit plaintiff would also likely fail under 
the second prong of the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense, as it is likely unreasonable for 
her to bargain for a job benefit to which she is not otherwise entitled by offering sex. See 
infra Part V.S (discussing relevant factors to consider in determining whether subordinate's 
submission was unreasonable). 
326 Jansen v. Packaging Corp. of Am., 123 F.3d 490,511-12 (7th Cir. 1997) (en bane) (per 
curiam) (Posner, c.J., concurring and dissenting), affd sub nom. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. 
Ellerth, 524 U.s. 742 (1998). 
327 Id. at 512. 
328 Jansen, 123 F.3d at 567; see also Chamallas, supra note 11, at 3; Estrich, supra note 322, 
at 834 (noting that distinction between quid pro quo and hostile work environment sexual 
harassment "takes the form of a continuum rather than a divide," and thus, even in hostile 
environment context, which lacks "manifest threat" but where "boss propositions a female 
daily or, when in order to do her job, a woman must endure a range of physical and 
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This is particularly true given that "sexual asides and insinuations are 
the well-worn tools of a sexual harasser.,,329 
Thus, if a tangible employment action does not require tangible job 
detriment but can instead be based on a threat coupled with a 
subordinate's submission, at what point does a supervisor's conduct 
cross the hostile work environment/tangible employment action 
threshold?330 How clear must the threat be to justify the employee's 
submission and hold the employer strictly liable?331 These are simply 
variations of the same types of questions that plagued courts regarding 
what constituted quid pro quo harassment prior to Ellerth and Faragher. 
The varied answers to these questions in the submission context would 
lead to precisely the type of uncertainty, contradictory outcomes, and 
temptation to litigate that Ellerth and Faragher sought to avoid.332 
In addition to the fine line between a supervisor's affirmative, as 
opposed to implicit, use of power, consider the distinction between a 
supervisor's attempts to use unofficial as compared to official power. 
For example, on a daily basis a supervisor "kiss[es], lick[s], bite[s land 
fondle[s] [a subordinate], and attempt[s] to undress" her.333 In addition, 
the supervisor "physically force[s] her to unzip his pants and fondle 
emotional abuse," results are same as in quid pro quo situation because "victim will 
submit, quit, or end up being fired"); Scalia, supra note 52, at 323 ("[I)t is a fiction that the 
quid pro quo harasser acts with more authority - actual or apparent - than the boss who 
takes without asking in the environmental discrimination case."); J. Hoult Verkerke, Notice 
Liability in Employment Discrimination Law, 81 VA. 1. REV. 273, 275-76 (1995) (noting 
similarities between hostile environment and quid pro quo sexual harassment, and stating 
that "it is thus quite puzzling that the law of employment discrimination treats these 
categories of sexual harassment so differently"). 
329 Frederick v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 246 F.3d 1305, 1312 (11th Cir. 2001) 
(discussing supervisor's claim that he was only joking when he suggested to plaintiff that 
they go to Holiday Inn to negotiate her raise (citing Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.s. 17, 
19 (1993»). 
330 See Estrich, supra note 322, at 855 (arguing that quid pro quo and hostile 
environment sexual harassment are essentially same regarding supervisor's use of power 
as, "[i)n both cases, the supervisor is abusing the power that has been entrusted to him, ... 
is acting for his own reasons and not the employer's, ... [and) his threats carry weight and 
his insults must be tolerated precisely because he is the supervisor, this is a workplace, and 
most women need their jobs"). 
331 See supra text accompanying note 187 (discussing circumstances in Holly D., and 
ultimately concluding that plaintiff was unable to show either implicit threat of job 
detriment or any causal connection between her job duties and her supervisor's requests 
that she engage in sex with him). In Eller/h, the Court declined to express an opinion 
regarding whether a "Single unfulfilled threat is sufficient to constitute discrimination in 
the terms or conditions of employment." 524 U.S. at 754. 
332 See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.s. 775, 804-05 (1998). 
333 Jin v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 310 F.3d 84, 88 (2d Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 52 
(2004). 
2006] Supervisory Sexual Extortion 601 
him" and subsequently 'gush[es] against her with his penis exposed, 
and ejaculate[s] on her.,,3 At the same time, the supervisor wields a 
baseball bat and threatens the subordinate with physical harm if she 
does not accede to his sexual demands.335 In the absence of any attempt 
to misuse official supervisory authority, the supervisor's conduct is even 
less "official" than the supervisor's sexual assault and accompanying 
verbal harassment in Reed, which the Court described as "exceedingly 
unofficial" and "exactly the kind of wholly unauthorized conduct for 
which the affirmative defense was designed.",336 
Suppose that, in addition to the egregious facts and threat of physical 
harm described above, the facts also include the supervisor's explicit 
threat to discharge the subordinate if she does not accede to his demands 
- essentially the facts upon which the Second Circuit imposed strict 
liability in lin.337 Under these circumstances, if the subordinate submits 
to the supervisor's sexual conduct, she does so out of a fear of either 
termination or being bludgeoned with a baseball bat, or a combination of 
both. Because the threat of physical harm is "exceedingly unofficial" and 
thus insufficient to impose liability, and the threat of discharge would 
constitute a misuse of official authority under lin and Holly D., must a 
reviewing court determine which threat, or combination of threats, 
compelled the plaintiff's submission before imposing strict liability? Is 
the mere presence of a job-related threat enough even if the threat was 
not a factor, much less a motivating factor, in the plaintiff's submission? 
Under the above scenario, requiring a reviewing court to determine 
the extent to which either or both of the two threats compelled the 
subordinate's submission leads to the lack of clarity and certainty that 
the Court sought to resolve in Ellerth. The desire for clarity and certainty 
motivated the Ellerth Court to essentially ignore the quid pro quo label 
for vicarious liability purposes, create the tangible employment action 
standard, and conclude that the threat alone, job-related or otherwise, is 
insufficient to impose strict liability in the absence of a tangible 
employment action. Nevertheless, under lin and Holly D., the discharge 
threat, coupled with the plaintiff's statement that she was cowed by the 
threat, is sufficient to impose strict liability on the employer. 
Taking the reasoning of lin and Holly D. even further shows how such 
reasoning turns Ellerth on its head. Consider essentially the same 
334 Id. 
335 Id. at 88-89. 
336 See supra note 297 and accompanying text. 
337 fin, 310 F.3d at 88-89. 
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egregious circumstances as those above but omit the threat of physical 
harm. Suppose further that the job-related threat does not implicate a 
tangible employment action such as discharge, but is instead a threat to 
reassign the subordinate to a more inconvenient job. Because Ellerth 
specifically excluded reassigning an employee to a more inconvenient 
job from the tangible employment action examples, an employer whose 
supervisor subjects a subordinate to such an action to retaliate for 
spumed sexual advances is not strictly liable for the supervisor's 
conduct. Nevertheless, under the reasoning in lin and Holly D., the 
supervisor misused his authority in making the job-related threat of a 
nontangible employment action and the employer would be strictly 
liable if the threat was successful at coercing sex.338 
If this reasoning is taken to its logical extreme, virtually any job-related 
threat or promise would be sufficient to impose strict liability if it 
accomplished the supervisor's goal of coercing a subordinate's 
submission to any sexually offensive conduct. This is true regardless of 
whether actually taking the threatened action constitutes a tangible 
employment action, particularly given the potentially expansive nature 
of the term "submission." Submission can be construed narrowly to 
include only circumstances where a subordinate "submits" to the 
supervisor's threats or promises by acting - engaging in sexual acts -
or broadly to include all circumstances where a subordinate "submits" to 
the supervisor's threats or promises by refraining from acting -
passively tolerating the conduct and refraining from reporting. 
To understand the potential breadth of the term "submission" and the 
corresponding strict liability imposed on employers for such claims, 
consider the facts presented in Ellerth. A supervisor subjects a 
subordinate to unwelcome sexual comments and touching coupled with 
threats to deny the subordinate tangible job benefits to which she is 
entitled. As in Ellerth, the subordinate does not complain, but instead 
endures the conduct and is ultimately promoted. Because the supervisor 
misused his authority in making the threats, the employee's failure to 
complain could be construed as the subordinate submitting to the 
sexually offensive conduct. Moreover, the supervisor's failure to 
terminate or otherwise take any detrimental job action against the 
subordinate, as well as the subsequent promotion, may be viewed as the 
338 Cf Fisher v. Elec. Data Sys., 278 F. Supp. 2d 980, 989 (S.D. Iowa 2003) (concluding 
that supervisor's refusal to provide necessary job-related infonnation to his subordinate 
unless subordinate responded favorably to his sexual advances was not tangible 
employment action because supervisor's conduct lacked requisite "official act of the 
enterprise" (citing Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998))). 
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benefit received by the subordinate for submitting to the unwelcome 
conduct. Under lin and Holly D., these facts could constitute a 
submission claim for which an employer is strictly liable. Nevertheless, 
the Ellerth Court rejected such a strict liability result, and thus implicitly 
rejected this interpretation of submission, when it concluded that 
Ellerth's allegations presented an unfulfilled threat case to which the 
affirmative defense applied. The Suders Court's approval of Reed further 
supports this conclusion. As in Reed, labeling the claim as a submission 
claim does not transform a mere unfulfilled threat claim into a claim for 
which the employer is strictly liable.339 
Finally, imposing strict liability in this context would contradict the 
policy of encouraging employees to report harassing conduct before it 
becomes unlawful. Nonetheless, at least one court has similarly 
misconstrued Ellerth and Faragher by suggesting that a plaintiff's receipt 
of a job benefit to which she was not entitled in exchange for not 
reporting sexually harassing conduct might constitute a tangible 
I . 340 emp oyment action. 
If submission claims are synonymous with tangible employment 
actions and give rise to the accompanying strict liability, the Supreme 
Court is right back where it started when it first heard Ellerth and 
Faragher. Plaintiffs and their counsel have an incentive to "fit facts into 
certain types or categories of harassment claims,,341 in an effort to impose 
339 See Reed v. MBNA Mktg. Sys., 333 F.3d 27, 33-34 (1st Cir. 2003) (concluding that 
supervisor's threat of discharge, which prompted plaintiff to "submit" and refrain from 
reporting, did not constitute requisite official act but instead amounted to unfulfilled 
threat, and thus, affirmative defense applied). 
"'" Matvia v. Bald Head Island Mgmt., 259 F.3d 261, 267-68 (4th Cir. 2001). _ The Matvia 
court stated in dicta that the El/erth/Faragher affirmative defense may not be available 
when a sexually harassing supervisor grants job benefits in exchange for an employee's 
silence regarding the harassing conduct. ld. at 268. Nevertheless, the court ultimately 
rejected the plaintiff's claim that she experienced a tangible employment action in the form 
of "a raise, promotion, and good evaluations" in exchange for her "silently suffer[ingJ" her 
supervisor's sexual advances. ld. at 267. The court found that the plaintiff was unable to 
demonstrate either (1) any promise of employment benefits in exchange for her tolerance of 
unwelcome conduct, or (2) any connection between her "refraining from reporting the 
unwelcome conduct" and her receipt of such employment benefits. ld. at 267-68. The court 
reasoned that to conclude otherwise would be inconsistent with El/erth because it "would 
transform any ordinary employment action," such as "an upgrade in equipment used by 
the employee, a grant of sick leave, or any other mundane, non-adverse action," into a 
tangible employment action "so long as sexual harassment is present." ld. at 267. But see 
Fisher, 278 F. Supp. 2d at 988 ("'[Slubmission' cases, where a supervisor makes favorable 
decisions that affect the terms and conditions of plaintiff's employment, such as awarding 
benefits or merely permitting the victim to keep her job, involve only 'unfulfilled threats'" 
(citing Grozdanich v. Leisure Hills Health Ctr., Inc., 25 F. Supp. 2d 953 (D. Minn. 1998))). 
3" Speaks v. City of Lakeland, 315 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1226 n.22 (M.D. Fla. 2004). 
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strict liability.342 Nearly eight years later, only the label differs. This 
labeling trend ignores the bright line drawn by the Supreme Court 
between cases where a tangible employment action is taken by a 
supervisor and those with no tangible employment action. 
Although an employee's submission to a supervisor's sexual demands 
may be a reasonable alternative under certain circumstances, strict 
liability should not be the rule. Rather, the employer should be 
vicariously liable for the supervisor's conduct, but then be permitted to 
assert the EllerthlFaragher two-prong affirmative defense. With respect 
to the second prong and assessing the subordinate's submission, courts 
should require the employer to prove that the employee'S submission 
was unreasonable under the circumstances.343 If the employer is unable 
to demonstrate that an employee's submission was unreasonable, the 
employer will be liable for the supervisor's conduct. Such a result 
addresses the concern that sexual extortion victims will be punished for 
their submission.344 Indeed, under the second prong correctly applied, 
the rights of victims whose submission was not unreasonable under the 
circumstances will be vindicated in a way that is consistent with Title 
VII's interrelated goals of preventing harm, encouraging employees to 
report unlawful behavior, and compensating victims of harassment.345 
'" For an example of how the tangible employment action standard is being 
improperly applied and expanded to impose strict liability in the submission context, 
similar to the quid pro quo label prior to Ellerth and Faragher, see Temores v. SG Cowen, 289 
F. Supp. 2d 996, 1002 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (concluding that employer could be held strictly liable 
in unfulfilled threat scenario in which supervisor made unwelcome sexual advances 
toward subordinate and allegedly tied monetary bonus to sexual favors, even though 
employee neither received bonus nor engaged in demanded sexual conduct). 
34' In Suders, the Court clarified that the defendant bears the burden of pleading and 
proving that the plaintiff unreasonably failed to mitigate harm. Pa. State Police v. Suders, 
542 U.S. 129, 151-52 (2004). The Court held that although a plaintiff might choose to allege 
facts related to mitigation in her pleadings or as part of her case in chief, she would be 
doing so only in anticipation of the employer raising the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative 
defense, as she is not required to do so. Id. 
344 Karibian v. Columbia Univ., 14 F.3d 773, 778-79 (2d Cir. 1994) (noting probability 
that "victims of sexual harassment who surrender to unwelcome sexual encounters" will be 
punished for their submission). 
'45 For an alternative approach to workplace sexual extortion whereby the supervisor is 
held criminally liable for such conduct, see Carrie N. Baker, Sexual Extortion: Criminalizing 
Quid Pro Quo Sexual Harassment, 13 LAW & INEQ. 213 (1994) (concluding that current state 
criminal coercion statutes are insufficient to address all forms of quid pro quo sexual 
harassment, and arguing that states should adopt criminal statutes specifically aimed at 
quid pro quo sexual harassment); Patricia J. Falk, Rape by Fraud and Rape by Coercion, 64 
BROOK. 1. REV. 39 (1998) (arguing that current rape statutes should be revised to encompass 
circumstances where perpetrator accomplishes sexual intercourse with his victim through 
coercion, including abuses of power); Christian Jordan, Note, The Casting Couch Is More 
Than Tortious: The Case for Expanded Interpretations of Rape Statutes, 13 S. CAL. REV. 1. & 
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Part V addresses the manner in which courts should apply the second 
prong in the submission context. 
V. THE DUTY TO AVOID HARM UNDER ELLERTH AND FARAGHER 
The conclusion that a submission claim does not constitute a tangible 
employment action for which an employer is strictly liable will 
undoubtedly make it more difficult for a submission plaintiff to prevail 
on her otherwise meritorious sexual harassment claim.346 In the absence 
of a tangible employment action, a submission plaintiff will prevail only 
if she can show that she was subjected to an actionable hostile work 
environment and her employer fails to prove that she "unreasonably 
failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities 
provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise.,,347 In addition to 
these hurdles, a pro-employer trend has emerged in the lower courts' 
application and analysis of both prongs of the affirmative defense, and 
many courts are incorrectly applying the second prong.348 Thus, 
plaintiffs have endeavored to expand the definition of "tangible 
employment action" to include submission claims and thereby avoid 
application of the affirmative defense. 
For example, some district courts are granting, and appellate courts 
are affirming, summary judgment in favor of employers at a 
disproportionately high rate on the grounds that the employer has 
satisfied both prongs of the affirmative defense.349 Additionally, some 
WOMEN'S STUD. 199,214-17 (2003) (arguing that because professionals invest considerable 
"education, time, money and foregone alternative employment, ... a boss who conditions 
job security or chances for promotion on sex in a professional setting [creates] a high stakes 
problem for a victim to confront," and arguing that modem forcible rape statutes should be 
revised to hold supervisor liable for such sexual extortion based on expanded 
interpretation of "force," "duress," or "menace"). 
346 See, e.g., Kerri Lynn Bauchner, From Pig in a Parlor to Boar in a Boardroom: Why Ellerth 
Isn't Working and How Other Ideological Models Can Help Reconceptualize the Law of Sexual 
Harassment, 8 COLUM. J. GENDER & 1. 303, 307, 332 (1999) (noting that, by requiring tangible 
job detriment to impose strict liability on employer and assessing victim's reasonableness 
in all other harassment cases, many harassment victims who suffer intangible, but no less 
damaging, harms will go unprotected and uncompensated); Grossman, supra note 26, at 
732 (noting "employer in a submission case will typically be able to make out both prongs 
of the affirmative defense and thus defeat liability"). 
347 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775,807 (1998); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. 
Ellerth, 524 U.s. 742, 765 (1998). Of course, this is in addition to the employer being able to 
prove that it satisfied its burden under prong one of the affirmative defense, which has not 
proved difficult under most circumstances. See infra Part V.B for a discussion of how 
courts construe "file-cabinet compliance" as sufficient under prong one. 
348 See infra text accompanying notes 349-50, 353-54. 
349 See, e.g., Grossman, supra note 26, at 703, 708 (noting pro-employer trend in granting 
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lower courts' analysis of whether the employer has satisfied its burden of 
proof under each prong of the affirmative defense, and particularly the 
second prong, is often cursory and, at times, virtually nonexistent.350 As 
one commentator noted, even when courts analyze the second prong, 
they often do so incorrectly by failing to apply the requisite avoidable 
consequences principles dictated by Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth351 
and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton.352 Instead, they apply what amounts to 
contributory negligence so that a plaintiff's recovery is completely 
barred due to her failure to report or her delay in doing SO.353 Moreover, 
summary judgment, and further noting that courts have "significantly curtailed the scope 
of Faragher and Ellerth using two techniques: (1) by construing the affirmative defense to 
completely absolve the employer of liability regardless of the type of harassment; or (2) by 
refusing to apply a rule of vicarious liability where the employer responds appropriately to 
the plaintiffs complaint"); Anne Lawton, Operating in an Empirical Vacuum: The Ellerth and 
Faragher Affirmative Defense, 13 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 197, 213-14 (2004) (documenting 
high incidence of summary judgment in favor of employers on affirmative defense, and 
concluding that affirmative defense effected little change in sexual harassment cases 
because federal courts reward employers for superficial compliance with prong one of 
affirmative defense, without inquiring whether employer's efforts to prevent sexual 
harassment are effective at decreasing incidence of workplace harassment, and federal 
courts penalize harassment victims who do not report under prong two of affirmative 
defense notwithstanding fact that social science research demonstrates that common, and 
thus arguably reasonable, response to supervisory sexual harassment is not reporting); 
John H. Marks, Smoke, Mirrors, and the Disappearance of "Vicarious" Liability: The Emergence 
of a Dubious Summary-Judgment Safe Harbor for Employers Whose Supervisory Personnel Commit 
Hostile Environment Workplace Harassment, 38 Hous. L. REV. 1401, 1404-05 (2002) (noting 
pro-employer trend, and arguing that affirmative defense has become "summary judgment 
safe harbor" for employers); David Sherwyn et aI., Don't Train Your Employees and Cancel 
Your "1-800" Harassment Hotline: An Empirical Examination and Correction of the Flaws in the 
Affirmative Defense to Sexual Harassment Charges, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1265, 1283-89 
(documenting high rate of summary judgment in favor of employers on affirmative 
defense, and noting that such results are directly counter to predictions by experts that 
affirmative defense would preclude summary judgment for employers in most cases). 
350 See Lawton, supra note 349, at 210, 243 ("[I]n sixty-seven percent of the cases 
addreSSing prong two [from January 1, 2001 through June 30, 2003], the courts improperly 
interpret[ed] the employer's obligation under prong two"); Marks, supra note 349, at 1429 
(noting courts' outright failure to discuss avoidable consequences and its related harm-
avoidance principles under second prong). 
351 524 U.s. 742 (1998). 
352 524 U.s. 775 (1998). 
353 Marks, supra note 349, at 1429 (noting that courts are concluding that employers 
satisfy second prong by showing that employees delayed reporting and that, in so doing, 
courts are treating "purportedly unreasonable delays as something akin to contributory 
negligence - a complete bar to recovery"). Out of the hundreds of cases addressing the 
second prong of the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense, fewer than 10 mention the 
avoidable consequences doctrine by name, and none of those include any discussion as to 
how the avoidable consequences doctrine should apply in the sexual harassment context 
where the plaintiff is forced to engage in the cost-benefit analysis discussed in Part V.B 
infra. See Durham Life Ins. Co. v. Evans, 166 F.3d 139, 162 (3d Cir. 1999) (Weis, J., 
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a few courts have dispensed entirely with the second prong in an effort 
to avoid holding employers liable for supervisor conduct that occurs on 
only one occasion, over a brief period of time, or suddenly and without 
warning.354 These courts have done so even though Ellerth and Faragher 
described the dual prongs as the "two necessary elements" of the 
355 defense. 
Based on these post-Ellerth/Faragher trends, it is probable that these 
same trends will continue in the submission context. In other words, 
many courts faced with submission claims will likely either simply 
ignore the second prong altogether or simply conclude with little or no 
analysis that the plaintiff unreasonably failed to take advantage of the 
employer's preventive opportunities or to avoid harm because she 
submitted to the unwelcome conduct. Given these documented pro-
employer trends, the fact that submission cases do not constitute tangible 
employment actions will likely lead to unjust results in the submission 
context in the absence of guidance as to how the second prong should 
apply in such circumstances. 
concurring); Savino v. c.P. Hall Co., 199 F.3d 925, 934-35 (7th Cir. 1999); Indest v. Freeman 
Decorating, Inc., 164 F.3d 258, 266 (5th Cir. 1999); Jones v. Dist. of Columbia, 346 F. Supp. 
2d 25, 49-52 (D.D.C. 2004); Speaks v. City of Lakeland, 315 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1228-29 (M.D. 
Fla. 2004); Duhe v. United States Postal Serv., No. Civ. A 03-746, 2004 WL 439890, at *5 
(ED. La. Mar. 9, 2004); Akers v. Alvey, 180 F. Supp. 2d 894, 901 (W.D. Ky. 2001). 
J5.I See, e.g., McCurdy v. Ark. State Police, 375 F.3d 762, 772 (8th Cir. 2004) (concluding 
that in case involving only single occasion of supervisor's sexually harassing conduct, 
employer is entitled to "modified" Ellerth/ Faragher affirmative defense that dispenses with 
second prong and instead focuses only on first prong and employer's efforts to prevent and 
correct sexual harassment), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 1088 (2005); Watkins v. Prof I Sec. Bureau, 
No. 98-2555, 1999 WL 1032614, at *5 n.16 (4th Cir. Nov. 15, 1999) ("[W]e cannot conceive 
that an employer that satisfies the first element of the affirmative defense and that 
promptly and adequately responds to a reported incident of sexual harassment [as the 
employer did here] ... would be held liable for the harassment on the basis of an inability 
to satisfy the literal terms of the second element of the affirmative defense."); Indest, 164 
F.3d at 265 (stating, "a case presenting only an incipient hostile environment corrected by 
prompt remedial action should be distinct from a case in which a company was never 
called upon to react to a supervisor's protracted or extremely severe acts that created a 
hostile environment," and holding that employer is not vicariously liable in incipient 
hostile environment case where plaintiff promptly complains and employer promptly 
responds and stops harassment); see also Marks, supra note 349, at 1424-28 (noting courts' 
inclination to interpret affirmative defense in disjunctive whereby "and" between two 
prongs becomes "or"). 
355 Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; Ellerth, 524 U.s. at 765; see also Harrison v. Eddy Potash, 
Inc., 248 F.3d 1014, 1025-26 (10th Cir. 2001) (acknowledging and affirming Tenth Circuit's 
prior rejection of Judge Jones's reasoning in Indest, and reaffirming requirement that 
employer must prove both prongs of Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense); Frederick v. 
Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 246 F.3d 1305, 1313 (11th Cir. 2001) ("Both elements [of the 
Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense] must be satisfied for the defendant-employer to avoid 
liability, and the defendant bears the burden of proof on both elements."). 
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To avoid this potentially unjust result, this Part proposes a normative 
framework to govern the application of the second prong in the 
submission context. This Part assumes the existence of an actionable 
hostile work environment. The term "submission" is used in its broadest 
sense and thereby includes any circumstances in which a subordinate 
fails to report and either passively tolerates a supervisor's unwelcome 
sexual advances and offensive sexual conduct or actively submits to a 
supervisor's sexual demands and engages in the unwelcome sexual 
acts.356 
As explained below, the avoidable consequences doctrine and the 
related harm-avoidance principles underpinning the second prong 
dictate that determining whether a submission plaintiff unreasonably 
failed to report or otherwise avoid harm is generally an issue for the 
jury.357 This is particularly true given that the reasonableness threshold 
under the avoidable consequences doctrine is considerably lower than 
that applied in the traditional negligence context when assessing 
whether an individual acted reasonably.358 In making this 
reasonableness determination, the jury must consider the victim's unique 
circumstances. Those circumstances include whether the plaintiff 
possessed a credible fear of harm, the plaintiff's working environment, 
the consequences of not submitting based on the perceived threat of 
harm, and any other aspect of the circumstances that bears on whether 
she was unreasonable in submitting rather than reporting the harassing 
behavior. 359 By requiring a trier of fact to consider the victim's unique 
circumstances, submission victims will not be punished. They will 
356 The purpose of this Part is to provide guidance regarding how the second prong 
should be applied in submission cases to avoid the incorrect contributory negligence 
approach taken by many courts. Thus, this Part focuses on the threshold question of 
whether the victim unreasonably failed to report or avoid harm, treated as one interrelated 
issue, and the relevant factors the trier of fact should consider when making such a 
determination in the submission context. If, after assessing the circumstances in the 
manner described in this Part, the trier of fact concludes that the victim unreasonably failed 
to avoid harm to some degree, the trier of fact must then consider whether the victim 
unreasonably failed to avoid all harm. If so, the trier of fact may conclude that the 
employer should avoid liability altogether. If the victim unreasonably failed to avoid only 
some of the harm, however, the trier of fact must ascertain at what point the supervisor's 
actions became actionable and then determine the extent to which the victim's damages 
should be reduced for the harm she could have reasonably avoided. See Marks, supra note 
349, at 1420-2l. 
357 See id. at 1448-49 (noting that uniquely factual nature of inquiry under second prong 
is question for jury, and thus summary judgment is rarely appropriate); George, supra note 
121, at 155-56 (noting "reasonableness" standard warrants fewer summary judgments). 
358 See discussion infra Part V.B. 
359 [d. 
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instead have their rights vindicated in a way that is consistent with Title 
VII's interrelated goals of preventing harm, encouraging employees to 
report unlawful behavior, and compensating victims of discrimination. 
A. The Obligation to Report 
A fundamental premise underlying the second prong of the 
EllerthlFaragher affirmative defense is that "sometimes inaction is 
reasonable.,,360 Although the Court in Ellerth stated that a subordinate's 
failure to report supervisory sexual harassment would "normally 
suffice" to satisfy the employer's burden under prong two, such a failure 
is not always sufficient.361 Indeed, if a failure to report was always 
sufficient, the Court would have concluded that Ellerth unreasonably 
failed to report or otherwise avoid harm. Not only did Ellerth fail to 
report her supervisor's harassing conduct and accompanying threats, she 
also admitted that she knew about her employer's antiharassment policy 
and made a conscious decision to refrain from reporting and ultimately 
quit her employment.362 Notwithstanding Ellerth's decision, the Court 
remanded the case to give her an opportunity to prove a hostile work 
environment claim and her employer an opportunity to establish the 
affirmative defense.363 In contrast, the Court in Faragher had no difficulty 
concluding that the City was unable as a matter of law to satisfy its 
burden under prong one of the affirmative defense.364 
The Court's decision to remand in El/erth, instead of concluding as a 
matter of law that the employer established the second prong based on 
Ellerth's failure to report, demonstrates that sometimes inaction is 
reasonable. The circumstances under which inaction is reasonable 
remain unclear, however. The avoidable consequences principles 
underpinning the second prong provide guidance for resolving this 
issue. 
B. Avoidable Consequences Principles 
With respect to the legal principles underlying the second prong, the 
El/erth Court explained that "Title VII borrows from tort law the 
avoidable consequences doctrine . . . and the considerations which 
360 Reed v. MBNA Mktg. Sys., 333 F.3d 27, 36 (1st Cir. 2003). 
361 See supra note l33 and accompanying text. 
362 Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.s. 742,749 (1998). 
363 [d. at 766. 
364 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.s. 775, 808 (1998); see supra notes l39-43 and 
accompanying text (discussing deficiencies of City's actions to prevent sexual harassment). 
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animate that doctrine would also support limitation of employer liability 
in certain circumstances."36S The Court in Faragher elaborated further: 
The requirement to show that the employee has failed in a 
coordinate duty to avoid or mitigate harm reflects an equally 
obvious policy imported from the general theory of damages, that a 
victim has a duty "to use such means as are reasonable to avoid or 
minimize the damages" that result from violations of the statute.
366 
This statement of the avoidable consequences doctrine is virtually 
identical to that provided in section 918 of the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts (the "Restatement of Torts"). Section 918 explains that "one injured 
by the tort of another is not entitled to recover damages for any harm 
that he could have avoided by the use of reasonable effort or expenditure 
after the commission of the tort. ,,367 
365 Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764 (citation omitted). 
366 Faragher, 524 U.s. at 806 (quoting Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.s. 219, 231 n.15 
(1982)); see also MCCORMICK ON DAMAGES, ch. 5, § 34, at 132 (1935) ("[W]hat the injured 
person can do at moderate expense or with reasonable exertions to minimize the loss or 
injury, he must do, or bear the risk of his inaction. "). 
367 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 918(1) (1979) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT]. This 
provision is subject to an exception for circumstances involving intentionally or recklessly 
inflicted harm: 
One is not prevented from recovering damages for a particular harm resulting 
from a tort if the tortfeasor intended the harm or was aware of it and was 
recklessly disregardful of it, unless the injured person with knowledge of the 
danger of the harm intentionally or heedlessly failed to protect his own interests. 
ld. § 918(2). The Restatement of Torts explains: 
one who intends a particular harmful result or who is aware of the result and is 
recklessly indifferent to its happening, is required to pay damages for it, unless 
the injured person, realizing the danger, intentionally fails to act in the protection 
of his own interests or is heedlessly indifferent to them. 
ld. § 918 cmt. a. In the context of intentionally or recklessly inflicted harm, "[t]he merely 
careless or stupid person is thus protected from consequences that the tortfeasor intended 
or was willing to have occurred while, on the other hand, the person who stubbornly 
refuses to protect his own interests is given no legal redress." ld. Although the Court in 
Ellerth stated that "[s]exual harassment under Title VII presupposes intentional conduct," 
the Court's recitation of the avoidable consequences principles underlying the second 
prong, and the fact that the Court's language is virtually identical to the avoidable 
consequences standard for negligence claims under the Restatement of Torts, indicates that 
the Court intended to apply the negligence standard when assessing an employer'S 
vicarious liability under the affirmative defense. Ellerth, 524 U.s. at 756; cf. Smith v. 
Henderson, 376 F.3d 529, 539 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that avoidable consequences doctrine 
does not apply to intentional torts, such as disability discrimination under Americans with 
Disabilities Act); Johnson v. City of Saline, 151 F.3d 564, 573-74 (6th Cir. 1998) (same). 
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The Court in Faragher explained in general terms how the harm-
avoidance principles of the avoidable consequences doctrine apply in the 
sexual harassment context: 
An employer may, for example, have provided a proven, effective 
mechanism for reporting and resolving complaints of sexual 
harassment, available to the employee without undue risk or 
expense. lf the plaintiff unreasonably failed to avail herself of the 
employer's preventive or remedial apparatus, she should not 
recover damages that could have been avoided if she had done so. 
lf the victim could have avoided harm, no liability should be found 
against the employer who had taken reasonable care, and if 
damages could reasonably have been mitigated, no award against a 
liable employer should reward a plaintiff for what her own efforts 
could have avoided.368 
To fully understand the scope of a plaintiff's obligation to report and 
avoid harm in the sexual harassment context, it is helpful to return to the 
policy underlying and the harm-avoidance principles embodied in the 
avoidable consequences doctrine. 
The policy underlying the avoidable consequences doctrine is the 
premise that "recovery for the harm [suffered] is denied because it is in 
part the result of the injured person's lack of care, and public policy 
requires that persons should be discouraged from wasting their 
resources, both physical [and] economic.,,369 With respect to harm-
avoidance, the Restatement of Torts provides that an injured person is free 
to choose among the available reasonable courses of action or 
alternatives in an effort to avoid additional harm.37o So long as the 
chosen alternative is reasonable, it is irrelevant whether it turned out to 
be the best alternative in hindsight.371 Additionally, the standard of 
368 Faragher, 524 U.S. at 806-07. 
369 RESTATEMENT, supra note 367, § 918 cmt. a. 
370 In this regard, the Restatement of Torts provides: 
He is required to exercise no more than reasonable judgment or fortitude; and, if 
different courses of action are open to him he is not required, as a condition of 
obtaining full damages, to choose the course that events later show to have been 
the best. He is not barred from full recovery by the fact that it would have been 
reasonable for him to make expenditures or subject himself to pain or risk; it is 
only when he is unreasonable in refusing or failing to take action to prevent 
further loss that his damages are curtailed. 
Id. § 918 cmt. c.; see also MCCORMICK ON DAMAGES, supra note 366, ch. 5, § 35, at 134. 
371 RESTATEMENT, supra note 367, § 918 cmt. c; see also MCCORMICK ON DAMAGES, supra 
note 366, ch. 5, § 34, at 134; see also Bauchner, supra note 346, at 317 (noting potential for 
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reasonableness applied in assessing the injured person's chosen 
alternative is considerably less strict than that applied in determining 
negligence liability in tort.372 Thus, in attempting to avoid harm, the 
injured person "cannot be expected to incur unusual, unwarranted, or 
disproportionate expense," and any "inconvenience or financial 
sacrifice" necessary to avoid harm may "obviously bear upon the 
reasonableness" of the victim's chosen course.373 
In assessing the reasonableness of the injured person's chosen course 
of action, the Restatement of Torts provides additional guidance. It states 
that "it is frequently reasonable for a person threatened by further harm 
from a tortious act to refuse to subject himself to pain or to a danger of a 
different kind, which it would be necessary to undergo if further harm is 
to be averted.,,374 Additionally, in deciding which avenue to pursue to 
avoid harm, the plaintiff may engage in her own cost-benefit analysis 
and, in doing so, the Restatement of Torts provides that she may take into 
account her own unique circumstances. 375 Finally, the victim may 
hindsight bias under second prong and how such bias may undermine victim's ability to 
recover if trier of fact does not assess reasonableness of her actions from perspective of 
victim at time she made her decision); Russell B. Korobkin, Behavioral Analysis and Legal 
Form: Rules vs. Standards Revisited, 79 OR. 1. REV. 23, 48 (2000) ("When the law is 
determined on a case-by-case basis after disputes arise rather than prospectively, 
adjudicators' evaluations about what an individual should have done are likely to be 
tainted by information about the results of the individual's actions."). 
372 MCCORMICK ON DAMAGES, supra note 366, ch. 5, § 34, at 134. 
373 ld. at 134-35. 
3" RESTATEMENT, supra note 367, § 918 cmt. d. Moreover, as noted by the Seventh 
Circuit, the avoidable consequences doctrine does not require a plaintiff to choose an 
alternative that would "creat[el a bigger crisis ... by solving the immediate one." Lawson 
v. Trowbridge, 153 F.3d 368, 378 (7th Cir. 1998) (concluding that mentally ill civil rights 
plaintiff who had been falsely imprisoned did not fail to avoid harm when he refused to 
risk eviction and use his rent money to pay bond necessary to obtain his release from 
confinement). 
375 In this regard, the Restatement of Torts provides: 
A person whose body has been hurt or whose things have been damaged may 
not be unreasonable in refusing to expend money or effort in repairing the hurt 
or preventing further harm. Whether or not he is unreasonable in refusing the 
effort or expense depends upon the amount of harm that may result if he does 
not do so, the chance that the harm will result if nothing is done, the amount of 
money or effort required as a preventive, his ability to provide it and the 
likelihood that the measures will be successful. There must also be considered 
the personal situation of the plaintiff. A poor man cannot be expected to 
diminish his resources by the expenditure of an amount that might be expected 
from a person of greater wealth. So too, whether it is unreasonable for a slightly 
injured person not to seek medical advice may depend on his ability to pay for it 
without financial embarrassment. 
REsTATEMENT, supra note 367, § 918 cmt. e. 
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recover for any expense or injury incurred while takin~ the chosen 
course of action, so long as the chosen course is reasonable.3 6 
To understand the harm-avoidance principles embodied in the 
avoidable consequences doctrine, it is helpful to examine two 
hypothetical scenarios from the Restatement of Torts. In the first scenario, 
a tort victim suffers bodily injury but then fails to protect her own 
interests by stubbornly refusing to promptly seek treatment for those 
injuries.377 Under such circumstances, the victim may recover only for 
the harm proximately caused by the tortfeasor and not the aggravation 
of the initial injuries attributable to her stubborn and thus unreasonable 
failure to obtain prompt medical treatment. In this first scenario, the 
victim must decide between promptly obtaining medical treatment and 
delaying medical treatment. Her choice to pursue the second alternative 
and delay treatment is unreasonable in the absence of any explanation 
other than sheer stubbornness.378 
In a second scenario provided in the Restatement of Torts, the same tort 
victim suffers the same bodily injury but is faced with additional risks 
relevant to her decision-making process.379 Although the victim in this 
second scenario realizes that her injury likely requires prompt expert 
treatment, seeking such treatment would require traveling ten miles over 
treacherous ice-covered roads. Due to the hazards of travel, the victim 
waits until the following day to go to the nearest physician. Because of 
the delay, the victim suffers further injury. Under circumstances such as 
these where the victim is choosing between two potentially costly or 
harmful alternatives, harm-avoidance principles dictate that a trier of 
fact may reasonably conclude that the victim did not act unreasonably in 
delaying professional treatment.380 If the trier of fact so concludes, the 
victim can recover for the additional damages caused by the delay in 
seeking treatment.381 What makes this second scenario different from the 
first are the circumstances facing the victim - two competing 
alternatives each with a corresponding potential harm - when she is 
deciding upon the appropriate course of action.382 The potentially 
different outcome in the second scenario is driven by a cost-benefit 
376 MCCORMICK ON DAMAGES, supra note 370, ch. 5, § 42, at 152. 
377 RESTATEMENT, supra note 367, § 918 illus. 1. 
378 Id. 
379 This example is based on the RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, supra note 367, § 918 illus. 10. 
380 See id. 
381 Id. 
382 [d. 
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analysis of the two competing alternatives.383 The above examples apply 
equally in the sexual harassment context. 
In the sexual harassment context, a plaintiff whose supervisor sexually 
harasses her must choose between promptly reporting the supervisor's 
behavior or continuing to endure the harassment. The viability of the 
plaintiff's claim from a harm-avoidance perspective depends on whether 
she is merely choosing between reporting or not, or whether she is 
choosing between two competing - and legally sufficient -
alternatives, each with a corresponding harm. 
A plaintiff who fails to report without explanation or justification will 
not be viewed as choosing between two reasonable, competing 
alternatives. Thus, the trier of fact is likely to consider such 
circumstances as akin to the first scenario described above, in which the 
victim's delay in seeking medical treatment is unreasonable. In contrast, 
when the plaintiff possesses a credible belief that reporting would result 
in harm to her, the cost-benefit analysis may yield a different result 
depending on the victim's unique circumstances. For example, a 
plaintiff who has been subjected to supervisory sexual harassment and 
who is faced with a credible fear of job detriment must choose between 
two competing alternatives, each with a corresponding harm. The first 
option is to submit and continue to endure the supervisor's harassing 
conduct, but avoid the job detriment. The second option is to report the 
conduct and suffer the job detriment, but avoid the emotional harm that 
would result from enduring the harassment. 
To many, it may seem that the only reasonable option under such 
circumstances is to promptly report the conduct. This is particularly true 
where the conduct is egregious. Nevertheless, to a plaintiff in such 
circumstances, reporting the conduct may be the more costly, and thus 
less reasonable option, given her unique circumstances. These 
circumstances may include her financial status and her dependence on 
job-related benefits, such as health care. If she chooses incorrectly and 
her supervisor terminates her, she may suffer a significant financial loss 
for which she can only hope to recover years later in a legal action 
brought against her employer. Thus, based on her unique 
383 Under such circumstances, the cost-benefit analysis is comprised of two principle 
variables: the probability-weighted costs of seeking treatment promptly and the 
probability-weighted costs of not seeking treatment promptly. The cost-benefit analysis of 
the two alternatives in the second scenario requires an assessment of the circumstances the 
victim faced - treacherous ice-covered roads and a distance of ten miles, as compared to 
the need for prompt treatment - to determine whether the victim's ultimate decision to 
delay treatment is reasonable. Thus, the trier of fact must have the opportunity to assess 
the victim's choice in light of the circumstances in which it was made. 
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circumstances, the victim may instead reasonably choose to submit and 
thereby avoid the graver harm of termination. Depending on the 
victim's financial and personal circumstances, it is neither surprising nor 
unreasonable to believe that a plaintiff faced with this choice may 
reasonably choose to suffer humiliation, shame, and emotional anguish, 
rather than endure the end of a career or financial ruin. Regardless of 
the choice, the fact-finder should have an opportunity to determine 
whether the victim's decision to submit to the harassment was 
unreasonable under the circumstances.384 
In this analysis, the relevant factors are interrelated and may include: 
whether the victim possessed a credible fear of harm; the plaintiff's 
working environment, which requires an assessment of, inter alia, the 
workplace culture, the terms of the employer's 
antiharassment/antiretaliation policy, and the employer's efforts to 
implement such policies; and the perceived consequences of her refusal 
to submit.385 While some of these factors are generally assessed under 
prong one of the affirmative defense, the trier of fact must also have an 
opportunity to consider them in the context of the second prong.386 
384 Although not relying on avoidable consequences principles, Professor Grossman 
argued that the trier of fact must consider context and the victim's perspective in 
determining whether the victim's response was reasonable. Grossman, supra note 26, at 
728-29. But see infra note 386 and accompanying text, where Professor Grossman argued 
that because the employer's efforts to prevent sexual harassment are to be assessed under 
prong one, any further inquiry regarding such efforts is unnecessary when assessing the 
reasonableness of the victim's actions. 
3S5 The assessment required under avoidable consequences principles is largely 
consistent with considerations deemed relevant by social scientists and psychologists 
regarding a victim's response to sexual harassment. Specifically, a leading researcher in 
the field noted: 
The way in which any individual will cope with potentially harassing situations 
depends on (1) her cognitive evaluation of the situation with respect to its 
significance for well-being (i.e., is it irrelevant, benign, or threatening) and (2) the 
options that are realistically available, their costs and benefits, and what is at 
stake. Such evaluations are part of a complex, reflexive process that changes 
over time as the situation unfolds. Additional influences on response include 
resources and constraints, both personal and environmental; these include both 
individual characteristics (e.g., assertiveness, sex role attitudes, economic and 
psychological vulnerability) and also organizational ones (e.g., climate, tolerance 
for harassment, etc.). 
Louise F. Fitzgerald et aI., Why Didn't She Just Report Him? The Psychological and Legal 
Implications of Women's Responses to Sexual Harassment, 5 J. SOC. IsSUES 117, 129 (1995). 
386 Professor Grossman contended that the "proper analysis of the second prong turns 
exclusively on the plaintiff's conduct." Grossman, supra note 26, at 700 n.140. Her 
contention, however, is based on an assumption that courts will engage in the necessary 
searching inquiry under prong one regarding the employer's efforts to prevent sexual 
616 University of California, Davis [Vol. 39:529 
1. Credible Fear of Harm 
From a harm-avoidance standpoint, it is important to ascertain 
whether the plaintiff possessed a credible fear of harm at the time she 
submitted. In the sexual harassment context, many scholars argue that a 
victim's failure to report is per se reasonable based on empirical studies 
documenting that most harassment victims subjectively fear retaliation 
and, for the small percentage who report, they do in fact suffer 
retaliation at a high rate.387 Based on these studies, it would be logical to 
conclude that because a large majority of harassment victims fear 
retaliation and thereby fail to report because of these fears, a particular 
victim's failure to report based on such fears would not be unreasonable. 
In this respect, the second prong seems at odds with social science 
research regarding sexual harassment, as the Court indicated that a 
plaintiff's failure to report will "normally suffice" to satisfy the 
employer's burden under prong two. As a result of this inconsistency, 
some scholars argue that the Court should revise or jettison the 
affirmative defense388 and, in particular, the second prong.389 Some have 
harassment by exammmg the "employer's policies, procedures, and penchant for (or 
against) retaliation." ld. As Professor Grossman acknowledged, this assumption is not 
supported by the courts' analysis of the first prong, which tends to be cursory at best. See 
id. at 723-27; infra note 413 and accompanying text. In any event, the harm-avoidance 
principles of the avoidable consequences doctrine demonstrate that it is necessary for the 
trier of fact to assess the victim's unique circumstances (including her work environment 
and steps taken by her employer to prevent harassment and retaliation) in determining 
whether the victim's chosen course of action was reasonable. 
For an example of how the second prong of the EllerthlFaragher affirmative defense 
and the avoidable consequences doctrine are applied to sexual harassment claims under 
California's antidiscrimination statute, see State Department of Health Services v. Superior 
Court, 79 P.3d 556, 565 (Cal. 2003) (applying Ellerthl Faragher affirmative defense to 
damages but not liability, and concluding that avoidable consequences principles of second 
prong allows employers "to escape liability for those damages, and only those damages, 
that the employee more likely than not could have prevented with reasonable effort and 
without undue risk, expense, or humiliation, by taking advantage of the employer's 
internal complaint procedures appropriately designed to prevent and eliminate sexual 
harassment"). 
387 Theresa M. Beiner, Sex, Science and Social Knowledge: The Implications of Social Science 
Research on Imputing Liability to Employers for Sexual Harassment, 7 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & 
1. 273, 306-23 (2001) (discussing social science studies regarding low reporting rates among 
victims of harassment and reasons for same); Grossman, supra note 26, at 723-27 
(discussing empirical studies that examine myriad reasons why victims fail to report 
harassment, and noting that primary reason is fear of adverse consequences and that many 
victims, in fact, suffer such negative consequences); Lawton, supra note 349, at 208 (noting 
that most common victim response to sexual harassment is to refrain from reporting, and 
citing social science studies demonstrating same). 
388 Joanna L. Grossman, The Culture of Compliance: The Final Triumph of Form Over 
Substance in Sexual Harassment Law, 26 HARV. WOMEN'S 1.J. 3, 71 (2003) (collecting and 
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taken a more moderate approach and argued that the affirmative defense 
should only reduce a victim's recoverable damages, instead of 
permitting an employer to avoid liability.39o In June 2004, however, the 
Suders Court reaffirmed the tangible employment action standard and 
the two-prong affirmative defense. 
Additionally, the Court in Ellerth and Faragher implicitly rejected the 
argument that an employee's unsubstantiated fears of job detriment are 
sufficient to excuse an employee's failure to report. As the First Circuit 
noted in Reed v. MBNA Marketing System, when the Supreme Court 
issued its companion decisions nearly twelve years after Meritor Savings 
Bank, FSB v. Vinson}91 the Court undoubtedly knew that an employee 
who reports a supervisor's inappropriate conduct might be 
uncomfortable, embarrassed, frightened, or any combination of these.392 
Moreover, the Court was also undoubtedly aware of the various studies 
that provided empirical evidence demonstrating that many plaintiffs 
reasonably fear embarrassment and job detriment if they report and that 
discussing empirical research regarding why sexual harassment occurs and how victims 
respond, concluding that affirmative defense is "doctrinally unjustifiable," and thus calling 
for "elimination of the affirmative defense, greater availability of punitive damages, and 
the recognition of individual liability"). 
389 Beiner, supra note 387, at 330-32 (arguing that "fail to avoid harm otherwise" 
language in prong two "is so vague as to be unworkable and should be eliminated 
entirely," and positing that affirmative defense should not be defense to liability but to 
punitive damages); Lawton, supra note 349, at 259-66; Sherwyn et al., supra note 349, at 1299 
(arguing that second prong of affirmative defense should be eliminated). 
390 See Grossman, supra note 26, at 735-36 (2000) (arguing that affirmative defense 
should not be defense to liability but should reduce damages and that such approach 
would be more consistent with Title VII's goals of compensation and deterrence, and 
concluding that Congress should take action to effectuate proposed approach). This 
approach essentially argues that the avoidable consequences doctrine should be applied to 
sexual harassment claims in the same manner as it is applied to common law torts where, 
unlike contributory negligence which may serve as a complete bar to recovery, the 
avoidable consequences doctrine simply results in a reduction of the victim's damages for 
those injuries the victim could have avoided with reasonable efforts. See RESTATEMENT, 
supra note 367, § 918 cmt. a (distinguishing contributory negligence, which precludes 
recovery, from avoidable consequences, which has no bearing on existence of cause of 
action but applies only to diminution of damages). Notwithstanding the traditional 
application of the avoidable consequences doctrine in the common law tort context, the 
Court in Faragher indicated that a plaintiff's failure to avoid harm could serve as a complete 
bar to recovery under some circumstances. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.s. 775, 
807 (1998) ("If the victim could have avoided harm, no liability should be found against the 
employer who had taken reasonable care .... "); Savino v. c.P. Hall Co., 199 F.3d 925, 935 
(7th Cir. 1999) (noting that Court intended that plaintiff's failure to avoid harm would 
absolve employer of liability under certain circumstances regardless of whether avoidable 
consequences doctrine functions differently in common law tort context). 
391 477 U.s. 57 (1986). 
392 Reed v. MBNA Mktg. Sys., 333 F.3d 27, 35 (1st Cir. 2003). 
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many suffer job detriment after reporting.393 The Court nevertheless 
"require[d] the employee in normal circumstances to make this painful 
effort if the employee wants to impose vicarious liability on the employer and 
collect damages under Title VII.,,394 The First Circuit reasoned: 
The complaint mechanism, after all, can be used to address threats 
of retaliation as well as harassment, and unless patently futile, 
concerns as to whether the complaint mechanism will fail can be 
tested by trying it out if failure is the only cost. But where there is a 
truly credible threat of retaliation that the complaint mechanism will not 
prevent, the employee's position is more hazardous and inaction more 
'1 I' d 195 east y exp ame . 
For this reason, numerous courts have properly applied Ellerth and 
Faragher to conclude that a plaintiff's subjective or generalized fears of 
either embarrassment or Job detriment are insufficient to excuse the 
plaintiff's failure to report. 96 
In contrast, as the First Circuit suggested in Reed, certain courts have 
properly concluded that a victim's failure to report may not be 
unreasonable when the victim possesses a credible belief that reporting 
would either result in harm to her or otherwise be futile. 397 A primary 
393 Id. at 36. 
394 Id. at 35. 
395 ld. at 36 (emphasis added). 
396 See, e.g., Madray v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc., 208 F.3d 1290, 1296, 1301-02 (11th Cir. 
2000) (affirming summary judgment for employer, and concluding that plaintiffs' reporting 
to individuals other than those designated in employer's antiharassment policy and 
resulting delay in reporting to appropriate individuals was unreasonable as matter of law 
where it was based on plaintiffs' generalized fear of "potential negative consequences" and 
plaintiffs admitted that they understood policy and individuals to whom report should be 
submitted); Caridad v. Metro-North Commuter RR, 191 F.3d 283, 295 (2d Cir. 1999) 
(concluding that plaintiff's failure to report her supervisor's sexual harassment was 
unreasonable as matter of law because it was not based on "credible fear that her complaint 
would not be taken seriously or that she would suffer some adverse employment action as 
a result of filing a complaint," but was instead based on her concern regarding negative 
reaction of coworkers); Shaw v. Autozone, Inc., 180 F.3d 806, 813 (7th Cir. 1999) (affirming 
summary judgment for employer, and holding that plaintiff's failure to report her 
supervisor's sexual harassment was unreasonable as matter of law when it was based on 
plaintiff's discomfort at discussing with her employer "offensive and repulsive sexual 
conduct" she endured because "an employee's subjective fears of confrontation, 
unpleasantness, or retaliation do not alleviate the employer'S duty under Ellerth to alert the 
employer to the allegedly hostile environment"). 
3'17 See infra Part V.C.l (discussing Reed, 333 F.3d 27, and Bennett v. Progressive Corp., 225 
F. Supp. 2d 190 (ND.N.Y. 2002»; see also Mota v. Univ. of Tex. Houston Health Sci. Ctr., 261 
F.3d 512, 526 (5th Cir. 2001) (affirming jury finding that plaintiff's eight to nine month 
delay in reporting supervisor's repeated sexual advances and other sexually offensive 
conduct was not unreasonable failure to complain or otherwise avoid harm where delay 
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factor relevant to assessing the credibility of the victim's belief is whether 
the victim was explicitly or implicitly threatened with harm.398 
Moreover, as discussed more fully below, a victim's working 
environment bears directly on the question of whether she possessed a 
credible fear of harm. Because the employer bears the burden of proof 
under prong two,399 the employer must demonstrate that it created an 
environment in which reporting is encouraged, sexual harassment is 
taken seriously, and retaliation is prohibited and promptly addressed. 
Furthermore, the employer must show that an employee who does not 
report under such circumstances acted unreasonably. 
2. Working Environment 
In addition to an explicit or implicit threat of harm from the 
perpetrating supervisor, the working circumstances themselves may also 
reinforce or evidence a credible threat of harm.40o Empirical studies 
stemmed from supervisor's high stature within defendant university and supervisor's 
comments referring to his power in university and implicit threats of retaliation if 
subordinate complained); cf. Walton v. Johnson & Johnson Servs., Inc., 347 F.3d 1272, 1289-
91 (11th Cir. 2003) (holding that plaintiff's two and one-half month delay in reporting her 
supervisor's sexually offensive conduct and accompanying rape was unreasonable as 
matter of law because plaintiff could have "avoided most, if not all, of the actionable 
harassment by reporting" her supervisor's behavior and because delay resulted from 
plaintiff's "subjective" fear of job reprisals based on her supervisor's comment that he was 
"well-connected to upper management and that he could assist her in getting the 
promotion" she desired and plaintiff's "subjective" fear of suffering physical harm if she 
reported based on her supervisor having twice showed her his gun prior to sexually 
assaulting her); Wyatt v. Hunt Plywood Co., 297 F.3d 405, 413 (5th Cir. 2002) (affirming 
summary judgment in favor of employer, and concluding that plaintiff's failure to report 
was unreasonable notwithstanding her supervisor's admonition not to "go over his head"). 
398 In the oral argument in Suders, Justice Scalia acknowledged that if a subordinate is 
threatened with death if she reports sexual harassment, it is "reasonable for her not to file a 
grievance," but he noted that the employer should not be strictly liable for the harassment 
given the unofficial nature of the conduct. Transcript of Oral Argument at 33, Pa. State 
Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129 (2004) (No. 03-95), available at 
http://www.supremecourtus.gov / oral_arguments/ argument_transcripts/03-95.pdf; see 
Ann M. Henry, Comment, Employer and Employee Reasonableness Regarding Retaliation Under 
the Ellerth/Faragher Affirmative Defense, 1999 U. Ci-II. LEGAL F. 553, 583-86 (1999) (arguing 
that employee should have opportunity to prove that she acted reasonably under second 
prong when supervisor has made "specific threats of retaliation," such as discharge, and 
suggesting that "lesser threats" may be insufficient to justify failure to report, but not 
addressing avoidable consequences principles). 
399 See supra text accompanying note 343. 
400 See Fitzgerald et aI., supra note 385, at 122 (noting that "organizational context - that 
is the organizational norms and culture" of workplace that are "powerful predictors of 
sexual harassment" - is equally relevant in influenCing victim's response to such 
harassment); see also Chamallas, supra note 11, at 381 ("Courts should recognize that the 
informal culture of an organization is as important as the formal policies in the employee 
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demonstrate that the "norms and culture" of the workplace are highly 
relevant in predicting the incidence of harassment and in influencing a 
victim's response to sexual harassment.401 Thus, in assessing the 
credibility of the perceived threat of harm specifically, and considering 
the reasonableness of the victim's failure to report more generally, the 
trier of fact must consider all relevant aspects of the victim's working 
environment. Such an assessment may include a consideration of the 
workplace culture, as well as the terms of the employer's antiharassment 
and antiretaliation policies. 
a. Workplace Culture 
Empirical studies demonstrate that sexual harassment is more likely to 
occur and employees are more reluctant to report when the employer 
creates or rermits an environment in which sexual harassment is 
acceptable.40 As one commentator suggested: "[I]f harassment is 
tolerated, or is not properly punished, employees will receive the 
handbook and should make their assessments of whether employers and employees act 
reasonably against this backdrop."); Tristin K. Green, Work Culture and Discrimination, 93 
CAL. L. REv. 623, 650 (2005) (noting that "[eJmployers' organizational choices can both 
facilitate and constrain the development of discriminatory work cultures"). 
401 Fitzgerald et aI., supra note 385, at 122; see Green, supra note 400, at 678 (identifying 
work culture as one source of discrimination in workplace and arguing that one alternative 
for remedying work culture discrimination is to require employers "to take reasonable 
steps to rid their workplaces of discriminatory work cultures as part of their obligation to 
exercise reasonable care to prevent and promptly correct all harassing behavior"); 
Grossman, supra note 388, at 53,56 (collecting and discussing empirical research regarding 
relevant factors for improving victim reporting rates, and noting that reporting rates "may 
be influenced by the organizational structure of the workplace," and suggesting that 
reporting rates may increase if employers increase efforts toward "eliminating gender 
imbalance in the workplace and maintaining tighter control over the work environment"); 
Grossman, supra note 26, at 726-27 (same). 
402 Beiner, supra note 387, at 295-303 (relying on social science research, and stating that 
victim's work environment and amount of harassment that occurs is influenced by 
"general atmosphere on the job, the attitudes of supervisors, the diversity of the workforce, 
as well as what behavior is tolerated or not," and noting that message communicated to 
victims based on these factors bears directly on whether victim reports harassing behavior); 
Grossman, supra note 26 (discussing empirical sexual harassment studies, and noting that 
antiharassment policies, training, and reporting mechanisms proactively implemented by 
employers may impact overall work environment and may have some positive impact on 
preventing harassment and encouraging reporting, but noting that some studies undercut 
this correlation); Lawton, supra note 349, at 223-28 (noting that "the more tolerant an 
organization is of harassment," as evidenced by supervisors' behavior in workplace and 
manner in which harassment complaints are addressed and resolved, the more likely 
potential harassers will engage in harassing behavior and the less likely victims are to 
report harassment, and citing empirical research supporting same). 
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message that it is acceptable behavior.,,403 In contrast, where an 
employer's policies and actions demonstrate its commitment to a 
harassment-free workplace, harassment will be less likely to occur and 
employees will be more likely to report harassment. 
For example, an employer may implicitly communicate its attitude 
toward sexual harassment and its related attitude toward harassment 
complaints in the way it implements its antiharassment policy. While 
one employer may demonstrate a casual attitude toward sexual 
harassment by simply requiring new employees to view an 
antiharassment· video at the commencement of their employment, 
another employer may communicate a stronger antiharassment message 
by having periodic training sessions that require employees to actively 
participate and thoughtfully respond to difficult questions about sexual 
harassment.404 The employer may further demonstrate its commitment 
to a harassment-free workplace by periodically evaluating its training 
program and its supervisors' efforts to implement and adhere to the 
d ·d .405 eSlfe practices. 
Additionally, the way in which an employer addresses complaints and 
the behavior of supervisors communicates a powerful message to 
employees regarding the employer's attitude toward sexual harassment 
and harassment complaints. For example, by failing to respond 
appropriately or at all to a sexual harassment complaint, an employer 
may implicitly suggest that harassment is tolerated and reporting is 
403 Beiner, supra note 387, at 298; see, e.g., Sharp v. City of Houston, 164 F.3d 923, 931 
(5th Cir. 1999) (affirming verdict in favor of plaintiff police officer on her sexual harassment 
claim based on her employer's negligence, and concluding that plaintiff's failure to report 
her supervisor's sexually harassing conduct did not absolve employer of liability because 
hierarchical structure of police department and unwritten code of silence effectively 
forbade lodging complaint against fellow officer such that anyone who violated code of 
silence "would suffer such a pattern of social ostracism and professional disapprobation 
that he or she would likely sacrifice a career" and plaintiff was thus left with untenable 
decision of whether to "report the harassment and lose her career, or endure the 
harassment and lose her dignity"). 
404 Beiner, supra note 387, at 330. 
405 See, e.g., Susan Bisom-Rapp, An Ounce of Prevention Is a Poor Substitute for a Pound of 
Cure: Confronting the Developing Jurisprudence of Education and Prevention in Employment 
Discrimination Law, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 30-31 (2001) (noting that efficacy of 
training programs is unclear, and thus arguing that employer training programs should not 
be sufficient to avoid liability but should be designed and evaluated to ensure that they 
accomplish desired goals); Susan Bisom-Rapp, Fixing Watches with Sledgehammers: The 
Questionable Embrace of Employee Sexual Harassment Training by the Legal Profession, 24 T. 
JEFFERSON L. REV. 125, 142-44 (2002) (same); Grossman, supra note 26 (noting that "there 
remains a significant gap" between "the empirical evidence of a training effect" and 
"conclusion that training will actually reduce harassment").+ 
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futile. 4lJ6 Moreover, if higher level supervisors engage in sexually 
harassing behavior, others may conclude that such behavior is acceptable 
in the workplace and thus reporting is futile. 407 The implicit message to 
an employee subjected to supervisor harassment under such 
circumstances is that reporting sexually harassing behavior is rife with 
danger and submission is the reasonable alternative under the 
. t 408 ClTcums ances. 
b. Antiharassment/ Antiretaliation Policy 
In addition to evaluating the culture of the victim's working 
environment, the trier of fact should ascertain whether the employer 
maintained an antiharassment policy and, if so, whether the victim knew 
of the employer's antiharassment policy. Although Ellerth and Faragher 
do not require that an employer demonstrate that it actually distributed 
or made its policy available to the victim to satisfy the first prong of the 
defense, the City's outright failure to disseminate its policy in Faragher 
proved fatal to its ability to assert the affirmative defense.409 Moreover, 
'06 Martha S. West, Preventing Sexual Harassment: The Federal Courts' Wake-Up Call For 
Women, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 457, 507 (2002) (arguing that courts should require employers to 
address women's fears of retaliation by demonstrating effectiveness of their antiharassment 
policies through dissemination of results of, and actions taken against harassers regarding, 
prior sexual harassment complaints); see also EEOC, supra note 147, 'lI V.D.l.c. ("[AJn 
employee would have a reasonable basis to believe that the complaint process is ineffective 
if ... he or she was aware of instances in which co-workers' complaints failed to stop 
harassment."). 
"" EEOC, supra note 147, 'lI V.D.l.c.; see, e.g., Frank v. Plaza Constr. Corp., 186 F. Supp. 
2d 420, 430-31 (S.DN.Y. 2002) (denying summary judgment for employer, and concluding 
that triable issue of fact existed as to whether plaintiff had been unreasonable in her 
outright failure to report sexually harassing conduct by chairman of board of directors and 
chief executive officer when her failure was based on harasser's high rank within company 
and fact that prior reports of harassment by other executive had been ignored and 
"provoked heightened hostility towards her," and implying that harasser's status alone 
may have been sufficient to create triable issue of fact); see also Harper, supra note 253, at 68-
69 (noting that in assessing whether victim is lower cost avoider under circumstances it is 
necessary to consider victim's circumstances, including comparison of relative value of 
supervisor and victim to employer such as, for example, relative disparity between 
supervisor who is company's "leading sales producer" and victim who works as "filing 
clerk"). For an alternative basis for imposing employer liability based on the conduct of a 
high-level supervisor who serves as a "proxy" for the corporation, see supra text 
accompanying note 12l. 
"" See, e.g., Booker v. Budget Rent-A-Car Sys., 17 F. Supp. 2d 735, 747-48 (M.D. Tenn. 
1998) (concluding that employer could not establish that employee'S failure to report was 
unreasonable under second prong where employer had not provided copy of its 
antiharassment policy to plaintiff and employee's work environment had "atmosphere" 
where employees feared retaliation and retribution for reporting). 
",. See supra notes 139-43 and accompanying text. 
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the fact that the victim is either unaware of or has not seen the terms of 
the policy bears on the reasonableness of the victim's response under the 
second prong.410 If the victim knew about the policy, the trier of fact 
should then examine the specific terms of the policy as they bear directly 
on whether a plaintiff's decision to submit was unreasonable. 
Currently, the specific terms of the employer's antiharassment policy 
are assessed, if at all, only under prong one.411 Nevertheless, a searching 
inquiry under prong one is often lacking. Courts routinely conclude that 
the employer satisfies its burden under prong one through "file-cabinet 
compliance," "where the employer demonstrates that it "develop[ed] 
and distribut[ed] [its] nicely worded harassment polic[y] and 
procedures. ,,412 Such a conclusion is problematic in the submission 
context because, in lieu of analyzing the plaintiff's conduct and whether 
her failure to report is unreasonable under prong two, many courts 
engage in the following flawed syllogism: if the employer's efforts to 
prevent sexual harassment - file-cabinet compliance - are reasonable, 
then the plaintiff's failure to follow such procedures is thus necessarily 
unreasonable.413 
410 See, e.g., Boyd v. Snow, 335 F. Supp. 2d 28, 36 (D.D.C. 2004) (stating that employer's 
failure to provide copy of its antiharassment policy to victim and further failure to direct 
her to its company website which contained information regarding employer's 
antiharassment policy was relevant to assessing reasonableness of victim's response to her 
supervisor's harassment). 
411 See, e.g., Harrison v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 248 F.3d 1014, 1028 (10th Cir. 2001) (stating 
that employer failed to satisfy its burden under prong one where employer failed to 
provide its nonsupervisory personnel with copies of antiharassment policy, and failed to 
post policy on employee bulletin boards including bulletin boards in women's changing 
room, and plaintiff was neither informed of nor provided copy of policy); Grossman, supra 
note 26, at 697 (stating that employer's failure to disseminate its antiharassment policy is 
relevant to whether employer satisfied its burden under prong one to take reasonable steps 
to prevent sexual harassment). 
412 Lawton, supra note 349, at 198; see supra notes 139-43 and accompanying text 
(demonstrating how "file-cabinet compliance" is inconsistent with outcome in Faragher). 
413 Lawton, supra note 349, at 215, 242; Sherwyn et aI., supra note 349, at 1290 (noting 
tendency of courts to conclude that, because employer took reasonable steps to prevent 
sexual harassment and thus satisfied prong one, employee's failure to report was "per se 
'unreasonable"'); see, e.g., Ashmore v. J.P. Thayer Co., 303 F. Supp. 2d 1359, 1372 (M.D. Ga. 
2004) (reversing jury verdict in favor of plaintiffs, concluding that employer's 
antiharassment policy constituted reasonable efforts to prevent harassment under prong 
one, and further concluding that plaintiffs' failure to follow terms of such reasonable 
policy, which required that plaintiffs report sexual harassment within 48 hours of its 
occurrence, was therefore unreasonable). The flawed syllogism renders the reasonableness 
assessment under the second prong superfluous. As discussed in Part V.A supra, the 
Court's statement that an employee's unreasonable failure to report will "normally suffice" 
indicates that a failure to comply with a reasonable complaint procedure does not always 
suffice. 
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Worse yet, the tendency to conclude that a victim's failure to report is 
unreasonable when her employer demonstrates file-cabinet compliance 
under prong one leads to a perverse result. Instead of incentivizing 
employers to provide multiple formal and informal reporting avenues 
for employees, employers may conclude that they may immunize 
themselves from liability by implementing a cryptic policy that provides 
fewer reporting avenues, and thus make it harder for an employee to 
report sexual harassment.414 Under this theory, employers will fare 
better in sexual harassment cases by making it more difficult for 
employees to complain by, for example, canceling their "1-800" 
harassment reporting lines.41s Such a result is obviously counter to the 
goals of Ellerth and Faragher. In any event, the more logical analysis is 
that the more cryptic and difficult a policy is to follow, the more likely 
the trier of fact will conclude that a subordinate's failure to follow that 
policy was not unreasonable.416 
Moreover, because most employees subjectively fear retaliation and 
consider this fear a factor in their decision whether to report, courts 
should scrutinize the terms of the employer's antiretaliation policy, the 
414 Sherwyn et al., supra note 349, at 1294. 
415 [d.; see Lawton, supra note 349, at 252-53 (contending that "[b]y permitting employers 
to restrict the methods by which victims can report harassment, courts make reporting 
more diffiCult ... [which], in tum, ensures that fewer employees will do so," and further 
arguing that this approach permits employer to avoid liability by "narrowly defining when 
it obtains notice" and thus "frustrat[es] Ellerth's and Faragher's stated goal of deterrence"). 
416 Marks, supra note 349, at 1457 (acknowledging inverse relationship between steps 
taken by employers to combat harassment and victim's reasonableness in failing to report); 
EEOC, supra note 147, 'j[ V.D.l.b. ("[E]mployee's failure to use the employer's complaint 
procedure would be reasonable if that failure was based on unnecessary obstacles to 
complaints ... [such as] if the process entailed undue expense by the employee, 
inaccessible points of contact for making complaints, or unnecessarily intimidating or 
burdensome requirements."); see, e.g., Fiscus v. Triumph Group Operations, Inc., 24 F. 
Supp. 2d 1229,1240-41 (D. Kan. 1998) (holding that plaintiffs' failure to complain of various 
incidents of supervisor's sexually harassing conduct was unreasonable as matter of law 
where employer had written antiharassment policy that permitted complaints through 
numerous avenues, company "condemned haraSSing behavior in a public forum and 
conducted antiharassment workshops/training for its supervisors," and plaintiffs' prior 
complaints had been promptly addressed and resolved); cf Frederick v. Sprint/United 
Mgmt. Co., 246 F.3d 1305, 1310, 1316 (11th Cir. 2001) (reversing summary judgment for 
employer, and concluding that triable issue of facts existed as to whether plaintiff's delay of 
more than one year in reporting her supervisor's sexual advances and offensive touching 
constituted unreasonable failure to take advantage of preventive or corrective 
opportunities or to otherwise avoid harm where plaintiff claimed that she had not received 
her employer's antiharassment policy, employer's code of conduct was unclear about how 
to report complaint even though it included reference to anonymous "Ethics Code Hotline" 
available to employees, and when plaintiff did complain she was allegedly told not to 
pursue her complaint). 
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formal and informal mechanisms implemented by the employer to 
prevent and remedy retaliation, and the efficacy of those mechanisms in 
preventing retaliation.417 Indeed, the EEOC's Guidelines require that an 
employer not only make it clear that retaliation is not tolerated, but also 
require that the employer "undertake whatever measures are necessary 
to ensure that retaliation does not occur.,,418 For example, an 
antiretaliation provision will appear more credible to an employee, 
particularly an employee who fears job detriment, if the employer details 
and then takes affirmative steps to prevent and address retaliation, 
instead of simply asserting that the employer adheres to a "zero 
tolerance" retaliation policy.419 One commentator suggested that courts 
should require employers to follow up with the complainant some time 
after the complaint to determine whether the complainant experienced 
any form of retaliation.
420 If an employer maintained and implemented 
an effective antiretaliation policy, employees might be encouraged to 
report. In any event, the employer's efforts in this regard would be one 
factor tending to show why an employee's failure to report was 
unreasonable under the circumstances. 
Another alternative is to provide a specific retaliation bypass 
mechanism in the policy itself by mandating that a supervisor other 
417 Fitzgerald et al., supra note 385, at 135 ("[If] resistance is to have any meaning, 
interventions must be developed to ensure that organizations provide a safe environment 
for victims to express that resistance through both formal and informal channels. Training 
programs designed to teach women to be more assertive and to access organizational 
complaint procedures, well-intentioned though they may be, are insufficient and 
misguided, without meaningful organizational protection from stigma and retaliation."); 
Harper, supra note 253, at 66-67 (arguing that, in absence of tangible employment action, 
employer should be able to avoid vicarious liability for harassment under affirmative 
defense "if and only if the employer has taken reasonable steps to make reporting of this 
harassment seem of relatively low cost to victim, and victim has still failed to report 
offending conduct"); see also MCCORMICK ON DAMAGES, supra note 366, ch. 5, § 42, at 152-55 
(stating that in evaluating reasonableness of course of action, victim's recovery is not 
diminished if course of action by which victim might have avoided or "lessened the injury" 
is of "such debatable efficacy that a reasonable man might either have adopted it or not"). 
41' EEOC, supra note 147, 'lI V.D.l.b. 
419 Harper, supra note 253, at 77-78 n.139 (arguing that, to prevail on second prong of 
affirmative defense, employer should be required to demonstrate that it "has successfully 
neutralized [the] risks [of retaliation] for a reasonable victim of harassment," and noting 
that employer'S attitudes toward sexual harassment are "reflected in their actions rather 
than in their words"). 
420 Lawton, supra note 349, at 267-68 (arguing that in evaluating prongs one and two of 
affirmative defense, courts should "require employers to produce evidence of the 
following: (1) complaint records; (2) a system of post-complaint follow-up; (3) employees' 
evaluations of the employer's policy and procedure; and (4) a system for evaluating 
managers on their compliance with the firm's antiharassment policy and procedure"). 
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than, or in addition to, the harassing supervisor evaluate the 
complainant's work performance for a specified period, perhaps a year, 
after any complaint.421 A bypass mechanism would likely make the 
antiretaliation provision more credible and would be relevant in 
assessing whether the employee's failure to report was unreasonable. 
Even in the absence of such a protective measure, the policy should at 
least inform employees that an unreasonable failure to promptly report 
harassment may preclude their ability to recover from their employer for 
such harassment.422 
Given the relationship between a victim's working environment and 
her willingness to report, the trier of fact should have an opportunity to 
evaluate these circumstances in assessing whether the victim's chosen 
course of action was unreasonable under the circumstances. Although 
employers cannot control the behavior of every supervisor, they can 
certainly create, and should be required to demonstrate to the trier of 
fact, the existence of a working environment that communicates and 
reinforces a strong antiharassment/ antiretaliation message to 
supervisors and victims alike. 
3. Consequences of Harm 
Finally, in determining whether the victim's decision to submit was 
unreasonable, the trier of fact must consider the consequences of the 
alternative courses of action available to the victim, in light of her unique 
circumstances. For example, the Restatement of Torts provides that a 
victim's financial resources are directly relevant to the victim's cost-
benefit analysis in determining which course of action to pursue.423 
421 See, e.g., Allen G. King, Resist and Report: A Policy to Deter Quid Pro Quo Sexual 
Harassment, 50 BAYLOR L. REV. 333, 343 (1998) (arguing pre-Ellerth/Faragher that 
antiharassment policy directed at sexual extortion should include, inter alia, assurances 
that "any adverse actions taken against her for a specified period will be scrutinized 
carefully by higher management" and "resist and report" provision that imposes 
affirmative duty on victim to resist and report quid pro quo threats and advances and 
subjects victim to discipline for failing to do so). Given the courts' tendency to equate file-
cabinet compliance with reasonable efforts to prevent sexual harassment, and thus 
conclude that a victim who failed to follow such reasonable procedures was necessarily 
unreasonable, a resist and report provision would simply provide further grounds for pro-
employer courts to conclude that the victim's submission was unreasonable under prong 
two because she breached the resist and report duty. A duty to resist and report would 
pose less of a problem if courts ceased engaging in the flawed syllogism discussed above 
and instead properly applied the second prong and considered the victim's unique 
circumstances . 
• 22 Bauchner, supra note 346, at 318 . 
• 23 RESTATEMENT, supra note 367, § 918 cmt. e ("A poor man cannot be expected to 
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While a trier of fact may conclude that it is unreasonable for a victim of 
financial means to submit under certain circumstances, that same trier of 
fact may conclude that submission on the part of a victim who lives 
paycheck-to-paycheck or is in a financially precarious position is not 
unreasonable under otherwise identical circumstances.424 The same 
would apply to a victim who, for example, desperately needs health 
benefits for either herself or a loved one and who does not have the 
means to secure those health benefits elsewhere.425 
In addition to financial consequences, the above principles relate 
equally to intangible considerations, such as the negative impact of 
reporting on career advancement.426 For example, imagine a well 
diminish his resources by the expenditure of an amount that might be expected from a 
person of greater wealth. So too, whether it is unreasonable for a slightly injured person 
not to seek medical advice may depend on his ability to pay for it without financial 
embarrassment."); see supra text accompanying note 375; cf Amanda M. Jarratt, Comment, 
Customizing the Reasonable-Woman Standard to Fit Emotionally and Financially Disabled 
Plaintiffs Is Outside the Scope of the Civil Rights Act's Prohibition on Sex-Based Discrimination: 
Holly D. v. California Institute of Technology, 34 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 127, 144-57 
(arguing that plaintiff's financial circumstances are not relevant to whether her failure to 
report was unreasonable but not considering relevant avoidable consequences principles 
underlying second prong, which call for just such assessment of victim's unique 
circumstances). 
424 See, e.g., Hawk v. Americold Logistics, LLC, No. 02-3528,2003 WL 929221, at *9-10, 
12 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 6, 2003) (denying summary judgment for employer on grounds that 
reasonable jury could find that, notwithstanding fact that plaintiff had attended 
antiharassment training and was aware of her employer'S antiharassment policy, plaintiff's 
seven to eight month delay in reporting her direct supervisor's sexually offensive conduct 
was not unreasonable failure to either report or otherwise avoid harm when reason for 
delay was plaintiff's fear that she would lose her job given her probationary status with 
employer and her supervisor's knowledge of how important job was to plaintiff). 
425 See, e.g., Aldridge v. State, No. 96-2382-JWL, 1997 WL 614323, at *3, 8 (D. Kan. Sept. 
10, 1997) (concluding in pre-Ellerth quid pro quo context that plaintiff alleged viable quid 
pro quo claim based on threats alone where plaintiff's supervisor implicitly threatened 
plaintiff's job when he knew that plaintiff's daughter was terminally ill and, after plaintiff 
again rejected his unwelcome sexual advances, he commented, "[y]ou know if you ever lost 
this job, no one would ever insure [your daughter]" and further queried, "[h]ow would 
you ever pay for [your daughter's surgeries] without insurance?"); Showalter v. Allison 
Reed Group, Inc., 767 F. Supp. 1205, 1209 (D.R.1. 1991) (holding that plaintiff stated viable 
claim of qUid pro quo harassment pre-Ellerth where his supervisor coerced him to engage 
in unwelcome sexual acts through supervisor's threats that he would use his extensive 
connections in plaintiff's industry to ensure that plaintiff would be "blackballed from the 
industry if he did not comply" and further threatened plaintiff with "loss of his medical 
benefits if he failed to participate in the sexual activity" when supervisor had previously 
learned from plaintiff that plaintiff's son had "heart defect and had undergone three open 
heart surgeries"), affd sub nom. Phetosomphone v. Allison Reed Group, Inc., 984 F.2d 4 (1st 
Cir.1993). 
426 Lawton, supra note 349, at 257 (noting that empirical studies show that "victims do 
not report harassment because they believe that reporting will make the situation worse," 
including beliefs that reporting will "adversely affect their careers"). 
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regarded female associate in a prestigious law firm who will be 
considered for partnership promotion in one year's time. She has been 
explicitly threatened with nonadvancement by a partner responsible for 
a large portion of firm revenue. Depending on the circumstances, she 
may reasonably conclude that the least costly alternative given her 
situation is to submit. Indeed, under some circumstances, the power 
disparity alone might be enough to create a triable issue of fact as to 
whether her failure to report was unreasonable under the 
• 427 Clrcumstances. 
Moreover, many harassment victims have invested considerable time 
and effort to achieve their current level of career success and goodwill 
with their employer.428 While a victim slowly amasses success and 
goodwill in the workplace over time, it is easily lost by reporting the 
harassing conduct of a superior who possesses not only the power to hire 
and fire but, perhaps more importantly, the power to influence, if not 
make, promotion decisions. Furthermore, given the difficulty of 
building goodwill, securing a different job that is comparable in all 
respects, including goodwill, is likely to be extraordinarily difficult, if not 
virtually impossible. And although Title VII may compensate the victim 
for any loss of income, it is highly unlikely that the victim will be 
compensated for the loss of goodwill. Thus, in some circumstances, the 
victim may still be worse off for having reported the supervisor's 
harassing conduct. 
Furthermore, in fields such as law or medicine, where a specific career 
"track" consisting of a certain number of years exists, the victim who 
reports in the face of a threat of nonadvancement may end up 
unofficially "off-track" with her current employer. Because no employee 
is consistently perfect, the victim's employer will have no difficulty 
explaining that the level of scrutiny increases as the victim progresses 
toward partnership or its equivalent and that the victim's unofficial off-
track status is simply the result of the victim's failure to live up to the 
employer's standards when subjected to such increased scrutiny.429 
427 See supra text accompanying note 407. 
42S See Jordan, supra note 345, at 214-15; see also Kenneth L. Karst, The Coming Crisis of 
Work in Constitutional Perspective, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 523, 532-33 (1997) (discussing value of 
work and how "[wJork shapes individual identities in ways both general and particular"); 
Vicki Schultz, Life'S Work, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1881, 1886-92 (2000) (discussing how work in 
United States "has been constitutive of citizenship, community, and even personal 
identity"). 
429 See Estrich, supra note 322, at 835-36 (noting that proving causal element in quid pro 
quo or other discrimination claim is often difficult as "an employer can always find good 
reasons to fire people"); see also Grossman, supra note 26, at 724-25 (noting that 
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Moreover, given the high burden for retaliation claims under Title VII 
and the highly subjective nature of promotion decisions in the 
professional setting, a victim may have difficulty characterizing her 
unofficial off-track status as an "ultimate employment decision" or 
"adverse employment action" required for a retaliation claim.430 Under 
such circumstances, a jury should be permitted to assess a victim's cost-
benefit analysis and determine not whether submitting was the best 
alternative as revealed in hindsight, but whether it was simply a 
reasonable alternative under the victim's unique circumstances.431 
Given the avoidable consequences principles and the highly factual 
nature of the inquiry, courts should permit the trier of fact to consider all 
relevant aspects of the victim's circumstances in determining whether 
her decision to submit was unreasonable. It is only when the victim's 
failure to report was patently "stubborn" or similarly without any 
reasonable basis under the circumstances that an employer should 
prevail on the second prong as a matter of law. While some may argue, 
as the First Circuit observed in Reed, that the second prong potentially 
serves as a "loophole for false or overstated claims of threat by one 
hoping to reach a sympathetic jury," juries are expected to be able to 
detect false claims and evaluate both the evidence and "reasonable 
behavior in human situations.,,432 More importantly, the Court's 
opinions in Ellerth and Faragher mandate such an assessment. 
"documented consequences of reporting harassment are quite severe" and may include 
monetary consequences and, "[f]or women in professional careers, such as law, medicine, 
or academics, silence in the face of harassment may be a calculated measure to avoid losing 
the sponsorship or mentorship of an older, more established male partner, doctor, or 
tenured professor") . 
• 30 See Henry, supra note 398, at 554 (arguing that high threshold for retaliation claims 
under Title Vll is inconsistent with second prong's requirement that victims report because 
actions such as "change in job duties" or "negative evaluation" do not constitute "ultimate 
employment decisions" required for viable retaliation claim, and thus proposing more 
inclusive approach to retaliation claims); Lawton, supra note 349, at 265-66 (discussing that, 
because "[c]ourts are split on whether unfairly evaluating performance alone can trigger 
retaliation," plaintiffs who report and receive unfair performance evaluations may be 
unprotected as they may not be able to state prima facie retaliation case under Title Vll). 
431 The situations discussed in this Part V.B are Simplistic accounts for illustration 
purposes. The factors delineated are not intended as a comprehensive list of the relevant 
factors to be considered by the jury, although such factors are likely relevant in many 
situations in which harassment arises. In addition to the factors delineated in this Part, the 
jury must also consider any other aspect of the circumstances that bears on whether the 
plaintiff was reasonable in submitting rather than reporting the harassing behavior. See 
supra text accompanying notes 359, 385. 
431 Reed v. MBNA Mktg. Sys., 333 F.3d 27, 37 (1st Cir. 2003). 
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C. Illustrative Cases Applying the Second Prong 
Although not expressly basing their analysis on avoidable 
consequences principles, a small minority of courts have implicitly 
recognized the need for the trier of fact to engage in this type of cost-
benefit and context analysis when determining whether a plaintiff's 
failure to report or her submission to sexually harassing conduct was 
unreasonable under the circumstances. A case that correctly applied the 
avoidable consequences principles required under Ellerth and Faragher is 
discussed below in Part V.c.l. For comparison purposes, a case that 
failed to correctly apply the requisite avoidable consequences principles 
is included in Part V.C.2. 
1. Second Prong Correctly Applied 
In Bennett v. Progressive COrp.,433 the district court concluded that a 
triable issue of fact existed regarding whether Bennett unreasonably 
failed to report and instead submitted to her supervisor's eight-month 
campaign of unwelcome sexual advances because she feared her 
supervisor's threats of job detriment. Bennett initially ignored her 
supervisor's unwelcome conduct, but the conduct became progressively 
more severe.434 Nevertheless, she did not report the conduct because she 
needed her job, as she was financially supporting her family, her father 
was ill, her mother had lost her job, and her brother had moved in with 
her after losing his home.435 She feared retaliation because her supervisor 
had previously overburdened another employee who he disliked, which 
ultimately caused that employee to resign.436 Moreover, when Bennett 
attempted to distance herself from the supervisor, he delayed her 
projects, refused to answer work-related questions, and intimated that he 
was her "only protection" in the office.437 
Over the subsequent months, Bennett's supervisor's behavior 
continued to increase in severity both in and out of the office.438 
Although she periodically contemplated reporting her supervisor's 
conduct, she did not do so because she feared losing her job.439 
Additionally, she felt insecure about complaining to her supervisor's 
433 Bennet v. ProgreSSive Corp., 225 F. Supp. 2d 190 (N.D.N.Y. 2002). 
434 ld. at 197-98. 
435 ld. at 198. 
436 ld. 
437 ld. 
438 ld. at 199-200. 
439 ld. at 199. 
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superior because of the close personal relationship between them.440 
Ultimately, based on Bennett's fear of termination and her supervisor's 
continued and escalating pressure to coerce her into acquiescing to his 
advances, she submitted to her supervisor's sexual advances and 
ultimately had sexual intercourse with him.441 When Bennett 
subsequently threatened to file a complaint if he did not cease his 
behavior, the supervisor told her that her career with their employer 
would be over if she complained.442 Ultimately, Bennett reported her 
., d t 443 supervIsor s con uc. 
Based on these facts, the court denied the employer's motion for 
summary judgment and concluded that a jury could find that Bennett's 
failure to report the eight-month period of harassment and her 
submission to unwelcome sexual intercourse was not unreasonable.444 
The court found that Bennett's eight-month delay in reporting her 
supervisor's conduct was not dispositive.445 It reasoned that a delay of 
such length is "reasonably explained by her fear of retaliatory 
termination and the financial insecurity such termination would bring 
'th 't ,,446 WI I. 
440 ld. at 197,199. 
441 ld. at 199. 
442 ld. at 200. 
443 ld. at 201. ... ld. at 209 . 
445 ld. 
446 ld. The court noted the delay in reporting might also be explained by the fact that it 
is difficult for a plaintiff to determine when the harassment becomes actionable. ld. at n.5 
(citing Marks, supra note 349, at 1429); see also Reed v. MBNA Mktg. Sys., 333 F.3d 27, 36 
(1st Cir. 2003) (concluding as matter of law that plaintiff was not unreasonable in failing to 
report her supervisor's verbally offensive conduct that occurred months prior to sexual 
assault because plaintiff "could reasonably have regarded this low-level harassment as not 
worth reporting; indeed, standing alone, it may not have triggered Title VII liability at all"). 
Additionally, because it is difficult to determine when harassment becomes actionable, a 
victim's informal efforts to prevent harassment should be considered as evidence bearing 
on the reasonableness of the victim's actions. See, e.g., Hardy v. Univ. of Ill. at Chi., 328 
F.3d 361, 365 (7th Cir. 2003) (reversing summary judgment in favor of employer, and 
concluding that triable issue of fact existed as to whether plaintiff's six-week delay in 
reporting her supervisor's repeated sexual advances was unreasonable given her initial 
efforts to resolve situation informally through numerous requests to supervisor that he 
stop behavior). 
For a case in which the First Circuit engaged in a similar cost-benefit analysiS 
regarding whether the plaintiff's failure to report was unreasonable, see Reed, 333 F.3d at 37 
(concluding that triable issue of fact existed as to whether 17-year-old plaintiff had been 
unreasonable in failing to report that her supervisor, who was twice her age, had sexually 
assaulted her and expressly threatened discharge if she reported). 
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2. Second Prong Incorrectly Applied 
In contrast to the Bennett court's correct application of the second 
prong, one of the most egregious examples of an incorrect application of 
the second prong in the submission context and the unjust result that 
followed is seen in Samedi v. Miami-Dade County.447 Samedi was a Haitian 
native who understood448 and spoke only minimal English449 and was 
unable to read English.450 She worked as a temporary county employee, 
and her duties generally included picking up trash in the field and 
performing other custodial duties in various office environments.451 
Shortly after she began working, two of her superiors began sexually 
assaulting her.452 According to Samedi, the two superiors each forced her 
to engage in numerous unwelcome sex acts with them during working 
hours by telling her that she had to submit to them because they were 
her superiors and by threatening to fire her if she refused. 453 During 
many of the sexual assaults, she attempted to defend herself, but her 
attacker physically overwhelmed her.454 These sexual assaults spanned a 
five-year period and included numerous incidents of "digital vaginal 
penetration, sexual intercourse, and/or oral copulation.,,455 During the 
entire five-year period, Samedi remained a temporary employee.456 
Five years into Samedi's temporary employment with the county, she 
had an opportunity to meet with the county's human resources officer, at 
which time she promptly informed the officer of the sexual assaults.457 
The officer immediately began an investigation and, as a result of the 
investigation, Samedi's superiors were demoted and relocated.458 
447 206 F. Supp. 2d 1213 (S.D. Fla. 2002). 
448 Id. 
449 ld. at 1215. 
'50 ld.; Samedi v. Miami-Dade Co., 134 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 1325 (S.D. Fla. 2002). 
'51 Samedi, 206 F. Supp. 2d at 1215. 
452 Id. 
453 [d . 
• 54 ld. at 1216. 
455 ld. at 1216 n.4. Other debasing conduct included one instance in which Samedi's 
superior instructed one of her male coworkers to remove his clothing and ordered Samedi 
to join the nude coworker. [d. at 1216. She endured numerous other instances where her 
superior would refuse to take her to the restroom while she worked in the field so that she 
was relegated to urinating on public streets while her superior watched her. ld . 
• 56 [d. at 1217. 
457 Id. 
458 Id. 
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Subsequently, Samedi filed suit against her employer for sexual 
harassment.459 The county moved for summary judgment on the 
grounds that it satisfied both elements of the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative 
defense.460 Regarding the second prong, the employer alleged that 
Samedi unreasonably failed to report the five-year campaign of abuse, 
notwithstanding her temporary status and her allegations that her 
superiors had repeatedly threatened her with discharge.461 The district 
court concluded: "[N]ot only is it totally unreasonable that the [p]laintiff 
took no other action in four years to stop the alleged forcible rapes and 
harassment, but it seems inconceivable.,,462 The court stated that the first 
prong of the affirmative defense is satisfied by mere posting, and 
considered it irrelevant that Samedi never saw the employer's 
antiharassment policy, which was posted on a bulletin board at the work 
site and written only in English.463 The court noted that Samedi had 
numerous complaint avenues available to her, such as her temporary 
agency, other supervisors, the police, and fellow employees.464 It further 
surmised that "the fact that [the plaintiff] did nothing in the face of such 
extreme abuse, tends to shed some doubt on the [p ]laintiff' s 
allegations.,,465 The court also found it significant that Samedi previously 
complained to one of her abusive superiors about a coworker who 
mocked her inability to speak English and admitted that she was pleased 
with how the situation was handled.466 Accordingly, the court concluded 
that her "failure to do anything to prevent the harm she complains of 
467 was unreasonable." 
459 Id. 
460 Id. at 1218-19. 
461 Id. at 1222-23. 
462 Id at 1223. Alternatively, the court could have concluded that the lengthy delay was 
tangible evidence of the plaintiff's credible fear of job detriment. See supra text 
accompanying note 446. 
463 Samedi, 206 F. Supp. 2d at 1220. 
464 [d. at 1223. 
465 [d. 
466 Id. 
467 Id.; see also Brown v. Perry, 184 F.3d 388, 397 (4th Cir. 1999) (affirming summary 
judgment for employer, and concluding that plaintiff, whose senior supervisor had 
previously subjected her to unwelcome sexual advances and groping at work-related 
conference, "utterly failed 'to avoid harm otherwise/ll at similar work-related conference 
six months later because she "unnecessarily put herself in a situation that permitted 
repetition of precisely the same kind of advances" when, after receiving senior supervisor's 
apology for his prior conduct and his promise not to "touch her," plaintiff accepted senior 
supervisor's invitations to accompany him to two bars and later to his hotel room where he 
again subjected plaintiff to unwelcome sexual advances and groping). 
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Based on the avoidable consequences principles underlying the second 
prong of the affirmative defense, the Samedi court incorrectly applied the 
second prong. It shifted the burden of proof from the employer to 
Samedi by requiring her to demonstrate the reasonableness of her 
actions, and then failed to consider the circumstances relevant to 
whether her submission and accompanying failure to report was 
unreasonable. Specifically, the court failed to consider the fact that 
Samedi was a recent immigrant who worked in an English-speaking 
environment, but could not read and spoke and understood very little 
English. The court also did not consider it relevant that Samedi neither 
saw nor read the county's sexual harassment policy. Moreover, the court 
did not acknowledge the relevance of her financially precarious 
temporary employment status and her related hope that she would 
ultimately obtain a permanent position. The court also made no mention 
of the fact that she was physically overwhelmed by her superiors when 
sexually assaulted. 
Instead of requiring the employer to demonstrate that it created a 
working environment in which employees were made to feel 
comfortable and protected when reporting harassment, the court put the 
burden on Samedi to demonstrate a work environment in which 
harassment was rampant and reporting was futile. The court then 
excluded as irrelevant evidence of sexual harassment complaints and 
disciplinary action records relating to employees other than the 
perpetrators.468 Finally, the court ignored the fact that once Samedi came 
into contact with a human resources officer, she promptly reported the 
conduct. 
Although a jury could have concluded that Samedi's submission and 
failure to report was unreasonable, the circumstances represent perhaps 
the quintessential example of a triable issue of fact regarding the 
reasonableness of her actions. Nevertheless, the court usurped the jury's 
role, shifted the burden of proof from the employer to Samedi, ignored 
the pertinent circumstances in which she found herself, and concluded 
that her submission and failure to report was unreasonable as a matter of 
law. This outcome directly conflicts with the result mandated by Ellerth 
and Faragher. 
468 Such evidence had been submitted by the plaintiff in opposition to an earlier 
summary judgment motion on her civil rights and Title VII sexual harassment claim. 
Samedi, 134 F. Supp. 2d at 1330-31. 
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CONCLUSION 
While supervisory sexual extortion is no less pernicious than it was 
prior to 1998, the employer liability standards for this classic quid pro 
quo scenario changed following the Court's decisions in Burlington 
Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth469 and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton.470 Instead of 
holding an employer strictly liable for supervisory sexual extortion due 
to the supervisor's use of official power and the deleterious effects that 
the supervisor's conduct has on a submission victim, Ellerth and Faragher 
focused on whether the employer's official decision-making processes 
were implicated in the supervisor's conduct, as evidenced by a tangible 
employment action. Under this new framework, strict liability is 
appropriate only when the supervisor takes a tangible employment 
action against a subordinate for refusing to submit to the supervisor's 
unwelcome sexual advances. 
In the submission context, a sexual extortion victim will be unable to 
make the necessary showing to impose strict liability under Ellerth and 
Faragher because her submission enabled her to avoid the job detriment 
required for a tangible employment action. In the absence of a tangible 
employment action, a submission plaintiff's circumstances must be 
evaluated as a hostile environment claim. Thus, a submission plaintiff 
must first demonstrate that she was subjected to an actionable hostile 
environment. If she makes the necessary showing, her employer can 
then assert and prove the two-prong affirmative defense. Under the 
second prong as currently, and incorrectly, applied by many lower 
courts, most employers would likely prevail on a summary judgment 
motion regarding submission claims. This leaves submission plaintiffs 
without vindication of their rights or compensation for their injuries in 
circumstances where the submission was not unreasonable. 
Under the approach to the second prong advanced in this Article, the 
result may be dramatically different if juries are permitted to consider 
the submission plantiff's unique circumstances in light of the harm-
avoidance principles of the avoidable consequences doctrine. While not 
exhaustive, the critical factors in the harm-avoidance analysis include an 
assessment of whether the victim possessed a credible fear of harm, the 
victim's working environment, and the perceived consequences of the 
victim's refusal to submit. Following Ellerth and Faragher, the jury 
should be permitted to consider these and any other relevant factors 
presented by the circumstances to determine whether the plaintiff's 
469 524 U.S. 742 (1998). 
47. 524 U.S. 775 (1998). 
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submission was unreasonable in light of the surrounding circumstances. 
Put in harm-avoidance terms, the jury should be given an opportunity to 
assess whether the victim faced two competing harms and to further 
assess the reasonableness of the submission victim's actions in light of 
those competing harms. 
As Judge Reinhardt aptly stated in Nichols v. Frank: "[N]othing is more 
destructive of human dignity than being forced to perform sexual acts 
against one's Will.,,471 While this is undoubtedly true, being forced to 
perform sexual acts against one's will is even more destructive when the 
employer avoids liability altogether because the jury is not permitted to 
hear evidence regarding why the decision to submit was not 
unreasonable under the circumstances. Under the approach to the 
second prong advanced in this Article, such a result is far less likely to 
occur. 
471 42 F.3d 503, 510 (9th Cir. 1994). 
